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FOOD LAW & POLICY: AN ESSAY
Peter Barton Hutt*
INTRODUCTION
Food has been the driving preoccupation of humans since the
dawn of evolution. Exactly when food processing began and when the
original hunter-gatherers settled down to develop agriculture-or
even the question of which of these occurred first-remain issues of
scholarly pursuit and debate. It is clear, however, that these events
occurred millennia before the advent of recorded history; therefore,
we must rely on largely adventitious discoveries of archeological arti-
facts to advance our developing knowledge of these events.
Inevitably, the development of stable societies and organized agri-
culture required the establishment of rules to govern common behav-
ior and shared expectations regarding the available food supply.
These rules-the earliest manifestation of food law and policy-were
undoubtedly first considered simply mutual understandings and com-
munal practice. By the time of our earliest recorded history, in the
clay tablets of ancient Samaria, these laws and policies had already
been reduced to formal requirements and prohibitions that were en-
forced through severe penalties.
From these ancient clay tablets to the present, there is a vast
unexplored treasure trove of food law and policy to be researched and
documented in every part of the world. This task is as enormous and
challenging as it is exciting and rewarding. Laws and policies never
before uncovered or analyzed are waiting to be revealed and studied.
* Peter Barton Hutt is a senior counsel in the Washington, D.C. law firm of
Covington & Burling, specializing in food and drug law. He teaches a full course on
food and drug law at Harvard Law School during Winter Term and taught the same
course at Stanford Law School during Spring Term 1998. Mr. Hutt is the co-author of
the nation's leading food and drug law textbook (PETER BARTON HUTT AND RICHARD
A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS, (2d ed. 1991)), serves on
several journal editorial boards, and has published numerous papers on food and
drug law and health policy. From 1971 to 1975 he served as Chief Counsel for the
Food and Drug Administration, and he currently serves as legal counsel for numerous
trade and industry groups connected to the food industry.
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Until now, there has been no publication to serve as a focal point
for this scholarly research. This new Journal of Food Law & Policy fills
that void. Future research on food law and policy, from ancient times
to the present, and spanning the entire world, now has a welcome
home. This represents a propitious and long-overdue advance in
scholarship, and the University of Arkansas School of Law must be
congratulated for recognizing the importance of this field and seizing
the opportunity to serve an unmet need.
THE BROAD SCOPE OF FOOD LAW AND POLICY
Because food provides the sustenance we must have to survive,
food law and policy encompasses social, cultural, and personal beliefs
and biases that cannot be ignored. For example, the current differ-
ences between the United States and Europe with respect to the mar-
keting of cheese made from unpasteurized milk, the use of growth-
promoting hormones in cattle, and the European distrust of geneti-
cally modified organisms in the food supply emanate more from a
deep cultural divide than from any scientific disagreement.
Religious practice can be an equally potent consideration. The
longstanding debate on whether the Jewish dietary laws were based on
empirical evidence that some food contributed to human disease and
therefore should be prohibited, or whether these laws were based sim-
ply upon ancient practice and superstition, will undoubtedly never be
resolved. The complexity of the Jewish laws governing proper grace
before partaking food, and requiring that agricultural land lay fallow
every seventh year, aptly demonstrates the power of religion in our
food law and policy.
Many erroneously assume that food law is limited to the govern-
mental laws and regulations governing the marketing of food within a
particular jurisdiction. For example, the United States Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) has complex statutory requirements and
prohibitions for all food products and food ingredients marketed in
the United States. The United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) has equally complex requirements and prohibitions specifi-
cally governing meat, poultry, and egg products. A true understand-
ing of food law and policy, however, extends far beyond these narrow
confines. It includes, for example, issues relating to the ownership of
agricultural property, the water rights needed to sustain agriculture,
tax incentives to preserve family farms, agricultural research and edu-
cation, governmental economic programs to prevent agricultural sur-
plus and to stabilize agricultural prices, food distribution programs
for school children and the poor, programs designed to provide nutri-
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tion education and now to prevent obesity, and a host of other poli-
cies that impinge on food and agriculture.
Neither FDA nor USDA comprises the boundaries of the federal
agencies that directly establish food law and policy. The Federal
Trade Commission regulates food advertising. The Alcohol and To-
bacco Tax and Trade Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, and Firearms) specifically regulates alcoholic beverages.
Drinking water is subject to regulation by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency. The National Marine Fisheries Service of the Depart-
ment of Commerce inspects fish. Postal fraud involving food is
subject to legal action by the United States Postal Department. The
Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulates worker
health and safety in food plants and on the farm. The pesticides that
are used to facilitate the growth of raw agricultural commodities are
registered and regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency.
The same proliferation of agencies that regulate the food industry at
the federal level exists at the state level as well.
APPRECIATING THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
FOOD LAW AND POLICY
There are many issues in food law and policy that have not
changed throughout recorded history. One of the earliest clay tablets
in ancient Samaria made it a crime for an innkeeper to provide a false
measure of ale. A fundamental right established in the Magna Carta
of 1215 was the guarantee of a uniform standard for weights and mea-
sures throughout England. Laws throughout the world, including the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), maintain that tradi-
tion today.
In medieval London, each baker was required to write his name
on each of his bread products so that a consumer could have recourse
in the event of an adulterated product. Today, all food products sold
in the United States, and in most of the world, are required to bear
the name and address of the manufacturer or distributor, for precisely
the same reason.
Laws prohibiting the adulteration and misbranding of food-al-
though not written in those precise terms-can be found in every civi-
lized country from ancient Greece and Rome to the present, At the
outset, these laws were designed to protect the economic expectation
of food purchasers. The Greek botanist Theophrastus, the Roman ag-
riculturalist Cato, the Roman naturalist Pliny the Elder, the Greek bot-
anist Dioscorides, and the Roman physician Galen, all describe
common practices in ancient Greece and Rome of adultering com-
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mon food ingredients and food products. At that time, the legal pro-
hibition against adulteration was based upon economic concern, not
on safety grounds. (Indeed, the term "safety" was first used in food
statutes within the past hundred years.) It was not until Frederick Ac-
cum published his landmark treatise on food adulteration in 1820
that food adulteration was identified as a safety, as well as an eco-
nomic, issue.
Conflicts in the regulation of food between national and local
jurisdictions have existed since the Middle Ages. In England, Parlia-
ment enacted food requirements for the entire country, the City of
London enacted rules for local application, and each of the food
trade guilds enforced standards for all members of that particular
guild; the courts imposed judge-made common law as well. Through-
out history, every European nation has established its own require-
ments regarding the food supply. Even after creation of the Euro-
pean Union, disparities among European food laws continue to exist
at the individual country level. In the United States, food law was ini-
tially a matter of city, county, and state jurisdiction. It was not until
the early twentieth century that federal food laws were first enacted.
As a result, disparities between federal and state food requirements
persist to this day.
International trade barriers and trade wars have similarly existed
throughout history. Pliny the Elder told the amusing story that, in
order to protect against foreign competition in the spice trade, the
Arab countries spread rumors that cassia grew in shallow lakes pro-
tected by winged creatures and cinnamon grew in deep glens infested
with poisonous snakes. In the 1890s, European countries and the
United States passed a plethora of protectionist laws against importa-
tion of cattle and other livestock. Today, even with the World Trade
Organization attempting to arbitrate, the same countries are locked in
disputes about the use of growth hormones and genetically modified
organisms.
The disparity among nations in all aspects of food law and policy
defies description. No two countries provide for the identical ap-
proach to food labeling. No two countries authorize the identical
food ingredients. Indeed, the very approach by which the food supply
is regulated differs widely throughout the world. In some countries,
everything is allowed that is not prohibited. In others, everything is
prohibited that is not allowed. Taking only our very friendly neighbor
to the north, even after the North American Free Trade Agreement,
food products that are permitted in the United States are prohibited
in Canada and the reverse is equally true.
[VOL. 1: 1
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Analysis of government food policy is easier in some countries
than in others. In the United States, the 1966 Freedom of Informa-
don Act permits access to internal government documents that were
completely unavailable before the enactment of this landmark statute.
For years, European nations declined to follow the same approach.
Only now is the European Union moving toward a greater openness
that will facilitate better public understanding of governmental action
and more complete scholarly evaluation of the development of Euro-
pean food policy.
The placement of a federal regulatory agency, and the scope of
its jurisdiction as determined in the organizing statute, is an impor-
tant element of food law and policy. FDA was incubated in the United
States Patent Office in the mid-1800s, became a part of USDA when it
was first created in 1862, and was then consecutively made a part of
the Federal Security Agency in 1939, the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare in 1953, and now the Department of Health and
Human Services since 1979. During all that time, it was only an ad-
ministrative creation, without a statutory base. Only in 1988 did Con-
gress, at long last, create FDA by statute. When FDA was taken out of
USDA in 1939, the regulation of meat was left behind-laterjoined by
the regulation of poultry and eggs. Ever since, there has been intense
debate about whether these two regulatory programs should be re-
united and, if so, whether that should occur in USDA or in the De-
partment of Health and Human Services.
The very structure of a regulatory statute has enormous influence
on the way that the agency implements the statute, and on the eco-
nomic impact it has on the regulated industry and the economy as a
whole. There is a clear hierarchy of regulatory controls. At the top is
the requirement of premarket approval. At the bottom is simple po-
licing of the marketplace. Coming down from the top, there is
premarket notification, premarket testing, compliance with standards,
and perhaps other forms of regulatory control. There has been little
or no scholarly investigation of the factors that lead to a choice among
these various methods of regulatory control or the differential impact
that results from that choice. The success and failure of some of these
statutory controls, when implemented by a food regulatory agency,
has similarly been the subject of little scrutiny. This is a field that is
wide open for serious investigation.
Each statute, each regulation, each guidance, and each statement
of policy relating to the regulation of food represents the culmination
of a deliberative process both within and without the government; and
each one also expresses new policy objectives and methods of imple-
mentation. Each of these documents has its own history that, when
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uncovered, reveals both the process and the substance involved.
Whether one searches the legislative history in congressional hear-
ings, reports, and debates, or delves into the administrative history
available under the Freedom of Information Act, the trade press, Fed-
eral Register notices, and informal materials, the exploration is cer-
tain to lead to greater insight into the development of our food law
and policy in the United States.
Without understanding the historical context of a statute, and the
perceived problems that the new law was intended to address, neither
the provisions of the law nor the policy that they are intended to em-
body can truly be understood. The 1906 publication of Upton Sin-
clair's novel, The Jungle, in the United States triggered enactment of
both the Federal Meat Inspection Act and the Federal Food and
Drugs Act later that year. Twenty-seven years of congressional hear-
ings and USDA reports had prepared the country for this type of legis-
lation. In contrast, the 1975 publication of Yuri Olesha's comparable
novel, Envy, in communist Russia provoked little or no public reac-
tion. Some events have triggered enormous public response, while
others have fallen on deaf ears.
For food, as in any other area, politics plays a large role in the
consideration of all legislation. A public tragedy can assure the imme-
diate consideration and enactment of protective legislation, as it did
with the Infant Formula Act of 1980, and political ideology can spell
doom for even the most venerable of statutes, as it did with the repeal
of the ninety-nine-year-old Tea Act in 1996. Tracing the statutory and
regulatory history of individual food products can be particularly re-
warding. The debate between Cato and Pliny the Elder in the 1st cen-
tury A.D. on "adjusting" wine (by the addition of functional ingre-
dients) parallels the fight of Harvey W. Wiley against adulteration of
blended whiskey in the early 1900s.
The Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906 was a relatively short
and simple statute. Its legislative history, which extends back to 1879,
has never been published, nor has it been the subject of thorough
research and scholarship. The 1906 Act was amended fewer than ten
times before its repeal in 1938. It was one of the most important stat-
utes in American history because it transformed our entire food sup-
ply. Yet the history of this remarkable piece of legislation between
1906, and the time it was repealed in 1938 and replaced with our cur-
rent law, is sparse and inadequate.
The FDCA is often erroneously viewed as a comprehensive or-
ganic statute. In fact, it began as a relatively short and simple law, and
has since been amended more than one hundred times. The inter-
play between the broad and general provisions of the original FDCA,
[VOL. 1: 1
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and the extraordinarily detailed and complex provisions that have
been added more recently, offers endless opportunity for thoughtful
analysis. The very complexity of the FDCA, as currently amended, is a
tempting invitation for a comprehensive recodification. Yet the only
attempt made at recodification was rebuffed, even in the era of the
relatively simple provisions in the statute that existed in the 1950s.
The annual ritual of the appropriations process offers scholars a
vast source of historical material about the policy that underpins im-
plementation of our food laws. Each year in the United States a gov-
ernment agency must submit voluminous materials to Congress
describing the past year's achievements and projecting plans for the
coming year. All of these materials are fully available to the public.
Members of the appropriations committees hold tremendous power
over regulatory agencies. In the early 1950s, for example, Representa-
tive John Taber from western New York became incensed at the regu-
latory action taken by FDA's Buffalo District Office against a
constituent's dried raspberries, and using his position on the House
Appropriations Committee, he engineered a drastic cut in FDA
budget. It took nearly a decade before the agency recovered. In con-
trast, beginning in 1992 Congress has now enacted user fee statutes to
help fund FDA premarket approval process for new drugs, new animal
drugs, and medical devices, but not for food additives. The ability of
any governmental agency to implement its statutory mandate to pro-
tect and promote the food supply can only be appreciated in the con-
text of the resources available to carry out its mission.
The process by which government food policy is adopted is often
as important as the substantive policy itself, because process can di-
rectly influence that substance. Prior to the 1930s, FDA simply an-
nounced its regulations and other policies without the need for any
form of public process. With the enactment of the Federal Register
Act in 1935 and the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, however,
this changed dramatically. The Federal Register Act required publica-
tion of all significant proposed and final regulations, notices, policy
statements, and other regulatory documents. The Administrative Pro-
cedure Act required public participation in the development of regu-
lations. Not content simply to implement these statutes, FDA in turn
published its own comprehensive procedural regulations in the 1970s
to govern all aspects of the agency's work and added the self-imposed
requirement of lengthy preambles to proposed and final regulations
in order to explain their intended meaning and rationale. No other
United States agency has followed suit. A thorough evaluation of the
impact of these experiments, as an administrative technique for im-
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plementing food law and policy, would be a welcome addition to the
published literature.
The evolution and application of enforcement powers and penal-
ties, and the way that they are used, often reveals a great deal about
social mores as well as effective compliance action. The Medieval En-
glish custom of leading a guilty butcher through the streets with a
piece of putrid meat around the neck may not have been a serious
deprivation of liberty, but it was undoubtedly a more effective deter-
rent than the warning letters or civil fines that prevail today. The ef-
fectiveness of the unique imposition of strict criminal liability (without
knowledge or intent) for violation of the food provisions of the FDCA
deserves comparison with the penalties under other regulatory stat-
utes both here and abroad.
Under most food laws, there are both formal enforcement pow-
ers (specified in the statute) and informal compliance mechanisms
(not granted under the statute) that emerge from the administrative
agency responsible for implementing the law. The criteria used by
administrative agencies in determining what enforcement powers to
use, and what penalties to impose, vary over time and among different
countries. In the United States, FDA relied almost exclusively upon
formal enforcement powers during the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury and relied on informal compliance mechanisms during the sec-
ond half of the century. European food law, in contrast, was poorly
enforced before the development of the European Union, and only
now is becoming the subject of the same type of tough enforcement
for which FDA has been known.
More than one United States constitutional scholar has pointed
out that most important principles of United States constitutional law
have been developed in the context of food regulation in general, and
milk regulation in particular. The power of both state and federal
governments to regulate private business in order to protect not only
the public health and safety, but also the economic stability of the
industry, and the power of the federal government over intrastate as
well as interstate commerce, have all been adjudicated by the Su-
preme Court in the context of food legislation. In Europe, the au-
thority of the new European Union to override national law in order
to achieve a common marketplace was decided by the European High
Court of Justice in the context of a sixteenth century German statute
regulating beer.
THE EvER-CHANGING Focus OF FOOD LAW AND POLICY
A close study of the historical development of food law and policy
reveals that virtually all new developments are based upon advances in
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science, not upon new legal insight. The Assize of Bread and Ale of
1266 in England prohibited the addition to bread and ale of any sub-
stance "not wholesome for Man's body." That statute remained in
force, without amendment, until it was repealed in 1844. Today, our
FDCA prohibits the addition to food of any "poisonous or deleterious
substance that may render it injurious to health." Thus, a full 738
years after Parliament enacted the 1266 statute, we are unable to
come up with any more articulate or specific statutory requirement to
assure the safety of the food supply.
There is a world of difference, however, between what was availa-
ble to the English in enforcing the 1266 statute and the exquisite ana-
lytical methodology and toxicological knowledge available to FDA to
enforce the FDCA today. In short, the history of the development of
food regulation is the history of science, not the history of laws and
regulations.
Perhaps there is no better example of the importance of the de-
velopment of scientific knowledge to the implementation of food law
and policy than the extraordinary impact of analytical methodology.
Although food adulteration was commonplace in ancient Greece and
Rome, it was difficult to detect because of the primitive nature of ana-
lytical methodology. Pliny the Elder contended that food adultera-
tion could be detected "by smell, color, weight, taste, and the action of
fire." Nonetheless, most subtle adulterations went undetected and un-
punished. Merchants set up a system of "garbeling" in order to sepa-
rate the genuine pepper from the garbel (the adulterating materials)
in the Dark Ages and Middle Ages, when pepper was used for cur-
rency, medicine, and as a spice. When chemistry emerged out of al-
chemy, one of the greatest seventeenth century scientists, Robert
Boyle, wrote the first modern tract on the use of analytical chemistry
to detect the adulteration of food through specific gravity. Frederick
Accum's 1820 treatise offered detailed chemical methods for the de-
tection of adulterated food, Arthur Hassall pioneered the use of the
microscope to determine food adulteration in the mid-1800s, and
thereafter public analysts were established in England to assure the
purity of the food supply. Yet FDA Commissioner C.A. Browne, writ-
ing in 1909, complained that the ability of the agency to detect food
adulteration at that time was little better than it was in the time of
Pliny the Elder. Just fifty years later, however, the sensitivity of analyti-
cal methodology had improved to two parts per billion or less, and
today it can reach below a part per quintillion. The problem today is
not finding adulteration, but understanding what regulatory action is
or is not appropriate once an adulterant is detected.
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The discovery and development of the field of toxicology had
been as important to the evolution of food law and policy as the im-
provement in analytical methodology. From earliest times, the safety
of the food supply could only be determined by human trial and error
or by watching the dietary habits of wild animals. In the sixteenth
century, Paracelsus enunciated the founding principle of toxicology-
that everything is a poison and nothing is a poison, because the differ-
ence between a poison and a remedy is the dose-but no one was able
to elucidate how to determine the boundary between a safe and un-
safe dose for another four hundred years.
In the early 1900s, Harvey W. Wiley sought to publicize the need
for a national food and drug law by testing the safety of the five most
widely-used food preservatives: boric acid and borax, salicylic acid and
salicylates, sulfurous acid and sulfites, benzoic acid and benzoate, and
formaldehyde. He chose the only means by which food safety could
be determined at that time-he fed them to a "poison squad" of
twelve USDA employees during 1902 throughl904. The reports were
long on clinical chemistry but very short on pharmacologic analysis,
because the field of toxicology had not yet been discovered. When
industry complained directly to President Theodore Roosevelt about
Wiley's conclusion that one of the ingredients was unsafe, the Presi-
dent convened a panel of five eminent scientists to resolve the dis-
pute. Those scientists then resorted to the only means available to
address the issue in 1911: they fed the ingredient to their students.
This was less than a hundred years ago.
Within a decade, however, researchers began to develop colonies
of inbred laboratory animals to replace human testing. Even then,
there was substantial scientific debate and uncertainty about how to
interpret the animal test results and apply those results to ascertain
safe consumption levels for humans. Regulatory necessity ultimately
led to the solution. Following the Elixir Sulfanilamide tragedy in the
fall of 1937 (when more than 100 people died because the product
contained diethylene glycol, a highly toxic compound), FDA toxicolo-
gists obtained all of the data from the humans who took that ill-fated
medicine and compared that data with animal feeding studies on the
same product. They discovered that there was a ten-fold variation in
the lethal dose of diethylene glycol both among humans and among
test animals. Multiplying ten by ten, the FDA scientists concluded that
a safety factor of 100 to one was appropriate. From then to this day,
the safety of a food ingredient has been determined in part by divid-
ing the highest no observed effect level (NOEL) in test animals by a
factor of 100. In this and many other ways, government regulatory
officials charged with protecting the safety of the food supply have
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made substantial advances not just in regulatory science but in a more
fundamental appreciation of basic science itself.
Some of the old food laws have become obsolete, and new laws
have been substituted, because of the changed circumstances. In Me-
dieval England, it was essential to enact laws that closely regulated the
amount of livestock to be kept on each farm, in order to assure an
adequate food supply. It was the very tyranny of these laws that lead
one-third of the population of England to leave their homeland and
settle in the American Colonies. Today, we have quite a different
problem. Even with a smaller acreage and a larger population, we
have a surplus of food. Thus, our laws today are designed to reduce
production in order to bring it more closely in line with consumer
demand both here and abroad.
Some old regulatory programs have acquired new uses over many
centuries. The food standards of ancient Rome constituted an elabo-
rate price-fixing program, designed to assure that there would be no
price gouging on a staple food product. A fixed price (set by the gov-
ernment) was all that could be charged for a particular quantity and
type of bread. England continued this tradition through the Assize of
Bread and Ale, and reinforced it by prohibiting the forestalling, re-
grating, and engrossing of any food. Today the role of food standards
is quite different. When first authorized under the FDCA in 1938,
food standards were intended to assure the safety of the permitted
ingredients and to preserve the defining characteristics and nutri-
tional quality of the food involved. With the advent of the Food Addi-
tives Amendment of 1958 the need for food standards to assure food
ingredient safety disappeared. And with the explosion of modern
food technology, FDA itself has questioned whether there is any re-
maining justification for food standards.
CONCLUSION
There is an inexhaustible amount of material to be uncovered
and analyzed, and an enormous body of literature to be developed, on
the history and current status of food law and policy both in the
United States and abroad. In 2006 we will be celebrating the 100th
anniversary of the original Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906 and
also the 740th anniversary of the Assize of Bread and Ale of 1266. The
Journal of Food Law & Policy has been established just in time to partici-
pate in this celebration and lead the way into the future. Because of
the central importance of food in all of our lives, food law and policy






Author's Note: This essay is a companion to the essay 'Food Democracy, "which
appears in 9 DRAKE JOuRNAL OF AGRICULTURAL LAw 9 (2004). In that
essay, the author discussed many of the progressive trends that are helping
reshape America's food system. These trends have a common denominator in
their reflection of the democratic tendencies of the American populace. The de-
sire of an increasing number of consumers to eat better food and to have access
to the information, choices, and alternatives that make better food available
are helping drive shifts in food production and marketing. Accompanying
these shifts are political and legal debates over fundamental policy issues that
relate to food labeling, support for local food production, the emergence of eco-
labels, and examination of the relation between nutrition and public health.
Arrayed against the emergence of these new economic and policy develop-
ments are the institutions and values of the conventional food and agricultural
sector, which the author collectively describes as Big Food. He argues the emer-
gence and recognition of 'Food Democracy" is a valuable development for help-
ing America examine the future of the food and agricultural system. In this
essay, the author provides further amplification of his thesis, in part using the
recent "mad cow" incident to illuminate some of the differences in values and
attitudes between Big Food and Food Democracy.
I. AMERICANS AND FOOD: Do WE KNOW WHAT WE WANT?
"It is impossible for Americans to think rationally about their
food choices. We have no framework to evaluate risks in our diet!"
thundered my colleague, a law professor from the University of Min-
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an edited version of his latest book, FOOD DEMOCRACY, which will be published in
2005.
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nesota. We were in Atlanta at the Association of American Law
Schools convention, taking part in a session that I had organized enti-
tled "Food, Agriculture, and the First Amendment." It was 8:30 on a
Sunday morning in earlyJanuary 2004, but the crowd was respectable.
This was surprising, given the time slot and the history of the Agricul-
tural Law Section in drawing crowds at a conference where sessions on
the high-flying intellectual subjects that stimulate legal academics (Is-
lamic Law was big that year) tend to be more popular than sessions on
the real-life topics shaping society.
Our session was designed to consider the irony of how cases in-
volving health claims on food and drug labels, and commodity promo-
tions, are providing grist for the United States Supreme Court's mill
of first amendment free speech analysis. The controversy over the re-
cent discovery of bovine spongiform encephalopathy ("BSE" or "mad
cow" disease), in our food supply resulted in the discussion quickly
turning to the ability of various label statements, such as "natural,"
"GMO free," and "no added hormones," to aide consumers in their
food choices.
My colleague, a brilliant but notoriously outspoken provocateur,
was bemoaning how all the various label claims (what he called "food
as love" statements) were confusing, unnecessary, designed to make
consumers worry about their food and, in effect, waste their money.
His comments were predictable, given his scholarship on libertarian
free-market themes, but it was the comment with which his rant began
that caught my attention. "In our house, the terms organic, free
range, and natural are all I hear. My wife doesn't even let me near the
grocery store to buy food anymore!"
There, in a nutshell, was my colleague's conundrum and perhaps
the source of his frustration. He does not worry about BSE or pesti-
cides in the food supply, because he understands the economic ratio-
nalizations we use and considers the personal risks minimal. His wife,
however, decides what food to buy and what food to serve on his table,
and she does worry about these issues and acts to reduce the risks she
perceives for her loved ones. In doing so, she is supporting people
who market clean food and work to create alternatives to the conven-
tional global industrialized food system (what we will call Big Food).
I do not know my colleague's wife, but it sounds like she may be a
closet food democrat, (or at least have those tendencies), something
that no doubt frustrates the hell out of her professor husband. While
he fights the good fight to keep the government off the back of Big
Food and to protect consumers from wasting money on soft-headed,
warm-hearted claims, the food dollars in his home are spent on "food
as love." What is a fellow to do?
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II. FOOD DEMOCRACY AND BIG FOOD: PREDICTING THE REACTION
Knowing my colleague's views on "food as love," if I had taken
time to tell him about this writing project, his response to the idea of
Food Democracy would have been predictable. If I can channel his
acerbic tongue, he might label it "a feel-good gloss for the nostalgic
yearnings of food snobs and pretend farmers." Undoubtedly, oppo-
nents will criticize Food Democracy, charging it represents an elitist's
dream world, peopled by mocha-sipping liberals who work weekend
gardens and are more concerned with the newest variety of arugula
than whether the poor can afford to eat. For these critics, the success
of Wal-Mart (which is now the largest grocer in the nation) and the
growing demand for McDonald's and fast food (even in light of the
surging attention to obesity and health) are evidence that Big Food
not only provides people with what they want to eat but what they can
afford to eat. Critics of Food Democracy claim that regular people
cannot afford to buy high-priced organic food, shop at farmers' mar-
kets, or worry about whether their steaks are locally grown or hu-
manely raised. Attacking supporters of "good food" as elitists is a
favored line of argument from the Dennis Averys I of the world, and
from others fronting for Big Food. Their weapons include industry-
funded public relation campaigns, such as Avery's "milk-is-milk" effort
attacking organic dairies.
The charge of elitism is largely unsubstantiated; but like many
such charges, it has just enough patina of logic to offer shelter for
those trying to deflect the criticism of Big Food that is inherent in the
food-democracy movement. Isn't organic food more expensive, and
doesn't Wal-Mart succeed by driving down costs, which forces compet-
itors and locally-owned grocers to do the same thing? Doesn't "all-
natural" meat, like that sold by Niman Ranch, cost more? Isn't it un-
likely that you can raise sufficient quantities of "locally-grown" pro-
duce during the winter in much of the country? The answer to all of
these questions is yes, or at least a qualified yes; and if that is where
the inquiry starts and stops, then the virtues of Big Food will triumph
and continue unchallenged. There is more to the story, however,
than these simple questions; there must be, or all of the powerful
1. See, e.g., Betsy Tao, A Stitch in Time: Addressing the Environmental, Health, and
Animal Welfare Effects of China's Expanding Meat Industry, 15 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. J. 321
(2003) ("Some, like Dennis Avery, Director of the Center for Global Food Issues at
the Hudson Institute and senior agricultural analyst in the United States Department
of State, make the argument that given the growth of the world's population and its
growing affluence, factory farms, along with biotechnology and intensive crop farm-
ing, are essential for providing the world with an adequate food supply.").
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trends reshaping America's food system, such as organic food, locally-
grown food, eco-labels, farmers' markets, and more signify nothing.
Organic food can cost more, depending on where it is purchased,
although the price spreads are coming down. No one claims, how-
ever, that organic food is the only measure of a Food Democracy.
Trying to equate any effort to improve agriculture with "organic"
is a favored tactic of Big Agriculture, used since the early days of the
sustainable agriculture movement in the late 1980s. Critics who felt
threatened by efforts to examine the use of inputs such as fertilizer
and pesticides, which when overused can damage the environment,
used the "0" word to scare farmers away from entertaining such her-
esy. The beauty of sustainable agriculture as a philosophy and re-
search goal, however, is how it marries the farmer's need to show a
profit with looking for ways to protect the environment. If research
shows how to produce the same amount of corn while reducing the
application of nitrogen fertilizer by half, why continue to buy more
fertilizer than needed and pollute the water supply with more fertil-
izer than the plants can use? The only people threatened by new
knowledge like this are the ones selling nitrogen fertilizer.
Knowledge and good examples, which help farmers find better
ways to produce food, helped "sustainable agriculture" triumph and
thrive despite the efforts of many to derail it. This observation holds
true today for the Food Democracy movement. There will be plenty
of people willing to challenge the ideas and examples it reflects, but it
is always wise to investigate the motives of one's critics.
On the organic front, the ground under the supporters of Big
Food is shifting as more food companies like Kraft Foods, Tyson
Foods, Campbell's Soup, and others move quickly to capitalize on the
growing demand for organic foods. The mainstreaming of organic
food makes it hard for people to brandish the term as an insult used
to denigrate the motives or practices of farmers. The irony is how
United States Department of Agriculture's ("USDA's") new national
organic standard raises concerns for many pioneers in the organic
community. Most traditional organic farmers adhere to organic prin-
ciples because they believe that they are better for the land, the food,
and their families. Legally, however, it was not possible to include all
of the organic farmers' values in the USDA's rules for using the na-
tional organic label, even assuming USDA had wanted to include
them. As a result, organic pioneers worry the industrialization of or-
ganic food is driving down prices and forcing small farmers out of the
market. They are concerned that many "new" organic companies are
simply in the business for money and do not share the more funda-
mental and philosophical goals of those who farm without chemicals.
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These fears cause some observers to believe that the success of organic
foods threatens the integrity of organic farming as an alternative to
conventional agriculture. This may be true, but it is also unrealistic to
think that one term, be it organic, local, natural, or whatever word you
choose, can carry an unlimited amount of philosophical baggage
about farming practices, worker standards, community ethics, or
other goals for promotion through food products.
The important lesson of the growth and "success" of organic food
is how it demonstrates that many people are concerned about what
they eat and are willing to spend time and money to find foods they
believe are, in some way, better for them. There is no reason to be-
lieve that the only way for farmers to serve these consumers is through
organic food. Organic food is just one important alternative among
many.
It is true that Wal-Mart has quickly become the nation's leading
grocer, but questions have been raised about social and economic
costs to the communities it is transforming and the workers it em-
ploys. In the press, a steady stream of news articles question the im-
pact Wal-Mart is having on society. The scrutiny may not slow its
growth, but the articles revealing the power and domination of Big-
ness, whether in food marketing or in any other part of our economic
or social life, are hardly benign. The scrutiny of how food is produced
and marketed is the healthy product of an open democratic system
that not only protects freedom of speech but values the role local gov-
ernments play in making decisions about land use and other public
issues. Wal-Mart and McDonald's are not the only examples of the
trend toward Bigness in America; they are just the most visible evi-
dence of shifts in food retailing and of the pressure to reduce prices
and serve consumers.
In fact, one can argue that Wal-Mart and McDonald's are exam-
ples of Food Democracy in action. By reducing prices and increasing
the availability of foods, Wal-Mart is helping low-income citizens, and
price-conscious shoppers of all incomes, spend less money on food so
they have more to spend on life's other necessities and pleasures. By
feeding millions of people each day, McDonald's has the potential to
be a positive source of information regarding health and nutrition.
What could be more democratic than giving folks an alternative place
to shop and save money? What better expression of America's free-
doms than to see the success of old Sam Walton's dream of bringing
everyday low prices to citizens across the country?
Of course, most of the people easily described as Food Democrats
do not see Wal-Mart or McDonald's as friends. To them, they person-
ify the values and evils of Big Food, the domination of large powerful
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businesses over smaller local businesses, spreading a universal season-
less cuisine of food sourced from anywhere in the world, with cost
rather than quality as the defining goal.
No doubt there is much truth to these concerns, but the reality is
that both parts of the food system need to, and will, exist. The market
for Wal-Mart is undeniable, as is the growing interest in local food.
The same is true for McDonald's. Offering consumers options to buy
healthy, nutritious, and delicious locally-grown food, does not mean
that other popular and affordable options must disappear. While
there may be some competition between these two parts of the food
system, a healthier way to view their coexistence is as counterbalances
on different ends of a social scale. Farmers' markets and other ave-
nues of promoting local food stand as a contrast and provide an alter-
native to Wal-Mart just as small bistros and home-cooked meals, slow
or otherwise, are alternatives to McDonald's.
The key democratic value at stake here is the ability to choose,
which requires having alternatives between which to choose. If peo-
ple have concerns about Big Food, then locally-grown food can be an
alternative. If you think local food is too expensive, then Wal-Mart is
an alternative. The real threat to the ideal of Food Democracy is if
either of the two cannot exist to serve as a balance and an alternative.
The future of Wal-Mart or McDonald's does not seem in doubt.
It is the future of local food alternatives, so critically important to the
future of Food Democracy, that need attention. This is why one of the
key tasks of Food Democracy is helping ensure that farmers, consum-
ers, and communities have alternatives for growing, selling, and buy-
ing better foods. How well the alternatives function and whether they
are a "criticism" of Big Food depends on the people involved and the
values they reflect.
III. MAD Cow, ANxIous CONSUMERS, AND A SURPRISED PUBLIC
As Americans tried to settle into the holiday spirit in late 2003,
two government announcements reminded us of our connections to
the real world. The first announcement was that federal authorities
were raising the homeland security terrorist threat to level orange,
which resulted in the cancellation of Air France flights from Paris to
Los Angeles and the addition of armed air marshals to foreign flights
bound for the United States. While these developments did not keep
many people from flying, they did add to the jitters of still anxious
travelers and left many wondering what our government expected us
to do in the face of such warnings. The second federal announce-
ment came right before Christmas, and sent a jolt of uncertainty
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through the economy and a wave of fear into consumers: mad cow
disease had come to the United States.
A sick cow from a Washington dairy tested positive for BSE, the
disease that had wrought havoc on agriculture in the United Kingdom
and led to the death of over 140 people in Europe. The news sent
beef prices plummeting and consumers, especially the legions of new
Atkins Diet-inspired meat eaters, scrambling to replace beef in their
meals. The fastest scrambling, however, occurred amongst govern-
ment officials and beef industry leaders who tried to confine the dam-
age and reassure the nation, as well as the dozens of countries
importing United States beef. A quick, though disputed, "discovery"
that the diseased cow apparently came from Canada offered hope the
crisis would be limited, but much of the damage had already been
done. Within days, over two-dozen nations banned imports of United
States beef, and domestic prices for cattle fell over twenty percent
from the record highs that producers had been enjoying before the
news struck. The lost export markets and sharp price declines caused
hundreds of millions of dollars of value to vanish from the nation's
beef sector.
This unfortunate, but predictable, incident brought new scrutiny
to the United States food safety system and meat-processing practices,
and the public (at least those paying attention) was disturbed by what
it learned. The nation's first BSE episode was marked by coincidence
and controversy more than strategy and reassurance. These factors
surprised and puzzled the nation's consumers, and as a result USDA
felt pressure to take quick and decisive action to assert control over
meat processing and marketing practices.
The Washington cow that tested positive for BSE was allegedly a
"downer," meaning she could not walk on her own power. Most peo-
ple assumed that sick animals such as this did not enter the human
food supply; but in this case, the animal's mobility was believed to be
impacted by paralysis from giving birth to an oversized calf, and the
vet who inspected her approved her slaughter. Public surprise num-
ber one was that this immobile animal, and thousands of other "down-
ers," were regularly processed and sold to United States consumers
without a clue of the animals' conditions.
Tissue from the cow was collected and tested for the presence of
BSE at the National Animal Disease Laboratory in Ames, Iowa, which
is located only thirty miles from our farm. In the days that followed,
Big Food argued that the test and discovery proved the system worked;
closer investigation by the media, however, showed that the discovery
was almost an accident. Of the millions of beef animals slaughtered
each year, USDA tests fewer than 20,000 for BSE, which is approxi-
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mately one in every 1,700 animals. Furthermore, tests are concen-
trated on older animals, because it is believed that the disease
develops only after a certain age and only in animals suspected of hav-
ing central nervous system disorders. It is estimated that over 100,000
downers are sent to market each year, but only a fraction of them are
tested for BSE. The Washington cow beat the odds and won the lot-
tery by being selected for testing. The tiny number of animals tested
for BSE, a number so small that a cynic might ask if we were trying to
not find something, was public surprise number two.
The Washington cow was not suspected of being ill, which is why
her meat was approved for people to eat. Her tissue was tested be-
cause the inspector happened to request it for her; and if he had not
pulled a sample of her tissue and sent it to the laboratory in Ames, the
BSE discovery would have never happened and our beef supply would
still be "safe." Public surprise number three was how fluke and good
fortune (or bad fortune if you had fat cattle to sell), as opposed to a
purposeful and successful BSE-detection plan, resulted in the discov-
ery of BSE in the United States.
The positive test result was announced by USDA on December
24th, and triggered a cascade of actions and investigations. One of
the first orders of business was to find the meat from the diseased cow.
Even though federal officials reassured the public that the brain and
spinal column had been removed during slaughter and the "muscle
meat" posed no risk, its location was a priority. But the public re-
mained concerned and confused: how was it that this meat had al-
ready been sold, and in many cases already consumed, if the animal
was being tested for possible illness? This was public surprise number
four: the meat and carcasses of animals suspected of illness are not
held until the test results are known, because we do not have the facili-
ties to hold the meat and have not wanted to spend the money to
implement faster testing.
Tracking down the meat would prove a challenge. The process-
ing facility in Washington where the cow was slaughtered is a relatively
small operation, and officials determined that only 10,000 pounds of
meat were suspected of possibly having come into contact with her
carcass. In the days following the announcement, however, as officials
worked to track where that meat had gone, the modern marvel of
America's food distribution chain was revealed. The meat had gone
to two other meat-grinding facilities and from there had been distrib-
uted to retailers in at least eight states and Guam. Public surprise
number five was the discovery that the meat we eat for dinner may
have traveled halfway across the nation and earned more frequent
flier miles than the eater.
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Finding the meat that came from the animal, and finding out
more about her origin, helped public officials gain control over the
story and helped reassure markets and eaters alike. But another ques-
tion of use and distribution was raised in the thinking public's mind:
what happened to the cow's brain and spinal column, and for what
exactly are byproducts like this used? The myriad of uses for the bits
and pieces left after processing animals (the "droppage" or "offal" in
meat-packing lingo) is a story unto itself. FDA soon announced the
public had nothing to fear because all of the concerned materials had
been found and a "hold" had been placed on them. But the door to
Pandora's box had been opened just a bit and people began to learn
about public surprise number six: what really goes into dog food and
what are those "animal byproducts" that are fed to livestock other
than cows, such as chickens and pigs?
There were other surprises woven into the BSE story, such as the
fact that Congress had tried to ban the slaughter of downers for
human consumption on three occasions but had been strongly op-
posed by a cattle industry that did not want to miss out on the income
from those sales. All of these surprises proved too much for the pub-
lic, and USDA had to act swiftly to get ahead of this snowballing crisis
in the public's confidence in the safety of America's beef supply. Re-
strictions on using downers were put in place, protections on how
meat near the spinal column can be processed were implemented,
and an enhanced testing protocol was established.
Many months have passed since the initial BSE discovery, and the
crisis appears to have blown over for the time being. There were
many casualties from the incident, however, such as the farm-owned
meat-packing plant in Iowa which had the unfortunate timing of hav-
ing its first exports to Japan on a ship as the incident broke.
Market prices and consumer confidence in beef have later re-
bounded, and at the time this article was written there was hope that
foreign markets would reopen in 2005. USDA's new enhanced testing
protocol is underway (although USDA's own Inspector General has
questioned its adequacy) and the announcement that several prelimi-
nary "positive" tests were later proved incorrect roiled the market and
producers in the summer of 2004.
One major result of the incident has been renewed attention to
developing a National Animal Identification System to allow for track-
ing beef cattle from the farms where they are born to their final
slaughterhouse. The goal is to create a method of tracking animals
and locating the possible sources of disease, which would have been
very useful during the situation that developed in Washington while
trying to determine where the BSE cow and her colleagues were. The
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
proposed program involves many important policy issues relating to
cost, responsibility, and control over the information being created.
The current proposal is a classic example of modern American agri-
cultural thinking, and it requires that all beef producers buy some
form of high-tech device to place in each animal, which can then be
used to track transfers and movements. While the premise my be
valid, the irony is that we will spend millions to develop a system that
will give us better information about the current location of any living
cow than we have about any human, be it a lost child, a foreign visitor,
or a violent criminal. The costs and complexity of such a system and
the resulting recordkeeping required will present significant opera-
tional hurdles, as does the intended "mandatory" nature of the pro-
gram. For an agricultural sector that cannot even agree to the idea of
labeling meat in the marketplace with its country of origin, the appar-
ent "consensus" on the need and expense of an animal identification
program is surprising and even suspicious.
IV. CREEKSTONE FARMS AND TESTING FOR BSE: MAKING FOOD
DEMOCRATS OUT OF BIG FOOD'S REFUGEES
John Stewart is an unlikely candidate to be either a spokesman
for Food Democracy or a hero for consumers and farmers alike. He
did not expect to trigger a controversy illustrating the fault lines be-
tween Big Food and Food Democracy or to stimulate a debate with
serious implications for international trade and America's food sys-
tem. As the owner of a beef-packing company, an avowed free-market
businessman, a former head of the American Meat Institute, and a
bulwark of Big Food and its dominion over America's diet, you might
expect Stewart to be assisting industry efforts to resist consumers'
desires for more information and choices in the food system. Instead,
Stewart is in the thick of a fight with USDA and the meat industry over
the right of his Kansas-based meat-processing company, Creekstone
Farms, to test each of the 300,000 animals it butchers a year for the
presence of BSE. In recent years, Stewart's company developed a very
profitable market raising and selling high quality black Angus beef,
especially to Japan. The discovery of BSE in the United States
brought that market to a sudden stop, at least until Japanese officials
and consumers become convinced that imported United States beef is
safe. This is when the free-market spirit came over Mr. Stewart. He
reasoned if Japanese customers want assurance that his beef is free
from BSE, then he would test each animal processed, a practice al-
lowed in both Europe and Japan. The only wrinkle in his plan was
that such testing is unprecedented in the United States and he
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needed USDA to approve the testing method involved. This is when
Mr. Stewart learned a lesson about how USDA really feels about re-
sponding to consumers' desires for more information and about the
meat industry's ability to influence the rules for domestic and interna-
tional marketing of food.
I had the opportunity to meet John Stewart when he spoke at the
Consumer Federation of America's national food policy conference in
May 2004. His presence seemed to send a chill through the represent-
atives of Big Food who filled the room, perhaps reflecting a mix of
resentment for one of their own who dared challenge the doxology of
Big Food and fear that his read of consumer hopes may be accurate.
While Stewart was given the cold shoulder by United States food
flacks, he was trailed by a pack of Japanese journalists and numerous
Japanese TV crews that were in attendance for his session. The point
seemed to be that you can become a hero to Japanese customers, but
at the cost of becoming a pariah to your brethren in the United States
meat industry. Stewart was the main attraction for a session on BSE
and USDA's proposed testing program. Dr. Peter Fernandez, Associ-
ate Administrator of USDA's Animal Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS), had the job of explaining and defending USDA's response.
His main point was that USDA's goal is to develop a testing procedure
in which consumers can have confidence, especially in foreign mar-
kets like Japan. He argued that the way you deal with meat safety con-
cerns from BSE is by removing the SRM (specific risk material), the
meat that may include spinal columns, not through testing like that
proposed by Stewart and Creekstone. He explained how USDA would
soon announce an enhanced testing protocol, costing over $70 mil-
lion. Later, in response to a question from the audience, he specifi-
cally said that "universal testing is not sound science."
The USDA's response to testing for BSE is parallel to the Starlink
matter involving the discovery of non-approved GMO corn in foods.
Their argument is "Trust us. We have rules, and they work." This is
true, but only if we take enforcement of the rules seriously. The tim-
ing of Dr. Fernandez's defense was complicated because the papers
that morning detailed a new incident at a small packing plant in
Texas, where a cow showing signs of neurological problems was
marked for testing but was then somehow disposed of before the test-
ing could be done. The incident fueled conspiracy theorists in the
food community and led to a May, 2004, New York Times editorial enti-
tled "More Mad Cow Mischief,"' 2 questioning how such a mixup could
happen. What is troubling is how the incident plays into the hands of
2. Mad Cow Mischief N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2004, at A16.
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critics (and competitors) who feel that the United States is not really
serious about trying to find mad cow cases, greatly complicating ef-
forts to clear the name of United States beef. One of the ironies with
the untested cow in Texas is that the packing plant in question did not
take downer animals because it had a contract with McDonald's,
which refused to buy them. This is why few BSE samples were taken,
and why no USDA inspector was present. The inspector was at the
other meat-packing plant in town, because that plant did take
downers!
John Stewart asked Dr. Fernandez "why USDA continues to un-
derestimate consumers' ability to appreciate information and why the
agency is willing to spend $300 a head to test cows when Creekstone
can do it for $20." Dr. Fernandez replied that the USDA's opposition
to the tests is due to the "intimation" of safety that would be drawn
from them. He portrayed the proposed tests as an attempt to guaran-
tee the beef is safe, even though this is not what the company or for-
eign buyers have said. In any case, it was a fine example of changing
the issue and using the "we know best" approach at the same time.
In his comments, John Stewart said "we are a business and in busi-
ness to make money." He said the safety of the United States beef
supply is not in dispute but that we have to recognize BSE is new terri-
tory for everyone, and it is not clear we understand the new science.
At some point it will become clear, and what we need to test will be-
come clear, but in the meantime he proposed testing be allowed. He
said that Creekstone does not support testing as a safety issue but "we
have to listen to consumers, these are smart people. There is one
clear message: if you want to test ... the government should let you."
Stewart explained how the company has received thousands of e-mails
of support but none of opposition. He said, "The only three groups
that say don't test are the government, the AMI [American Meat Insti-
tute], and the NCBA [National Cattlemen's Beef Association]. Now
why is that?" He concluded by noting that the government is worried
about the costs of testing but that what USDA does not understand is
that consumers make the decision as to value. If it is worth it to them,
they will pay. "They [USDA] don't understand free enterprise. I ha-
ven't seen a case more blatant of government trying to tell business
how to operate." He said the government should step back and re-
evaluate its policy. "Consumers want [testing] whether it is safe or
not. What does it matter? It is their choice. I represent free enter-
prise and my customers; I [do not] represent the government."
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V. THE COSTS OF FOOD: GOOD, BETTER, BEST, OR ELITISM
COMES TO THE TABLE
From an economic perspective, many controversies in the debate
about our food system revolve around how we account for the costs to
society associated with different methods of producing and marketing
food. As the Food Democracy movement grows and opportunities for
consumers to buy foods they believe are better increase, then the
prices of such foods may come down as supplies expand. As we learn
more about the health and safety risks of some foods, and about the
environmental costs of industrialized agriculture, our accounting
might change as well.
One value of the alternatives offered in Food Democracy is that
they make it possible for consumers to consider the true costs Big
Food may impose on society and our health. Certainly the lessons
drawn from the "mad cow" episode show there are risks and costs in
our food system about which consumers are uninformed. If there is
any good news in the mad cow discovery, perhaps it is how it finally
prompted USDA to regulate practices, such as banning the use of
downer cows for human consumption, which should have been
stopped long before.
The bad news for Big Food is how more consumers now realize
that the livestock industry long defended these practices, giving more
weight to the small economic gain from them (such as feeding animal
parts back to cattle) than to the possible risks to consumers. The dan-
ger to Big Food in defending practices that may be ultimately indefen-
sible (such as using antibiotics as a growth promoter) is how it may
change consumers' respect and deference to Big Food's explanations.
What might be the tally if consumers pause to ask the question "what
else don't we know about the food processing industry that may be
jeopardizing our health and the quality of the food we eat?"
If the downer cow incident in Washington is any guide, it shows
how increased public scrutiny and consumer concern can lead to
change. A ban on eating downer cows might add to the cost of meat,
although there is little evidence to prove this. Even if prices do rise,
though, has the value of the meat not gone up with removal of this
risk? If prices go up, is this not a cost consumers will gladly pay if it
means the meat supply is safer? Certainly some consumers, who in
the face of BSE worries now seek out natural beef and find local
sources of meat in which they have greater confidence, are willing to
pay more money and spend more time buying food. Is there any rea-
son to think there are not other, similar, efficiency-driven food
processing practices that deserve more public scrutiny as well? The
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lesson from the Washington incident and the BSE scare may be that
when a more complete accounting of the costs of food is possible
(whether in the market price or in consumers' judgment and knowl-
edge) that we may find food produced by Food Democrats to be a
better bargain than the products of Big Food. The support for Food
Democracy reflected in the growing demand for better food, farmers'
markets, organic food, and natural beef shows that for many consum-
ers the issue of price is not the only factor in their food buying deci-
sions if we give them the information and alternatives to make those
decisions in an educated manner. For these people, the question is
not whether we can afford better food, but whether we can afford the
risks presented by our current food system or the possibility of not
having better food available to puchase?
What, then, do we make of the critics from Big Food and their
expected charge that Food Democracy is elitism served only on
healthy tables? It is true that there are people interested in new vari-
eties of arrugula. I know, because we grow hundreds of pounds of it
at Sunstead Farm. The customers who buy it represent one compo-
nent of the better-food movement and the fresh-food market; but
from my experience, most Food Democrats are not driven by elitism
or a desire to segregate any more than the motive of Big Food is hu-
manitarianism or altruism. The motivations driving the majority of
Food Democrats are more basic-families trying to create livings on
their farms, food producers marketing healthier foods, consumers
wanting to eat better and healthier food-and more communitarian
and humanitarian in nature than the simplistic images that critics may
try to project.
The premise that somehow the desire for better food and for cre-
ating more opportunities in our food system is an elitist goal should
be rejected. So should the corollary premise, which is that high qual-
ity, fresh, nutritious food is somehow a luxury that only the wealthy
can afford. How can good food be the province of the rich when
historically it is the birthright of small farmers and people who worked
the land? What does it say about society if we come to the point where
the measure of our food system is that cheap food is good enough for
you but if you want fresher, tastier, more nutritious food you will have
to pay more, probably more than you can afford? Is this not, however,
the premise of those who criticize the goals or values of people who
make up the body of Food Democracy?
Don't take my word for it. Consider these features of the Food
Democracy movement and then decide if they are elitist in nature or
intent.
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Many of the freshest, most nutritious foods, such as the foods sold
at farmers' markets, come from the gardens and small farms of people
not typically in the upper economic classes. These are working fami-
lies, earning a living or a second income from the land, and doing so
by sharing the unique patrimony of agrarian life. The knowledge of
heirloom seeds, of canning and preserving foods, of curing hams and
bacon, of making cheese and jams, and many other aspects of local
food is essentially the cultural wealth of low-income rural people.
How is it elitist to spend money with these farmers and support the
transfer of their knowledge and products to a new generation of eat-
ers? Many efforts to support regional food identities are built on high-
lighting unique foods and recipes indigenous to the areas. Mostjams,
jellies, meats, and cheeses are of humble or rural origins.
Marketing opportunities, such as the farmers' markets and CSAs
often associated with Food Democracy, are structured to offer lower
prices and make food affordable and accessible. By putting more in-
come in farmers' pockets while still offering consumers lower or com-
petitive prices, both groups can benefit economically. Then how can
it be said that farmers' markets, CSAs, and other direct marketing ef-
forts are elitist or luxuries of the wealthy? Anyone who visits a farm-
ers' market will recognize the fallacy of such a charge. Every market
to which I have been is a mix of people, young and old, rich and poor,
and more a cross-section of the community than an extension of the
country club.
The same is true with gardening; it is an equal-opportunity expe-
rience. The essence of gardening is empowering people to grow some
of their own food so they can appreciate fresh produce and experi-
ence the beauty and bounty of nature's cycles. Yes, there are wealthy
people who garden,just like there are poor people who go to farmers'
markets. The reverse is true as well, but neither gardening nor shop-
ping for vegetables is widely seen as a favored pastime of the upper
class any more than it is an exclusive trait of the unemployed. The
truth is that gardening and farmers' markets are, at their essence,
democratic and about the pursuit of happiness. The motivations that
draw people, rich or poor, young or old, to the market and the garden
are not those of elitism. What attracts people to these pursuits are
human values, ones that reflect the simple love for good food, beauty,
being in nature, and connecting with the land. One defining element
of Food Democracy is enjoyment-of food, of experience, of people,
and of nature.
Many components of Food Democracy share the goal of opening
new economic opportunities for people in our food system. The op-
portunities may be for retirees moving to the country to find a new life
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producing food, be it wine, cheese, or meat. The opportunities may
also be for the college-aged couple committed to environmental val-
ues who want to think globally but live and eat locally. For both types
of people, and for everyone else in between, being involved with farm-
ing and food is the magnet that draws them to Food Democracy. Are
they elitists? If you go to one of the winter meetings of the people
working these farms, such as the Upper Midwest Organic Farming
Conference in LaCrosse, Wisconsin, those in attendance will not strike
you as elitists. The families and young people you will see are any-
thing but elitists. In many ways, they are the newest expression of
America's historic cycle, of a "back-to-the-land movement" in which
people find an economic outlet for their agrarian values.
Rather than scorn new farmers as educated fools and "part-tim-
ers" who make no contribution to America's food system, criticisms
you hear so many times in traditional farming circles, should we not
welcome their energy and talent and applaud their willingness to re-
turn to rural America? Do we not need someone willing to do the
work that it takes to help feed us? Is one of the cherished freedoms of
our democratic society not the freedom to choose how and where we
want to live and work? Helping more people find a rewarding future
in food production and marketing should be viewed as a national
goal, not a threat to the hegemony of Big Food.
An important segment of people drawn to the opportunities in
local food systems is America's newest citizens. A primary beneficiary
of many local food initiatives is the new immigrant farmers-the
Hmong flower growers in California, the Korean fruit producers in
Washington, the Latino vegetable farmers in Michigan-as well as
their fellow immigrants who rely on them to produce and market the
foods of their cultures. All of these groups combine to make a new
homestead movement that promises to bring energy and life to rural
areas now being depopulated by industrialized farming.
Is it elitist to hope that a new generation of land-owning small
farmers might emerge from these groups, especially if we are wise
enough to implement public policy to assist them? Or is the truly elit-
ist vision for the future of our food system the vision based on main-
taining new immigrants as a landless pool of unskilled laborers
available to fill the needs of the meat packers and livestock factories,
or the other "opportunities" offered by Big Food? To read more
about how bleak that future is, see David Shipler's book, The Working
Poor: Invisible in America,3 which documents the continuing "harvest of
3. DAVID SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: INVISIBLE IN AMERICA (2004).
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shame" and the underpaid workers who make our "cheap food"
possible.
Access to education and information are at the heart of the Food
Democracy movement, just as these public values have driven and fed
much of the historic social and economic progress in our nation. Ed-
ucation has been, and will continue to be, the most powerful force in
creating economic opportunity and promoting political equality in so-
ciety. Is it elitist to give people more information about the sources of
their food and about the impact of their choices? Had it not been for
the discovery of BSE in the cow in Washington we would still be eating
downer cows, but now that we know, who would want to go back to the
way it was before we knew the truth about that aspect of our food
system?
The fundamental values driving Food Democracy are not about
elitism or economic discrimination; they are about access to healthy
food, building stronger communities, creating more economic oppor-
tunity, and opening more personal connections in society. They are
about personal satisfaction and human enjoyment and fulfillment;
and these are truly public and democratic values, not the values of an
elitist or exclusionary mindset. Decisions on value are made by con-
sumers in a Food Democracy; this is the freedom of choice we should
have in a democracy and in a capitalistic system.
For the majority of American consumers, the issue is not really
about cost at all. We are fortunate that many of us can all afford to eat
whatever we choose to purchase, be it organic food or Niman Ranch
meat. Our choices depend on our priorities and how, in turn, those
priorities shape our food-buying habits. Do we want better-tasting
food, more confidence in its safety, and more information about its
production-or is cost our main concern? Our food choices are a
function of many things, in addition to price. How much we know
about our food and our own values, the availability of food options,
and competing demands on our funds all shape our decisions and
priorities.
Acknowledging the truths about the difference in cost does not
make any food, or the person selling it, an elitist. How can being a
successful businessman and using the market to obtain higher prices
for a better product make you an elitist? This is a strange argument to
make in a culture where the business community prays on the alter of
the free market and worships in the temple of capitalism.
Some parts of the Food Democracy movement reflect America's
history of political change, but is this a reason to fear Food Democracy
or to reject the underlying values or goals being promoted by Food
Democracy? Pause and ask yourself, in light of the scrutiny of Food
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Democracy, what are the motivations of those who defend and protect
Big Food? Are they really defenders of the poor and less fortunate in
society? Is feeding the masses and creating healthier eating opportu-
nities what motivates them? Are they interested in the values of a true
democracy? These could be their goals, and if so, they are welcome
and free to promote their agenda; but if this truly is the goal of Big
Food, then why is hunger still a bane to our nation and food insecu-
rity on the rise in many states? Why is the nation experiencing an
epidemic of dietary ills that threaten the health of our children and
the long-term stability of the nation's health care system? The reality
behind any criticisms of the ideals of Food Democracy, criticisms
which no doubt come from those most threatened by its growth, is
that those criticisms will be more defensive of the status quo and and
of the economic interests of Big Food than they are concerned about
the public good.
The irony of the "costs more" argument of Big Food is that the
higher costs of Food Democracy are, in part, a function of how much
our current economic system has enabled the marketing of cheap
food and hidden the costs of Big Food. Today, much of the real cost
of cheap food is shifted out of the market and onto society in other
ways-poor diets, obesity, environmental damage, exploited workers,
and underpaid farmers. If one goal of Food Democracy is to help
people understand the true costs of producing healthy, high-quality
food and to give them ways to support an alternative system, then one
side effect may be to increase food costs. The story of organics, eco-
labels, farmers' markets, and all of the marketing avenues of Food
Democracy is a story in which consumers voluntarily pay more for
these products. This is not an expression of their elitist desire or proof
they have more money than sense; it is the reflection of their success
in finding ways to buy the foods they want and to support the farming
practices that they feel are best. It is the story of farmers finding mar-
kets and staying on the farms to care for the land and their families.
The consumers who choose these more "expensive," better food op-
tions are voting with their feet and mouths, spending their money to
support Food Democracy. Some may call it elitism, but the people
involved call it freedom.
VI. FOOD Is A TOOL, NOT A WEAPON
Food is the centerpiece of the Food Democracy movement. This
idea may seem simplistic, but it bears repeating. What differentiates
the Food Democracy movement from what has come before, in terms
of various agrarian movements and consumer campaigns, is the role
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that food plays as the meeting point and focus of the debate. Earlier
forms of agrarianism, such as the populism of the early twentieth cen-
tury and even the more recent sustainable agriculture movement, fo-
cused primarily on the role of the family farm or the need for
environmental protection. None of these movements had much to do
with food, largely because food was constant as to its quality, source,
and how it was processed and marketed. Before the twentieth century
reign of the food scientists made manufacturing new foods with chem-
istry and technology common, we had not altered food so drastically.
This meant that concern about the quality or safety of food did not
provide a means of connecting the interests of consumers to the
needs of farmers.
A critical part of what is different today in the debate over food in
society is that our the food is different. We have altered it, processed
it, and cheapened it. For many people, we have unfortunately turned
it into something to fear as much as to value.
Consider how we can take clean, wholesome beef from a farm
and then slaughter and process the meat in ways that introduce the
threat of contamination so extensively that we must consider irradi-
ating it. In effect, we are considering treating meat as a biohazard, just
to be sure it is safe to eat. The cumulative result is that today's con-
sumers are recognizing that food is different, and are questioning
whether there are alternative types of farming and marketing that can
produce better, healthier, more satisfying food.
Some farmers and food companies are responding by looking for
ways to produce and market the better foods that consumers want.
The truth is that in the process of industrializing agriculture, we may
have threatened many of the traditional processes of farming and the
integrity of food marketing. We may have also placed the public's
confidence in food in jeopardy. The negative consequences of our
actions (falling consumer confidence, increasing food safety fears,
and growing diet and nutrition impacts) have led many to finally real-
ize what agriculture produces-food-and ask for better products.
The opportunity to use food, something we all need and in which
we all have a common interest, as the centerpiece for social and politi-
cal discussions makes Food Democracy a powerful and encompassing
theme for developing linkages and partnerships between components
of society. The growing role of food as the focus of public attention is
apparent in many ways. Recent trends within sustainable agriculture
research, such as the work of the Leopold Center on the concept of
food miles and increased attention to farm marketing and "value-ad-
ded" agriculture, illustrate this shift in focus. Food is the main charac-
ter in all the debates about obesity and nutrition, from concern over
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fast food marketing aimed at children to the United States' policy on
sugar consumption. Food is undoubtedly the canvas, the political
backdrop upon which future farm policies and social relations will be
developed. The significance of shifting our attention to food is how it
finally offers a direct way to make discussions about farming and agri-
culture relevant to consumers who are affected by how agriculture
performs. Because we all eat, "consumers" are really a proxy for the
public, and because all consumers eat, the public has an immediate
and available way to vote on its interests, to take action, and to influ-
ence the future of our food system. Whether and how the public will
vote depends on the information and education available. This is the
reason why control over food knowledge, especially over food labels
and the information that can be shared about food, is the key battle-
ground in the debate.
This shift in public focus can be used as the way to stimulate dis-
cussion about Food Democracy. Food is the medium for communica-
tion and understanding, but it is also a tool to support farmers and
companies serving the needs of consumers. Food is not just the
endpoint of a production-marketing equation; it is a pathway, a form
of communication about society's values. It is not just the food; it is
everything about it-taste and enjoyment, sharing and knowledge,
participation and identity-that makes it fulfilling. The new Ameri-
can food movement is not about gastronomy and novelty as much as it
is about community and democracy.
The idea of using food as a tool to build democracy is in contrast
to the 1960s idea, best expressed by former United States Secretary of
Agriculture Earl Butz, of using food as a weapon. America "plant[ed]
fence row to fence row" and used food to defeat communism and
maintain our economic supremacy in the world. The enemies were
hunger, poverty, ignorance, and Communists, as well as nations who
did not open their markets to American exports or subject their farm-
ers to the forces of free trade and the power of America's farms. To-
day, most of the "commies" are gone, and those who remain are major
customers. Other enemies still remain, though, and unfortunately
our approach to food helped them spread, even into our own society.
We treat food as a weapon and use this rationale to continue the
destruction of farming culture and rural areas here and abroad. In
our quest for economic domination we employ every new technology
available, even over the objections of our customers. The fact that
Europeans do not want hormones in their meat or genetically modi-
fied grain in their food does not stop us from challenging their right
to object. Today, our attitude is repeated by rejecting the right of the
Japanese to have beef tested for BSE. Worse still, USDA is refusing
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the right of Kansas meat packer Creekstone Farms to voluntarily per-
form BSE tests so it can regain the Japanese markets it lost after the
discovery of BSE in the United States. In asserting the correctness of
our science at the high cost of losing these markets to competitors, we
have forgotten a simple lesson of marketing: you have to produce
something that customers want to buy. Today, the greatest fear of Big
Food is that Americans will want something other than the foods it
insists on producing.
We have treated food as a weapon and then turned it on our-
selves, the small farms, the rural towns, the workers, and ultimately
the consumers of America. We undervalue the contributions of farm-
ers, depopulate the towns, underpay the workers, exploit the land,
and overfeed the rest of us. The food industry has mounted a cam-
paign to convince us that there is no such thing as bad foods, just bad
food choices; but it is doing all it can to multiply our opportunities to
make bad choices. In an effort to avoid responsibility and liability for
the nation's nutrition and health problems, the food industry says that
the answer to obesity is simply for consumers to "move more." In-
creased physical exercise will undoubtedly benefit many people, but
this simple message of personal responsibility should not obscure the
role of Big Food.
Today, we have the ability to change our attitude and approach to
food and to consider food as a tool and a pathway to better farming
and a healthier future. Many Americans have decided to "move
more," but part of that movement is to look for better food and a new
relationship with the food system. They are discovering just how pow-
erful a tool food can be as a way to forge bonds between farmers and
consumers, to support sound farming practices, and to produce better
and more nutritious foods.
VII. FOOD AND VALUES: NOT MORE, BETTER
The idea of Food Democracy is premised on there being people
and businesses interested in supporting its emergence and in high-
lighting the contrast with the existing food sector. The key to under-
standing the difference between Food Democracy and Big Food is not
just size; it is the values around which they are created. The essential
value differences between Big Food and Food Democracy concern the
difference between "cheap food" and food that is more satisfying.
Food Democrats are looking for more satisfaction from food, and
their goal is to create a better food system. Is this not why we have a
political democracy? We support political democracies because they
are more satisfying than other political forms, and we believe they are
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better for society and more liberating for the human spirit. The goal
is similar for Food Democracy. More satisfaction and better food can
come about in any number of ways. For some people, it means the
food was raised locally by people they know. For other people, it con-
cerns revealing what the food may contain, such as pesticides or ad-
ded growth hormones. For some, it concerns the methods of
production, such as how the animals were treated or the land was
farmed. For others, it is whether the food was sold at a farmers' mar-
ket or at a natural food store. For some, it will be how it tastes-the
most personal of food's attributes. The others' measure of satisfaction
may be in how it was purchased, like whether it was bought directly, or
whether it is a certain brand, which is seen as an indicator of quality.
For some people, food satisfaction will mean having the ability to par-
ticipate in the production of food on their own farms or in their own
gardens.
Food Democracy is really about enlarging the number of ways
that food and the food-buying experience can be enhanced. It is
about breaking free of the tyranny of an industrial food system that
substitutes its own set of values, or what it believes should be your
values, for more choices and more knowledge about food production
and marketing.
The contrasting values between Big Food and Food Democracy
are not simply minor issues of taste or sensibility; rather, the differ-
ences are more fundamental and significant for society. Several values
reflected by Big Food are the most troubling. The first is opposing
the consumer's right to know more about food, such as how it is
raised or even what it contains. America's food labeling laws are
based on companies being required to provide only the minimum
amount of information mandated by government, an approach that
protects the right not to reveal other information and to resist efforts
by marketers who do. The hypocrisy of opposing efforts to provide
consumers with more information while simultaneously arguing "the
consumer is king" is apparent.
A second value conflict is the lack of any sense of place or identity
with most food products marketed by Big Food. In the United States,
our view is "food is food," and where it is raised is no more important
than how or by whom it was produced. Big Food resists creating ways
to identify food with either the place it is grown, such as whether it
was locally or internationally raised, or with the farmers or factories
who produce it. This attitude is best exemplified by the food indus-
try's fierce opposition to Congressional efforts to require country-of-
origin labeling on meat, produce, seafood, and other commodities.
Big Food's approach is to treat food and its ingredients as fungible
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commodities, giving no value to a sense of place or origin and creat-
ing no incentive for supporting local production. It resists the idea of
identifying food with place for a number of reasons, namely because it
is costly and difficult to do, assuming it can be done at all. If people
have an idea where food is produced, they might want to buy locally
raised food, something Big Food finds nearly impossible to supply. It
is not easy to develop a food processing or marketing system to main-
tain any sense of identity or to preserve local production capacity.
This is true even if your heart is in it. The fungible nature of food
ingredients lets Big Food substitute any product sourced from any lo-
cation, at any time, into the mixture without worrying about describ-
ing the product differently. The potatoes may come from Idaho today
or Canada tomorrow; it does not matter. The underlying message of
many of Big Food's media campaigns, like the industry's "milk-is-milk"
attack on natural dairy products, is that it does not matter how food is
produced or where it comes from as long as it is edible.
This simplistic attitude toward food underpins the third value
conflict between Big Food and Food Democracy, the idea of food as a
definition for a product rather than as a set of values or traits of the
product. In the United States, chicken is chicken; it is how it is de-
fined as a food. How or where it was raised does not go into the equa-
tion of it being chicken. In fact, if you ask for more information
about the origin of the chicken the people selling it will have no idea
and will look at you strangely for even asking; but anyone who eats
chicken knows that there can be more to it than just the correct spe-
cies of fowl being processed. Many things can make chicken satisfy-
ing, or even delicious. Chicken can taste good, look good, and be safe
to eat, but if being safe to eat and cheap are the only measures of the
product's value then the opportunity for satisfaction is more happen-
stance than planned.
Our idea of chicken is in contrast to the French method of pro-
ducing and marketing the many varieties of chicken designed to meet
various consumer desires, but we do not have to develop a laundry list
of chicken options for it to be more satisfying. In fact, a proliferation
of different types of chickens might be confusing for Americans; the
point of this idea is not simply to acknowledge how much better
chicken could be, but to recognize how we have reduced food to the
lowest common denominator. The reductionist view of food has re-
duced not just the variety of food but the opportunities for consumer
satisfaction. In our system, chicken has been reduced to a commodity
rather than a food; and if you want something special about your
chicken (including one that tastes like old-fashioned chicken) then
the burden is on you, either as a seller or a buyer, to make the connec-
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tion. The goal of Food Democracy is to create more diversity and
choices, including more and better types of chicken. Yes, the starting
point may be the same species of fowl, but the products marketed
could be from different types of chickens, fed and raised in different
methods and produced locally, all with different prices.
The fourth value of Big Food in conflict with Food Democracy is
the idea of cheap food. The most powerful organizing principle of
Big Food has been to reduce the cost of producing food by increasing
production and efficiency, and using any new technology or labor-
saving device to do so. The argument used to justify everything peo-
ple find troubling about modern industrialized agriculture and food
processing is cost and efficiency. Name a controversy about America's
food system, a food-safety scare or a practice the public finds offensive,
and no doubt you will find that the justification is to reduce cost and
increase efficiency. From processing downer cows for people to eat,
to injecting growth hormones to produce more milk for us to drink,
to feeding hormones to produce more meat more quickly, to planting
GMO crops, to feeding processed chicken feces to cattle, to confining
thousands of pigs to one building, to forcing millions of laying hens
into battery cages, to spraying crops and the workers who harvest
them with powerful chemicals, to speeding slaughterhouse lines and
increasing the risks of contamination, to promoting irradiation of the
meat as the way to make the feces on it edible.., all of these practices
and methods introduce more risks into our food supply, and once
discovered, they make people fear their food. They are the result of
the drive to make food cheaper. Perhaps the ultimate cost and the
greatest price that Big Food's values impose on the public is the fear
of food. The desire to not be afraid of food, but instead to trust and
enjoy it, is a major force driving millions of consumers to search for
Food Democracy.
VIII. FOOD AS FEAR, FOOD AS LovE
The idea of Food Democracy is that there are Food Democrats,
people who are helping drive the debate and the movement to a bet-
ter food system. In thinking about what Food Democrats are looking
for, several goals are clear. Many of these goals I call the "C words:"
connection, community, confidence, choice, and comfort. These are
all traits the foods, and relations created within a Food Democracy,
can have. They are also looking for a different form of accounting for
costs, in that cost is not just the price tag on the food but a sum of
other impacts and effects of the food they buy.
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Another way to help explain the value of Food Democracy is to
consider whether modern society sees food as fear or food as love.
The concept of food as love may be a bit strong for many to swallow,
including my law professor colleague, but clearly food is the very basis
of love. From the child at a mother's breast to sitting around the din-
ner table, from the romantic meal to the family holiday feast, food is a
major language for expressing and experiencing love. If you have
trouble thinking of food as love, is it not more appealing than think-
ing of food as fear?
Food as fear, however, is for many Americans an increasing expe-
rience and, in some ways, the destination where the Big Food ideology
is taking us. Irradiate your meat, be sure and cook it well, wash and
scrub your fruits and vegetables (even the raspberries), think twice
about the chicken, do not lick the bowl or eat cake batter because the
eggs are raw, do not cross-contaminate your cooking surfaces, be sure
to disinfect your counters, and for heaven's sake do not use that
wooden cutting board! These are the admonitions of an increasingly
industrialized and fearful food system.
It is not wrong to make consumers aware of the need to fight
bacteria, but do we not also need to stop to think of how the bacteria
got there? In our rush to educate consumers and to make them ac-
cept their responsibility for food safety, do we also need to rush to
absolve the food processors and marketers whose practices and cost
saving efficiency help sow the sources of many food safety concerns?
What are the social and psychological costs when we come to fear
our food rather than revel in it? One economic advantage of making
people fear their food is how it makes it possible to profit from the
fear, because one thing is for sure-people are not going to stop eat-
ing. I remember an incident from a summer class, Legal Issues in
Farm Direct Marketing, when I asked students about going to farmers'
markets. One student explained how her family never shopped at
roadside stands or farmers' markets because they were worried the
food would not be clean. Even though you could not get closer to the
source, for her family the grocery store offered the promise of clean,
wholesome food. The grocery industry does all it can to promote and
protect the safety of food it sells, but having said this, viewing the
stores as a protector of safety might offer a false sense of security. The
truth is that when the doors open and the food comes off the truck, it
might as well be coming out of a black hole in terms of providing
consumers with information as to the production methods used or the
location where the food was raised. Big Food's resistance to efforts by
Congress to mandate "county-of-origin labeling" illustrates that more
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information is not everyone's primary goal. Local food allows con-
sumers to see where and how the food is raised.
IX. FOOD DEMOCRACY: REVOLUTION OR RESTORATION?
Can you have a revolution if no one gets shot? Can you have a
revolution if those leading it do not consider themselves revolutionar-
ies? If the most that happens is that food tastes better, farms are more
profitable, eaters are healthier, and communities are stronger, then is
it accurate to call the changes underway in America's food system a
revolution? These questions come to mind as I think about the future
of Food Democracy and the struggle between people working for a
better food system and the forces defending the status quo. Many
people have used the language of revolution to describe what is un-
derway in America's food. For example, Alice Waters describes what is
happening as "a delicious revolution," a wonderful turn of phrase that
captures both the pleasure and the promise involved. AndJohn Rob-
bins, author of Diet for a New America4 and The Food Revolution: How
Your Diet Can Help Save Your Life and Our World,5 focused on changing
how we eat as a society as the best way to change societal health.
When you consider recent changes in what we eat, America's
food scene has undoubtedly experienced several "revolutions," not
the least of which is the fast food revolution so ably documented in
Eric Schlosser's modern masterpiece Fast Food Nation.6 Other mini-
revolutions in recent years provide reasons for optimism about the
future of Food Democracy. The growing popularity of artisan bread,
the success of local micro-breweries, and more recently, the produc-
tion of high-quality farmstead cheeses, all reflect new opportunities in
our food system. We should not overlook the amazing transformation
of coffee either; with the emergence of the corner coffee house, a new
type of retail food establishment is growing at a pace that shows little
sign of abating. Each year, some new idea "revolutionizes" the food
sector (such as the low-carb diet, which was popularized by best-selling
diet books) but food trends can be fleeting. The bloom may now be
off the rose of artisan bread, not because it is not better but because
bread itself has fallen from favor as a casualty of the low-carb craze. Is
Food Democracy just another trend, an interesting name but a silly
idea longing for a goal that can never be reached?
4. JOHN ROBBINS, DIET FOR A NEW AMERICA: How YOUR FOOD CHOICES AFFECT
YOUR HEALTH, HAPPINESS AND THE FUTURE OF LIFE ON EARTH (1998).
5. JOHN ROBBINS, ET. AL., THE FOOD REVOLUTION: HowYOUR DIET CAN HELP SAVE
YOUR LIFE AND OUR WORLD (2001).
6. ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION (2001).
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The future of Food Democracy will be written by the actions of
farmers, consumers, food marketers, and government officials work-
ing to satisfy their own needs and, in the process, resolving the issues
that shape the debate about America's food and farming future.
Whether what unfolds will be as significant as I believe, or simply the
collective muddling through to another day that marks much of soci-
ety's progress, depends on whether food becomes a central issue in
the personal and political agendas of America's eaters. If the personal
stake is significant, then the changes to come may be as well. If the
present concerns about food fade or are lost in a fog of conflicting
advice and unfilled expectations, then the future may be more of the
same.
Wendell Berry, whose writings over the last thirty years have in-
spired and educated a generation of Food Democrats, sees the strug-
gle between local food and global forces as a revolt. In a 1999 essay,
"The Whole Horse," he wrote, "What agrarian principles implicitly
propose-and what I explicitly propose in advocating those principles
at this time-is a revolt of local small producers and local customers
against the global industrialism of the corporations."' 7 Berry asks rhe-
torically whether there is hope such a revolt can succeed and have
significant influence on the world. Here is part of his answer:
Yes, I do. And to be as plain as possible, let me just say what I know.
I know from friends and neighbors and from my own family that it
is now possible for farmers to sell at a premium to local customers
such products as organic vegetables, organic beef and lamb, and
pasture-raised chickens. This market is being made by the excep-
tional goodness and freshness of the food, by the wish of urban con-
sumers to support farming neighbors, and by the excesses and
abuses of the corporate food industry.'
Berry argues that the pattern of economic revolt is due to the scale of
industrial agriculture, which increases the abuse of food and the land
and renders it unable to see or serve the small local opportunities
created in its wake. He notes, "the market for so-called organic food,
for example, is really a market for good, fresh, trustworthy food, food
from producers known and trusted by consumers, and such food can-
not be produced by a global corporation."
9
My experiences raising and selling food grown on our farm and
visiting with Food Democrats all across the nation support Berry's con-
7. Wendell Barry, The Whole Horse, in THE ART OF THE COMMONPLACE: THE ACRA-
RIAN ESSAYS OF WENDELL BARRY 236 (2002).
8. Id.
9. Id.
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clusion. It is important to understand that changes in our food system
are happening, and not just because Berry or other leaders are urging
them. They are happening because of the desires of farmers and con-
sumers for better food and more satisfaction. Let the reader judge
whether it is a revolution, although the name may not be as important
as what the stories mean for the promise of Food Democracy. To par-
aphrase Aldo Leopold's comment about the possibility that our nation
will someday embrace a land ethic, I believe that Food Democracy is
an evolutionary possibility and a culinary and cultural necessity. Our
inherent tendency towards democracy and the undeniable demands
for better food, for food with a connection to the land, for food with a
story, and for food with more flavor, indicate that we are well under-
way in our search for Food Democracy. If you think about revolutions
as being quick and violent, this is not the case with Food Democracy,
as the movement has grown and evolved over the last two decades. If
revolutions need a firebrand leader and a central cause as a trigger,
Food Democracy fails the test because it has hundreds of leaders and
almost as many issues at its core. Rather than being centrally organ-
ized and led, it is more insurgent, dispersed to thousands of kitchens,
farms, and markets all across the nation. Still, many issues underpin-
ning the Food Democracy movement do have a revolutionary quality,
if that means opposing the status quo and the economic values now in
control. Fair trade food, eco-labels, heirloom vegetables, heritage live-
stock breeds, sustainable agriculture, organic farming, buy local cam-
paigns, and the Slow Food movement all find their origins and
motivations in the perceived misdeeds of Big Food and industrial eat-
ing, as well as in the desire of farmers and eaters to find a better way.
If we use the term "revolution" to describe the Food Democracy
movement, then two related questions must be considered. First,
against what are people revolting, and second, is the goal the same as
most revolutions-that of replacing oppression and totalitarianism
with democracy? What eaters are revolting against is fairly clear-the
faceless standardization of our food, the economic and political domi-
nance of companies and institutions comprising Big Food, and the
lack of human values and satisfaction reflected in industrialized agri-
culture. The answer to the second question is perhaps less clear, in
part because we are loath to consider how economic trends and cur-
rent political goals can reflect anti-democratic values (let alone pro-
duce oppressive or totalitarian results). So rather than focus on the
darkness of characterizing others, let us turn to the sunshine of the
promised future.
The goal of Food Democracy is a food system offering more op-
portunities for farmers and consumers, greater varieties of products,
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more information, more choices, more local involvement, as well as
greater attention to health, the environment, animal welfare, and
human values. The goal is a food system that offers more personal
connections, a stronger sense of community, and more satisfaction in
all the ways that food can satisfy human needs. It is not just a "revolu-
tion," it is also a restoration, an effort to restore democracy to our
food system. It is about replacing the realities of industrialized Big
Food with the democratic ideals of a more locally driven and human-
oriented food system, based on values other than mere economic
efficiency.
In The Soul of Capitalism,I ° William Greider paints a compelling
portrait of the problems in America's economy and argues that we
need to reinvent American capitalism to reflect human values. He
examines the contradiction between our fabulous wealth and our
growing feeling of personal impoverishment and concludes that an
increasing number of citizens are willing to question the politics and
economic assumptions of our quest for "more." Most importantly,
Greider marshals the economic evidence to show how our current ap-
proach to capitalism sanctions greater concentrations of wealth and
generates greater social inequalities. He concludes that our current
path threatens the very essence of our democracy, and argues that
the "house of economics is due for major renovations." Reading
Greider's book in early 2004 gave me optimism for Food Democracy,
because our themes and conclusions mirror many of the same devel-
opments, although he adds a cogent economic rationale for what I
have merely observed. Perhaps his most important insights are on the
theme of democracy, in particular his observations about the inher-
ently anti-democratic aspects of our two most common economic envi-
ronments-corporate governance and the workplace. He asks if it is
really so puzzling to see evidence of declining citizen participation in
some forms of democratic expression, such as voting, when most of us
spend our working lives in anti-democratic environments and have
our fortunes and retirements invested in the fate of corporations.
This shunting of democratic expression in our economic life makes
even more important the opportunity for democratic expression and
fulfillment in our social life, in what we eat, and in how we live. His
book is full of ideas on how to address the weaknesses in our form of
capitalism and in the process help restore our democracy.
Greider's theme of "restoration" is at the heart of my view of
Food Democracy. Food Democracy is not something new that people
10. WILLIAM GREIDER, THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM: OPENING PATHS TO A MORAL ECON-
oMY (2003).
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are seeking to assert. There is no revolution in seeking better food or
wanting more information or alternatives; these are the promise of
the democratic system we hold dear. Democracy is not something we
can take for granted, and the Food Democracy movement is about
restoring something we should have today. Restoration is what drives
the Food Democrats, not just revolt.
TRACEABILITY AND LABELING OF GENETICALLY




In the last several years, European Union (E.U.) policy has en-
couraged development of biotechnology, including genetically modi-
fied (GM) (that is, bioengineered)' agricultural crops. The E.U.
developed a strategy for life sciences and biotechnology, directed to-
ward improving the competitiveness of the European biotechnology
sector and the general situation for European biotechnology.2 E.U.
documents have acknowledged the potential significance of geneti-
cally modified crops-for example, the conclusion in a recent report
that "the potential of plant genomics and biotechnology to deliver ma-
jor advances in our lifestyles and prosperity is enormous. [Biotechnol-
ogy] can also maintain and enhance the competitiveness of E.U.
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1. Regulatory measures refer to GM crops, though the U.S. Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) prefers the more accurate term "bioengineered." Mark Mansour
& Sarah Key, From Farm to Fork: The Impact on Global Commerce of the New European Union
Biotechnology Regulatory Scheme, 38 INT'L LAW. 55, 65 (2004).
2. See generally Life Sciences and Biotechnology-A Strategy for Europe: Second
Progress Report and Future Orientations, COM(2004)250 final.
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farmers and food producers."3 Nonetheless, producers and consum-
ers in the E.U. have been reluctant to grow GM crops or to consume
GM foods, 4 and scientists disagree about the risks and net benefits of
GM crops and food products. European Community (E.C.) legislators
enacted new regulatory measures only after long deliberation, and
some Member States continue to object to the use of GM crops and
foods in their territories.
Under the new regulatory measures, the E.C. has started to ap-
prove GM products. In July 2004, the European Commission ap-
proved the import and processing of Monsanto's GM maize, NK603,
for use in animal feed and for industrial purposes, but not for cultiva-
tion or for food.5 The maize was approved for ten years under strin-
gent new regulations. A scientific risk assessment ensured that it
poses no danger to the environment, and an assessment by the Euro-
pean Food Safety Authority concluded that it is as safe as non-GM
corn. 6 When sold, the corn must be labeled clearly as genetically
modified, and its unique identifier will ensure that it can be traced
through the process of post-market monitoring.7 In October 2004,
the Commission authorized the placing on the market of food and
food ingredients derived from the same NK603 maize.8 Monsanto
had submitted its initial request to place NK603 on the market in
April 2001, and the regulatory process for authorization of food and
feed uses had lasted three and one-half years.9
3. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PLANTS FOR THE FuTURE-2025: A EUROPEAN VISION
FOR PLANT GENOMICS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 19 (2004).
4. In 2002, only about 25,000 hectares of GM crops were sown, mostly in Spain.
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, STA-
TISTICAL AND ECONOMIC INFORMATION 2003 at 4.23 (Feb. 2004).
5. Commission Decision 2004/643, 2004 OJ. (L 295) 35. Art. 5 indicates that the
Decision does not apply until NK603 has also been approved for food.
6. European Food Safety Authority, Opinion of the Scientific Panel on Geneti-
cally Modified Organisms, 2003 E.F.S.A. J. 10, 1-13, available at http://www.efsa.eu.
int/science/gino/gmo-opinions/176/opiniongmo 03_final enl.pdf.
7. See Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the placing on the market, in
accordance with Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil, of a maize product (Zea mays L. line NK 603) genetically modified for glyphosate
tolerance, COM(2004)193 final.
8. Press Release, European Commission, Genetically modified NK603 maize
authorised for both food and feed (IP/04/1305, Oct. 26, 2004). The authorizations
do not allow cultivation in the E.U.
9. Proposal for a Council Decision authorizing the placing on the market of
foods and food ingredients derived from genetically modified maize line NK 603 as
novel foods or novel food ingredients under Regulation (EC) No 258/97, COM
(2004)439 final, at 2.
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Similarly, in May 2004, the Commission authorized the placing
on the market of a GM sweet corn, Syngenta's Btll.'0 This corn was
authorized for import in 1998, and the recent authorization applies to
canned corn. The corn will be labeled as genetically modified, can be
traced by its unique identifier, and will be entered in the Community
Register of Genetically Modified Food and Feed.1' With these approv-
als, eighteen GM foods and nine GM feeds have been approved for
sale in the European Union since 1996.
Approvals of GM crops for cultivation in the E.U. have progressed
more slowly. For the first time, in September 2004, the Commission
listed genetically modified seeds in the E.U. Common Catalogue of
Varieties of Agricultural Plant Species. 12 The seventeen varieties were
derived from Monsanto's MON 810 maize, authorized in 1998. List-
ing in the Common Catalogue allows the maize to be sold and planted
in all Member States.
1 3
The approval of NK603 corn signaled the end of a de facto mora-
torium on approvals of GM crops for import since 1998. To some
extent, the de facto moratorium was the result of a perception that
regulatory measures were inadequate to govern GM crops, food, and
feed. In 2001, after a lengthy regulatory process, the E.C. began to
enact new measures to ensure that GMOs are regulated during the
experimental stage, when they are placed on the market, and after-
wards; that those products can be identified and traced through their
life cycle; and that labeling will provide adequate information and
consumer choice.
The most important measures directed specifically toward GMOs
are
U Directive 90/219 on the contained use of genetically modified micro-
organisms, as amended.'"
10. Commission Decision 2004/657, 2004 O.J. (L 300) 48.
11. See Proposal for a Council Decision authorising the placing on the market of
sweet corn from genetically modified maize line Btl 1 as a novel food or novel food
ingredients under Regulation (EC) no 258/97, COM(2004)10 final; Press Release,
European Commission, Commission authorises import of canned GM-sweet corn
under new strict labelling conditions-consumers can choose (IP/04/663, May 19,
2004).
12. The Common Catalog is governed by Council Directive 2002/53, 2002 O.J. (L
193) 1, as amended.
13. Press Release, European Commission, Inscription of MON 810 GM maize vari-
eties in the Common EU Catalogue of Varieties (IP/04/1083, Sept. 8, 2004).
14. Council Directive 90/219, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 1, as amended; consolidated text
at CONSLEG 1990L0219-20/11/2003.
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* Directive 2001/18 on the deliberate release into the environment of
genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/
220, as amended.1 5
* Regulation 1829/2003 on genetically modified food and feed.
1 6
* Regulation 1830/2003 concerning the traceability and labelling of
genetically modified organisms and the traceability of food and feed
products produced from genetically modified organisms and amend-
ing Directive 2001/18.17
The last two measures replace several Regulations (1139/98,18 49/
2000,19 and 50/200020), as well as the Novel Foods Regulation,
2 1
which had governed pre-market authorization and labeling for GM
foods, insofar as it applied to GMOs.
The Commission has proposed a Decision to establish minimum
thresholds for adventitious or technically unavoidable traces of GM
seeds in other products, 22 but at a September 2004 meeting, the mea-
sure was not agreed. The Food Law, Regulation 178/2002,23 sets out
general principles and establishes the European Food Safety Author-
ity. In addition, the Environmental Liability Directive applies to allo-
cate responsibility for some types of damage for contained use,
deliberate release, transport, or placing on the market of GMOs.
24
Other measures, mentioned below, also apply.
A. Lawmaking in the E. C.
The European Union, now twenty-five Member States, is gov-
erned by primary legislation-its founding Treaties, as amended-
and by secondary legislation.
15. Parliament and Council Directive, 2001 OJ. (L 106) 1, as amended; consoli-
dated text at CONSLEG 2001L0018-07/11/2003.
16. Parliament and Council Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 OJ. (L 268) 1.
17. Parliament and Council Regulation 2001/18, 2003 OJ. (L 268) 24.
18. Council Regulation 1139/98, 1998 O.J. (L 159) 4 (labeling of food produced
from GMOs).
19. Commission Regulation 49/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 6) 13 (amending Regulation
1139/98).
20. Commission Regulation 50/2000, 2000 OJ. (L 6) 15 (labeling for GM addi-
tives and flavorings).
21. Parliament and Council Regulation 258/97, 1997 OJ. (L 43) 1. Parts of the
Regulation remain in effect.
22. Draft Commission Decision establishing minimum thresholds for adventitious
or technically unavoidable traces of genetically modified seeds in other products,
http://www.genfood.at/download/com-draftseeds-04_2004.pdf.
23. Parliament and Council Regulation 178/2002, 2002 OJ. (L 31) 1.
24. Parliament and Council Directive 2004/35, 2004 OJ. (L 143) 56.
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1. Primary Legislation: The Treaties
The Treaties establish the E.C. and many of its institutions, au-
thorize Community activities, and prescribe procedures for decision
making. The Treaty of Rome (1958) established the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC); the Treaty on European Union (1993)
changed the name of the EEC to European Community (EC) and ad-
ded new cooperation. The Single European Act (1987) helped com-
plete the single market and added the environment title. The
Amsterdam Treaty (1999) made further amendments and renum-
bered the Treaty, and the Treaty of Nice (2003) streamlined proce-
dures for new Member States.
2 5
In June 2004, E.U. leaders agreed on the text of a new Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe. 26 After translation into all offi-
cial languages, the Constitution was signed by Heads of State and Gov-
ernment of the Member States in Rome, in October 2004. All twenty-
five Member States must ratify the Constitution, using their own con-
stitutional procedures, before it can enter into force. If the ratifica-
tion procedure is successful, the Constitution will enter into force in
November 2006.27 The Constitution will create one Union, which will
replace the European Communities and European Union, and the
Constitution will govern the Union, replacing the E.U. and E.C.
Treaties.
28
2. Secondary Legislation: Types of Measures
The Treaty entrusts enactment of secondary legislation to the Eu-
ropean Parliament acting jointly with the Council, to the Council, and
to the Commission. The E.C. enacts secondary legislation under au-
thority of the Treaty, and measures normally identify the source of
25. The various Treaties are available at European Commission, Treaties, http://
europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/search/search treaties.html.
26. TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C
310) 1 (2004) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION].
27. European Union, Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, at http://eu-
ropa.eu.int/futurum/referendum-en.htm (last visited June 13, 2005). The Heads of
State of three candidate countries, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, also signed. In
Spring 2005, however, both France and the Netherlands rejected the Constitution in
national referenda, raising doubts about its success. See, e.g., Ed Johnson, Britain Sets
Aside Vote on EU Constitution After Defeats in France, Netherlands, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB-
UNE, June 6, 2005, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/2005
0606-1638-britain-euconstitution.html.
28. European Union, Summary of the Agreement on the Constitutional Treaty (June 28,
2004) (a non-paper to provide information on the Treaty), at http://europa.eu.int/
futurum (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
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authority. Measures that govern GMOs and GM food and feed invoke
Treaty authority to regulate in the areas of agriculture, the environ-
ment, and public health,29 as well as authority for the approximation
(or harmonization) of Member State laws that affect the establish-
ment or functioning of the internal market.30
GMOs are governed by several different types of secondary legis-
lation. Most important are regulations and directives. "A regulation
shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and
directly applicable in all Member States. '3 1 Because regulations apply
directly, most need not be transposed into Member State law. Regula-
tions that govern GMOs, however, require cooperation of Member
States in the authorization process. "A directive shall be binding, as to
the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is ad-
dressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form
and methods. ''3 2 Directives are normally effective after implementa-
tion in Member State law, usually by a deadline established in the di-
rective. The Commission may seek enforcement against Member
States that fail to enact implementing provisions.33
Other measures include decisions, recommendations, and opin-
ions. Decisions may be addressed to Member States or private parties,
and "a decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it
is addressed."34 "Recommendations and opinions shall have no bind-
ing force.
'35
3. Enacting Secondary Legislation
The Treaty prescribes several methods for enacting directives and
regulations. Most important is the co-decision procedure, 36 a lengthy
process that requires agreement of both the European Parliament
and the Council. Most recent measures that govern GMOs have been
enacted under this procedure. In addition, the Commission or the
Council often issues detailed rules to implement measures enacted by
Parliament and Council.
29. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3
(1997) [hereinafter E.C. TRAT].
30. Id. art. 95.
31. Id. art. 249.
32. Id.
33. Id. art. 226; see, e.g., Case C-296/01, Commission v. French Rep., 2003 E.C.R. I-
0000 (finding that France failed to transpose Directive 90/220, the original measure
that governed deliberate release of GMOs).
34. E.C. TREATY art. 249.
35. Id.
36. Id. art. 251.
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4. Case Law
The European Court of Justice and Court of First Instance37 en-
sure that "in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law
is observed."38 The Commission, national courts, and individuals may
refer matters to the courts. The Treaty establishes the jurisdiction of
each court.
B. Environmental Principles
The Treaty of Rome did not provide Community competence for
environmental matters or even mention the word "environment."
Nonetheless, beginning in 1973, the Commission published a series of
Environmental Action Programs, and the Council enacted environ-
mental legislation under authority of more general Treaty articles. In
1987, the Single European Act added a title on the environment and
provided a clear legal basis for enacting environmental measures.39
1. Principles
The environmental title of the Treaty, as amended, indicates that
community environmental policy should "aim at a high level of pro-
tection" and should be based on "the precautionary principle and on
the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environ-
mental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the
polluter should pay."40 The integration principle encourages environ-
mental protection by prescribing that environmental protection must
be integrated into the definition and implementation of other Com-
munity policies and activities. 41 These principles help to guide E.C.
regulation of GMOs; among them, the precautionary principle has re-
ceived most attention.
37. Id. arts. 220-245.
38. Id. art. 220.
39. For detail on E.C. environmental authority, see Margaret Rosso Grossman,
Agro-Environmental Measures in the Common Agricultural Policy, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 927,
937-53 (1995).
40. E.C. TREATY art. 174(2); CONSTITUTION art. 111-233(2) also includes these
principles.
41. E.C. TREATY art. 6; CONSTITUTION art. 11-97.
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2. Precautionary Principle
a) In General
Evolving, perhaps, from the German Vorsorgeprinzip,42 the precau-
tionary principle (or precautionary approach) has become part of in-
ternational law, particularly for measures that protect the
environment. For example, The Rio Declaration invokes the princi-
ple: "In order to protect the environment, the precautionary ap-
proach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.1
43
Similarly, the Convention on Biological Diversity advocates the
precautionary approach, noting that "lack of full scientific certainty
should not be used as a reason for postponing measures" to minimize
loss of biological diversity. 44 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to
the Convention on Biological Diversity, which entered into force in
September 2003 and governs living modified organisms, uses a pre-
cautionary approach when importing parties are faced with "[1] ack of
scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information
and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of
a living modified organism." 45
Developed in environmental law, the precautionary principle has
also been applied in other fields, including food law and public health
measures. The principle has engendered significant controversy, and
it is not uniformly accepted, interpreted, or applied. 46
In the E.C., the precautionary principle is enshrined, though not
explained, among the environmental principles in the Treaty; under
the integration principle, it should also be incorporated in other E.C.
42. Vorsorgeprinzip means "principle of precaution."
43. U.N. CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, Rio DECLARATION ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, Principle 15, U.N. Doc. 4/conf.151/26 (vol. I),
U.N. Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 (1992).
44. CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, pmbl., June 5, 1992, available at http://
www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp?g=0&a-cbd-00.
45. Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 11(8) (2000), 39 I.L.M. 1027, available at
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf. For more information
on the precautionary principle, see LUCAS BERGKAMP, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW FOR
THE NEW ECONOMY 157-214 (2003); NICOLAS DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCI-
PLES: FROM POLITICAL SLOGANS TO LEGAL RULES 91-223 (2002).
46. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PENN. L. REV.
1003, 1004 ("I aim to challenge the precautionary principle ... because, read for all
that it is worth, it leads in no direction at all.").
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policies.4 7 The Communication from the Commission on the precautionary
principle48 provides explanation and guidelines for application. The
Commission notes:
Although the precautionary principle is not explicitly mentioned in
the Treaty except in the environmental field, its scope is far wider
and covers those specific circumstances where scientific evidence is
insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and there are indications
through preliminary objective scientific evaluation that there are
reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous ef-
fects on the environment, human, animal or plant health may be
inconsistent with the chosen level of protection.
49
The principle is used to manage risk, and its use is triggered by unac-
ceptable risk and scientific uncertainty. Measures based on the princi-
ple must be proportional, non-discriminatory, consistent with similar
measures, based on analysis of costs and benefits, subject to review in
light of new scientific data (that is, temporary), and assign responsibil-
ity for producing scientific data.
50
The Council endorsed the broad lines of this Communication
and, among other recommendations, called on the Commission to in-
corporate the principle in legislative proposals and other actions,
where appropriate. 51 A European Parliament resolution raised issues
about application of the principle.5 2 Parliament noted that the pre-
cautionary principle is only one of several tools for risk management
and should be "part of an overall policy based on other factors such
as, for instance, traceability or labelling.
'53
b) GMOs and the Precautionary Principle
Because biotechnology is perceived to pose uncertain risks to
health and the environment, GMOs have invited application of the
precautionary principle. The principle has influenced the regulation
47. DE SADELEER, supra note 45, at 110. For a Court of First Instance decision ap-
plying the principle, see Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council, 2002
E.C.R. 11-3305.
48. Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle,
COM(2000)1 final.
49. Id. at 9-10.
50. Id. at 16-20.
51. Council Resolution on the Precautionary Principle, 1, 24, Annex III to Eu-
ropean Council, Nice, Conclusions of the Presidency (Dec. 2000), http://www.
europarl.eu.int/summits/nice2_en.htm.
52. European Parliament Resolution on the Precautionary Principle, 2001 O.J. (C
232) 345.
53. Id. at 347.
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of GMOs in the E.C., and much commentary has focused on its appli-
cation to the management of risk from GMOs.
54
Early E.C. legislation that governed GMOs used a precautionary
approach, but without referring directly to the precautionary princi-
ple. For example, Directive 90/220 did not cite the principle, though
it did invoke the related principle that preventive action should be
taken.5 5 Nonetheless, the precautionary approach played a role in im-
plementation of this and other measures, and it was one basis for the
de facto moratorium on authorizations of GM varieties that began in
October 1998.56
Directive 2001/18 again mentions the prevention principle and
directly invokes the precautionary principle: "The precautionary prin-
ciple has been taken into account in the drafting of this Directive and
must be taken into account when implementing it."5 7 In addition,
"Member States shall, in accordance with the precautionary principle,
ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to avoid adverse effects
on human health and the environment which might arise from the
deliberate release or the placing on the market of GMOs. ' '5 8 Various
provisions of Directive 2001/18, especially for risk assessment and
post-approval monitoring, implement the principle.
The 2002 Food Law, which lays down general principles and re-
quirements for food safety, devotes an article to the precautionary
principle:
In specific circumstances where, following an assessment of availa-
ble information, the possibility of harmful effects on health is iden-
tified but scientific uncertainty persists, provisional risk
management measures necessary to ensure the high level of health
protection chosen in the Community may be adopted, pending fur-
ther scientific information for a more comprehensive risk
assessment.
59
Measures enacted should be "proportionate and no more restrictive
of trade than is required .... [with] regard being had to technical
and economic feasibility and other factors.
' '60
54. E.g., Zeynep Kivilcim Forsman, Community Regulation of Genetically Modified Orga-
nisms: A Difficult Relationship Between Law and Science, 10 EUR. L.J. 580 (2004).
55. Council Directive 90/220, pmbl., 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15, 15.
56. See Silvia Francescon, The New Directive 2001/18/EC on the Deliberate Release of
Genetically Modified Organisms into the Environment: Changes and Perspectives, 10 REv. EUR.
CMTY. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 309, 311 (2001).
57. Parliament and Council Directive 2001/18, pmbl. (8), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 1.
58. Directive 2001/18, art. 4(1), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 5.
59. Parliament and Council Regulation 178/2002, art. 7(1), 2002 O.J. (L 31) 1, 9.
60. Regulation 178/2002, art. 7(2), 2002 O.J. (L 31) at 9.
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The 2003 regulation on traceability and labeling, refers to "risk
management measures in accordance with the precautionary princi-
ple."61 The accompanying GM food and feed Regulation refers in-
stead to a "high level of protection of human life and health." 62
II. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REGULATORY MEASURES
European Community regulation of GMOs and GM food and
feed relies on a number of interrelated Directives and Regulations. 63
These have been enacted and revised over the past fifteen years,64 and
the regulatory system is not yet complete. The system for authorizing
the use of GMOs is process based, rather than product based. It re-
quires case-by-case authorization of GMOs and follows a step-by-step
process of decreasing containment. Traceability and labeling, with
thresholds for their applicability, are important components of the
most recent E.C. regulation.
Because the focus of these materials is new E.C. measures that
govern food and feed and require traceability and labeling, provisions
for authorization of GMOs under older measures are treated only
briefly, despite the detailed regulatory scheme.
A. Contained Use-Directive 90/219, as Amended
Directive 90/219, which continues in force, sets out measures for
the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms (GMMs).
Contained use refers to activities in which micro-organisms are geneti-
cally modified or in which the GMMs are used in any way, and for
which "specific containment measures are used to limit their contact
with, and to provide a high level of safety for, the general population
and the environment. '65 The Directive thus governs research, work in
61. Parliament and Council Regulation 1830/2003, pmbl. (3), 2003 OJ. (L 268)
24, 24.
62. Parliament and Council Regulation 1829/2003, pmbl. (2), 2003 OJ. (L 268) 1,
1.
63. The most important measures are listed in the Introduction, supra text accom-
panying notes 14-24.
64. Measures enacted in 1990 governed the contained use of genetically modified
micro-organisms (Council Directive 90/219, 1990 OJ. (L 117) 1) and the deliberate
release of genetically modified organisms into the environment (Council Directive
90/220, 1990 OJ. (L 117) 15). Council Directive 90/220 was repealed, effective Oc-
tober 17, 2002, when Directive 2001/18 took effect. Council Directive 90/219, as
amended, continues in force.
65. Parliament and Council Directive 90/219, art. 2(c), 1990 OJ. (L 117) 1, as
amended; consolidated text at CONSLEG 1990L0219 - 20/11/2003.
2005]
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
laboratories, and industrial work with GMMs. Member States assume
responsibility for many aspects of implementation.
Member States designate a competent authority to assume re-
sponsibility for implementing the Directive, including inspections and
other control measures. Member States must avoid adverse effects on
health and environment from contained uses of GMMs. Therefore,
users are to carry out risk assessments to determine the class of risk
(negligible, low, moderate, or high risk) and the resulting assignment
of containment level. 66 Moderate or high risk contained use of GMMs
requires prior written consent of the competent authority.67 Users
have responsibility to apply the containment and other protective
measures that apply to each class of contained use and to notify Mem-
ber State authorities of activities carried out on their premises.68
Member States must report to the Commission when accidents occur
and annually (with a summary every three years). They must also no-
tify other States of relevant incidents (e.g., accidents).
Annexes to the Directive describe criteria to be met when estab-
lishing safety of GMMs for human health and the environment (An-
nex II); principles to be applied in the risk assessment (Annex III);
measures required for various types of containment-laboratories,
growing rooms, animal units, other activities (Annex IV); and infor-




The E.C. enacted Directive 2001/18 after a decade of experience
with its predecessor, Council Directive 90/22070 and a Commission
review of its effectiveness. 71 The new Deliberate Release Directive was
intended to make the decision making process for authorizing GMOs
more efficient and transparent and to control risks that might
66. Directive 90/219, arts. 5, 6, 1990 OJ. (L 117) at 4, 5.
67. Directive 90/219, art. 10, 1990 OJ. (L 117) at 6.
68. Directive 90/219, arts. 7-12, 1990 OJ. (L 117) at 5, 6-7.
69. For more detail on Directives 90/219 and 90/220, see Margaret Rosso Gross-
man & A. Bryan Endres, Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms in the European
Union, 44 AM. BEHAVIORAL ScL 378, 393-403 (2000).
70. Council Directive 90/220, 1.990 OJ. (L 117) 15, as amended (no longer in
force).
71. Report of the Commission on the Review of Council Directive 90/220/EEC,
cited in Parliament and Council Directive 2001/18, pmbl. (1), 2001 OJ. (L 106) 1.
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threaten human health and the environment. 72 It imposed more
stringent measures for environmental risk assessment, added a post-
market monitoring requirement, limited the authorization for release
of GMOs to ten years, and required Member States to ensure tracea-
bility and labeling of GMOs at all stages of placing on the market.
A number of other regulatory measures supplement Directive
2001/18 with detailed guidance notes (e.g., Council Decision 2002/
811, 73 Commission Decision 2002/62374), format instructions for sub-
mitting information (e.g., Council Decisions 2002/812, 2002/813; 75
Commission Decision 2003/70176), and arrangements for GMO regis-
ters (e.g., Commission Decision 2004/20477). Member States were to
have implemented Directive 2001/18 in their national laws by 17 Oc-
tober 2002. Not all States have done so. As of August 2004, seven of
the fifteen Member States and eight of the ten new States had commu-
nicated implementation measures. The Commission filed legal ac-
tions against eight of the fifteen Member States for failure to enact
national measures.
78
Under the Directive, a genetically modified organism is "an or-
ganism, with the exception of human beings, in which the genetic
material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by
mating and/or natural recombination. ' '79 General provisions in the
Directive-e.g., environmental risk assessment, confidentiality, consul-
tation requirements-apply to all GMOs.
Anyone who plans to seek authorization for release of a GMO
must carry out an environmental risk assessment.8 0 The Directive
identifies the types of information that might be needed to carry out
72. Directive 2001/18, pmbl. (5), (48), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 3. See also Estelle Bros-
set, The Prior Authorisation Procedure Adopted for the Deliberate Release into the Environment
of Genetically Modified Organisms: the Complexities of Balancing Community and National
Competences, 10 EUR. LJ. 555 (2004).
73. Council Decision 2002/811, 2002 OJ. (L 280) 27.
74. Commission Decision 2002/623, 2002 OJ. (L 200) 22.
75. Council Decision 2002/812, 2002 OJ. (L 280) 37; Council Decision 2002/813,
2002 OJ. (L 280) 62.
76. Commission Decision 2003/701, 2003 OJ. (L 254) 21.
77. Commission Decision 2004/204, 2004 OJ. (L 65) 20.
78. Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on
the experience of member states with GMOs placed on the market under Directive
2001/18/EC and incorporating a specific report on the operation of parts B and C of
the Directive, COM(2004)575 final at 4. This document is a report on Member State
experience under Directive 2001/18.
79. Directive 2001/18, art. 2(2), 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 4.
80. Directive 2000/18, art. 6, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 6.
2005]
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
the risk assessment for higher plants and for other organisms.8 1 Po-
tential adverse effects of the release on human health and the envi-
ronment, especially from gene transfer, must be assessed on a case-by-
case basis. The Directive establishes "principles" for risk assessment,8 2
and the Commission provided more specific guidance.8 3
Directive 2001/18 governs deliberate release of GMOs in two cir-
cumstances: "any other purpose than for placing on the market" (in
Part B) and "placing on the market of GMOs as or in products" (in
Part C). These two circumstances are discussed separately.
2. Non-Market Deliberate Releases
Directive 2001/18 implements a step-by-step principle. That is,
"the containment of GMOs is reduced and the scale of release in-
creased gradually, step by step, but only if evaluation of the earlier
steps in terms of protection of human health and the environment
indicates that the next step can be taken."8 4 GMOs cannot be placed
on the market until they have been field tested in appropriate ecosys-
tems; therefore deliberate release at the research stage is one of the
steps towards marketing.
85
Member States, through their competent authorities, play the
main role in authorizing non-market deliberate releases, e.g., releases
for field testing or other research. The Directive governs the proce-
dure to be followed and the time frames for the various steps in the
process.
A notification to the Member State competent authority is re-
quired before a deliberate release of a GMO or combination of
GMOs. The notification requires a technical dossier, including de-
tailed information prescribed in Annex l11,86 and the environmental
risk assessment.8 7 A summary of each notification must be sent to the
Commission, which forwards the summary to other Member States,
81. Directive 2000/18, Annex III, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 23-31.
82. Directive 2000/18, Annex iI, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 19-22.
83. Commission Decision 2002/623, 2002 OJ. (L 200) 22. Applicants should de-
termine risk by evaluating possible adverse effects, their likelihood, and the magni-
tude of the consequences, and by identifying management strategies available to
reduce risks.
84. Directive 2001/18, pmbl. (24), 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 2.
85. Directive 2001/18, pmbl. (23), (25); 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 2.
86. See also Council Decision 2002/813, art. 1, 2002 OJ. (L 280) 62, 62 (establish-
ing the particular summary notification format that must be used in connection with
a non-market deliberate release).
87. Directive 2001/18, art. 6, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 6.
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who may "present observations."18 If appropriate, Member States may
consult the public on a proposed release.8 9 The competent authority
must give written consent to the release or, if the proposed release
does not comply with the Directive, reject the notification.
No release is permitted until the notifier has received written
consent from the competent authority. After the release, the notifier
must report results, especially concerning risk to health or the envi-
ronment, to the competent authority.90 Member States must make
available to the public information on all releases in their territory,
but without disclosing confidential information. 9 1 Commission Deci-
sion 2004/204 sets forth detailed guidance for Member States to fol-
low in developing publicly accessible registers. 92
C. Placing on the Market
Placing products on the market affects the entire Community.
Once a written consent for a GMO has been issued, that GMO may be
used "without further notification throughout the community."
93
Member States may not "prohibit, restrict or impede the placing on
the market of GMOs, as or in products," if the GMOs have been au-
thorized. 94 Therefore the procedures for placing GMOs on the mar-
ket are more complicated and require more involvement of the
Commission and the competent authorities of all Member States.
Directive 2001/18 makes clear that placing on the market also
covers imports. That is, products containing or consisting of GMOs
cannot be imported into the E.C. if they do not comply with E.C.
requirements.95
Directive 2001/18 governs the placing on the market of GMOs,
and Regulation 1829/2003 governs GM food and feed. Under the
latter, the "one door-one key principle" applies; that is, a single au-
88. Directive 2001/18, art. 11, 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 8.
89. Directive 2001/18, art. 9(1), 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 8.
90. Directive 2001/18, art. 10, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 8; see also Decision 2003/701,
2003 O.J. (L 254) 21 (providing the format for reporting results of a non-market
deliberate release).
91. Directive 2001/18, arts. 9(2), 25, 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 8, 14.
92. Commission Decision 2004/204, 2004 O.J. (L 65) 20. To protect commercial
interests, two sets of data should be maintained, one accessible to the public and the
other accessible only to Member States, the Commission, and EFSA.
93. Directive 2001/18, art. 19(1), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 12.
94. Directive 2001/18, art. 22, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 13. Article 22 applies without
prejudice to the safeguard clause, Article 23.
95. Directive 2001/18, pmbl. (11), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 1.
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The authorization procedure for GMOs to be placed on the mar-
ket under Directive 2001/18 begins with notification to the Member
State competent authority. That notification must include informa-
tion about the GMO, the environmental risk assessment, a plan for
post-release monitoring, conditions for use and handling of the prod-
uct, a summary of the dossier, and other information. 97 The summary
dossier must be prepared according to the format prescribed by the
Council. Required information includes the nature of the GMO and
its predicted behavior, plus information about previous releases and
the monitoring plan. 98
The post-release monitoring plan is an important component of
the notification. The Directive describes its contents in general
terms,99 and guidance notes provide additional details.10 0 The objec-
tive of the monitoring plan for a GMO is to ensure that the assump-
tions underlying the environmental risk assessment are correct and to
identify unanticipated adverse effects on human health or the envi-
ronment.1 0 1 In light of the unique characteristics of each GMO, mon-
itoring plans must be developed on a case-by-case basis.
10 2
The Member State competent authority must examine each noti-
fication for compliance with the Directive, then prepare an assess-
ment report. The report should focus particularly on the proposed
use, the environmental risk assessment, and the proposed post-release
monitoring plan.10 3 A competent authority may decide that a GMO
should not be placed on the market and reject the notification. If the
competent authority concludes that the GMO should be placed on
the market, the authority must send the dossier summary, along with
its assessment report on the proposed GMO, to the Commission and
to the competent authorities of the other Member States.10 4 The
96. Parliament and Council Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 0.J. (L 268) 1.
97. Directive 2001/18, art. 13(2), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 9.
98. Council Decision 2002/812, Annex, 2002 0J. (L 280) 37, 38.
99. Directive 2001/18, Annex VII, 2002 0J. (L 106) at 36.
100. Council Decision 2002/811, Annex, 2002 0J. (L 280) 27, 27-36.
101. Decision 2002/811, Annex, 2002 OJ. (L 280) at 29.
102. Decision 2002/811, Annex, 2002 0J. (L 280) at 28.
103. Directive 2001/18, Annex VI, 2001 0J. (L 106) at 35.
104. Directive 2001/18, art. 4, 2001 0J. (L 106) at 9-10. If the competent authority
concludes that the GMO should not be placed on the market, the procedure differs
slightly. See Directive 2001/18, art. 15, 2001 0.J. (L 106) at 10.
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Commission must make the dossier summary and assessment report
available to the public for comment.10
5
The Commission and other Member States have the opportunity
to ask for information, make comments, or "present reasoned objec-
tions" to the placing of a GMO on the market. 10 6 If no objections are
made, or if outstanding issues are resolved, the competent authority
that assessed the GMO may give written consent to the notifier and
also inform the Commission and the other Member States. 107 Indeed,
in a case brought under Directive 90/220, the European Court ofJus-
tice held that when no objections are raised, the competent authority
is obliged to give consent.1
08
Written consent will be explicit and will include specific condi-
tions for use, handling and packaging of the GMO or for protection
of the environment, labeling requirements ("This product contains
genetically modified organisms."), and obligations for monitoring. 10 9
After consent, notifiers must follow the prescribed monitoring plan
and report regularly to the Commission and competent authorities;
results of monitoring are also available to the public.110 Written con-
sent shall be given for a maximum of ten years, and the Directive
prescribes a procedure for renewal.111
The standard procedure described above applies unless the Com-
mission or a Member State raises and maintains an objection to con-
sent. In most cases under prior law (that is Directive 90/220),
objections have been raised.1 2 Under Directive 2001/18, when objec-
tions are raised, the Commission must consult the competent Scien-
tific Committee, the Scientific Panel on GMOs of the European Food
Safety Authority.' 13 If the scientific decision is favorable, the Commis-
sion will follow the Community inter-agency regulatory procedure to
reach a decision. 11 4 The Commission submits a draft of the measure
to be taken (i.e., a legislative decision to give consent to a proposed
GMO) to a regulatory committee, made up of Member State repre-
105. Directive 2001/18, art. 24(1), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 14.
106. Directive 2001/18, art. 15(1), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 10.
107. See Directive 2001/18, art. 15(3), 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 10.
108. Case C-6/99, Association Greenpeace France v. Minist~re de l'Agriculture et
de la Pfche, [2000] E.C.R. 1-1651. See Francescon, supra note 56, at 312.
109. Directive 2001/18, art. 19(3), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 12.
110. Directive 2001/18, art. 20, 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 12-13.
111. Directive 2001/18, arts. 15(4), 17, 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 10-11.
112. See Brosset, supra note 72, at 568-71 (outlining Member State failures to
cooperate).
113. Directive 2001/18, art. 28, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 14-15.
114. Directive 2001/18, arts. 18, 30(2), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 12, 15. That procedure
is set out in Council Decision 1999/468, art. 5, 1999 O.J. (L 184) 23, 25.
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sentatives. If that committee agrees, the Commission will grant con-
sent. If not, the Commission submits the measure to the Council (and
informs Parliament). If the Council does not agree or oppose the
consent by a qualified majority, the Commission may grant consent.
Under this procedure, for example, the Commission granted consent
for placing Maize NK603 on the market. 1
15
Even after consent is granted, a safeguard clause protects Mem-
ber States.1 16 A Member State may provisionally restrict or prohibit
use or sale of a GMO as or in a product on its territory under limited
conditions. The Member State must have detailed grounds for con-
sidering that the GMO poses a risk to human health or the environ-
ment, on the basis of either information made available since the date
of consent or a reassessment of existing information using new scien-
tific information. 1 7 The Member State must inform the Commission
and other Member States, including its review of environmental risk
and other information. The Commission, with assistance of the Scien-
tific Committee, must decide whether the Member State's action is
justified. A number of Member States have invoked the safeguard
clause in attempted bans of GMOs.1 18 In July 2004, for example, the
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) published opinions of the
Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms that found no
new scientific evidence that would justify prohibition of certain GM
crops in Greece or Austria. 119
The Treaty offers an additional general safeguard. Article 95(5)
permits Member States to introduce national provisions after adop-
tion of a Council or Commission harmonization measure, "based on
115. Commission Decision 2004/643, 2004 OJ. (L 295) 35.
116. Directive 2001/18, art. 23, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 13.
117. Directive 2001/18, art. 23, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 13.
118. Six Member States invoked the safeguard clause, art. 16, of Directive 90/220,
in nine applications. In each instance, no justification for the state ban was found.
European Commission, Questions and Answers on the Regulation of GMOs in the European
Union, at 8 & Annex 5 (Nov. 2004), http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/food/bi-
otechology/gmfood/qanda-en.pdf. For a list of Member State invocations of the
safeguard clause, see Invocation of Article 16 under Directive 90/220/EC and Article
23 under Directive 2001/18/EC (Safeguard clause) as of 15 March 2005, http://eu-
ropa.eu.int/comm/environment/biotechnology/safeguardcClauses.htm.
119. European Food Safety Authority, Opinion of the Scientific Panel on Geneti-
cally Modified Organisms on a request from the Commission related to the Austrian
invoke of Article 23 of Directive 2001/18/EC, 2004 E.F.S.A. J. 78, 1-13, http://www.
efsa.eu.int/science/gmo/gmo-opinions/507_en.html; European Food Safety Au-
thority, Opinion of the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms on a re-
quest from the Commission related to the Greek invoke of Article 23 of Directive
2001/18/EC, 2004 E.F.S.A. J. 79, 1-8, http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/gmo/
gmo-opinions/506_en.html.
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new scientific evidence relating to the protection of the environment
... on grounds of a problem specific to that Member State arising
after the adoption of the harmonisation measure." 120 The Member
State must notify the Commission of the proposed provisions and the
grounds for enacting them; the Commission must ascertain whether
the provisions discriminate or restrict trade and whether they inter-
fere with the internal market.121 Relying on this Treaty provision,
Austria proposed a ban on the use of GMOs in Upper Austria, justify-
ing its measure as a means to protect traditional and organic produc-
tion systems, nature, the environment, and biodiversity. 122 Austria's
proposed measure, a ban on GMOs, was more restrictive than the
case-by-case authorization procedure prescribed in Directive 2001/
18.123 To evaluate the scientific justification for the proposed Aus-
trian ban, the Commission asked the advice of EFSA, which consulted
the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms. EFSA con-
cluded that Austria's justification did not meet the requirements of
Treaty Article 95(5),124 and the Commission therefore rejected Aus-
tria's proposed national provisions. 125
2. Food and Feed-Regulation 1829/2003
a) In General
Regulation 1829/2003 on GM food and feed is designed to en-
sure a high level of protection of human and animal health and to set
out provisions for authorizing, supervising, and labeling GM food and
feed. 126 The Regulation relies on the new principles articulated in
Directive 2001/18 and uses the framework for risk assessment estab-
lished in the 2002 Food Law, Regulation 178/2002.127
120. EC TREATY art. 95(5). Article 95(4) includes an analogous provision for ex-
isting Member State measures.
121. EC TREATY art. 95(5) (6).
122. Commission Decision 2003/653, 2003 OJ. (L 230) at 36. The difficulties
posed by coexistence of organic and GM crops concerned Austria.
123. Decision 2003/653, 2003 oJ. (L 230) at 34, 39. Moreover, Directive 2001/18
permitted widespread circulation of approved GMOs whereas Austria sought to pro-
hibit circulation of an approved GMO.
124. Decision 2003/653, 2003 OJ. (L 230) at 42. Austria did not provide new scien-
tific evidence related to protection of the environment, prove that its concerns about
the coexistence of organic and GM crops were environmental, or show that Upper
Austria had unique ecosystems.
125. Decision 2003/653, 2003 OJ. (L 230) at 43.
126. Parliament and Council Regulation 1829/2003, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 1-2.
127. Regulation 1829/2003, pmbl. (9), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 2. See also Parliament
and Council Regulation 178/2002, 2002 OJ. (L 31) 1.
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EFSA administers Regulation 1829/2003, carrying out responsi-
bilities similar to those of the Commission under the Deliberate Re-
lease Directive. EFSA assesses the risks of GM food or feed, albeit with
assistance from Member State agencies. 128 The Food Law makes the
Scientific Committee and permanent Scientific Panels of independent
scientific experts responsible for providing scientific opinions of the
EFSA.129 A Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms, estab-
lished in the Food Law, plays a key role.
130
Under the one door-one key principle, a single application may
cover a GMO and a food or feed containing or consisting of GMOs.
In that case, the applicant must provide information normally re-
quired under Directive 2001/18: the technical dossier, information
and conclusions about the risk assessment, and a monitoring plan for
environmental effects.'
3 '
The Regulation sets out separate, but similar, measures for GM
food 13 2 and feed;'3 3 products likely to be used both as food and feed
may be authorized under a single application.134 In November 2004,
EFSA published a lengthy guidance document for preparation of risk




Regulation 1829/2003 governs GMOs for food use, food contain-
ing or consisting of GMOs, and food produced from or containing
ingredients produced from GMOs.13 6 "Produced from GMOs" means
"derived, in whole or in part, from GMOs, but not containing or con-
sisting of GMOs.' 3 7 The Regulation governs GM food additives and
flavorings as well.
38
128. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 6, 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 8-9.
129. Regulation 178/2002, art. 28(1), 2002 OJ. (L 31) at 15.
130. See Regulation 178/2002, art. 28(4) (d), 2002 OJ. (L 31) at 15.
131. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 5(5), 17(5), 2002 O.J. (L 31) at 8, 13.
132. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 3-14, 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 6-12.
133. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 15-26, 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 12-17.
134. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 27, 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 17.
135. See generally European Food Safety Authority, Guidance Document of the Sci-
entific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms for the Risk Assessment of Geneti-
cally Modified Plants and Derived Food and Feed, 2004 E.F.S.A. J. 99, 1-94, www.efsa.
eu.int/science/gmo/gmo-guidance/660/gmo-guidance-riskassess-en l.pdf.
136. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 3(1), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 6.
137. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 2(10), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 6; see also Regulation
1830/2003, art. 3(2), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 24, 25.
138. Regulation 1829/2003, pmbl. (12), (13), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 2.
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Products that are produced with a GMO but have no GM material
in the end product are excluded from regulation. This includes food
made with GM processing or products from animals fed with GM
feed.139 GMOs to be used as seeds are governed by other measures
and generally fall outside the scope of the Regulation.1 40 The require-
ments of Regulation 1829/2003 apply in a "non-discriminatory man-
ner" to Community and imported products,141 and the Regulation
purports to take account of commitments to international trade and
obligations under the Cartagena Protocol. 142
(2) Authorization Process
GM food cannot be placed on the market in the E.U. without an
authorization granted under Regulation 1829/2003. An authorized
GM food must not have adverse effects on health or the environment,
mislead the consumer, or differ in a nutritionally adverse way from
the food it replaces. The authorization process is intended to ensure
that these requirements are met.143
Authorization is similar to the process under Directive 2001/18,
though the EFSA plays a central role under Regulation 1829/2003.
The applicant submits an application, accompanied by scientific stud-
ies, a summary dossier, and other information, to the competent au-
thority in a Member State. The Commission, in consultation with
EFSA, has enacted detailed rules to guide the preparation of applica-
tions. 144 The national competent authority sends the application to
EFSA, which informs, and forwards the application to, other Member
States and the Commission and makes the summary dossier available
to the public. 145
Authorization involves a scientific evaluation followed by a risk
management decision.146 EFSA must prepare its opinion on the basis
of scientific analysis and consultation with experts and (for GMOs,
under the one door-one key procedure) with Member State compe-
tent authorities. EFSA must forward its opinion, along with an assess-
ment report, to the applicant, the Commission, and the Member
States. The opinion is made public, and comments may be submitted
139. Regulation 1829/2003, pmbl. (16), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 2-3. See also Mansour
& Key, supra note 1, at 61.
140. Regulation 1829/2003, pmbl. (34), art. 6(3) (c), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 4, 8.
141. Regulation 1829/2003, pmbl. (43), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 5.
142. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 44, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 21.
143. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 4, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 7.
144. See generally Commission Regulation 641/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 102) 14.
145. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 5, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 7-8.
146. Regulation 1829/2003, pmbl. (9), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 2.
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to the Commission. The Commission then submits a draft decision
on the authorization to the Standing Committee on the Food Chain
and Animal Health.1 47 The inter-agency regulatory procedure, men-
tioned above,1 48 is used to reach final decision on the application.
Authorization of GM food is valid throughout the Community for ten
years and can be renewed. 149 Authorized GM foods are listed in the




Regulation 1829/2003 also governs GMOs for feed use, feed con-
taining or consisting of GMOs, and feed produced from GMOs.1
5 1
GM feed cannot be placed on the market, used, or processed in the
E.U. without authorization. 15 2 Authorized GM feed must not have ad-
verse effects on human or animal health or on the environment, mis-
lead consumers, impair "distinctive features of the animal products,"




The authorization process is similar to the process used for GM
food, with the initial application, accompanied by scientific studies
and other pertinent information, submitted to the Member State com-
petent authority. That authority informs EFSA, which makes informa-
tion available to other Member States, the Commission, and the
public.
154
An application for authorization will undergo a stringent scien-
tific evaluation, followed by a risk management decision.1 55 EFSA
prepares an opinion, based on scientific evidence and expert consul-
tation, which is sent to the applicant, the Commission, and the Mem-
ber States; the public has an opportunity to submit comments to the
147. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 7, 35, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 9, 19.
148. Council Decision 1999/468, 1999 O.J. (L 184) at 23.
149. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 7(5), 11, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 9, 10-11.
150. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 7(5), 28, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 9, 17.
151. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 15(1), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 12.
152. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 16(2), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 12. Conditions of the
authorization must be satisfied.
153. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 16(1), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 12.
154. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 17, 2003 Oj. (L 268) at 12-13.
155. Regulation 1829/2003, pmbl. (9), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 2.
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Commission.156 In light of the EFSA opinion, the Commission sub-
mits a draft decision on the application to the Standing Committee on
the Food Chain and Animal Health.157 As with GM food, the inter-
agency regulatory procedure is used to reach a final decision on the
application. A GM feed authorization is valid throughout the Com-
munity for ten years and is renewable, and authorized GM feeds are
included in the Community Register of Genetically Modified Food
and Feed.'
5 8
D. Traceability and Labeling - Regulation 1830/2003 and
Regulation 1829/2003
Both traceability and labeling are important components of food
safety measures in the E.C. Two regulations enacted in 2003 work
together to harmonize these requirements.
1. Traceability and Labeling in Other Measures
The 2002 Food Law defines "traceability" as "the ability to trace
and follow a food, feed, food-producing animal or substance intended
to be, or expected to be incorporated into a food or feed, through all
stages of production, processing and distribution."'5 9 The Food Law
points out the need for a comprehensive system of traceability within
food and feed businesses to avoid disruption in case of food safety
problems. 160 That Law requires traceability of food, feed, food-pro-
ducing animals and other substances used in food; it requires food
and feed business operators to implement systems and procedures,
including labeling, for traceability.
16 1
156. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 18(3), (6)-(7), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 14.
157. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 19, 35, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 14-15, 19.
158. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 19(5), 28, 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 15, 17.
159. Parliament and Council Regulation 178/2002, art. 3(15), 2002 O.J. (L 31) 1, 8.
Compare a narrower definition preferred by U.S. producers and firms: "The efficient
and rapid tracking of physical product and traits from and to critical points of origin
or destination in the food chain necessary to achieve specific food safety and, or,
assurance goals." FARM FOUNDATION, FooD TRACEABILITY & ASSURANCE IN THE GLOBAL
FOOD SYSTEM 9 (2004), www.farmfoundation.org (last visited June 8, 2005).
160. Regulation 178/2002, pmbl. (28), 2002 O.J. (L 31) at 3. The European Rapid
Alert System for Food and Feed, authorized by the Food Law, arts. 50-54, was used in
November 2004 to trace dioxin-contaminated potato by-products used for animal
feed and to block movement of animals on farms that used the feed. Press Release,
European Commission, Dioxin Contamination: EU traceability and alert notification
systems work well (IP/04/1343, Nov. 5, 2004).
161. Regulation 178/2002, art. 18, 2002 OJ. (L 31) at 11. New guidelines facilitate
implementation of traceability requirements in the Food Law. European Commis-
sion, Guidance on the Implementation of Articles 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of
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For GMOs specifically, Directive 2001/18 indicates the impor-
tance of ensuring traceability "at all stages of the placing on the mar-
ket of GMOs as or in products authorized under [the placing on the
market provisions] of this Directive." 162 Directive 2001/18 also re-
quires labeling. For placing a GMO on the market, both the initial
notification procedure and the written consent provisions require
compliance with labeling requirements and language that "this prod-
uct contains genetically modified organisms."163 Member States are
directed to follow labeling requirements, and minimum thresholds
for labeling must be established.
1 6 4
While Directive 2001/18 called for a general pre-market tracea-
bility system for GMOs, it did not define traceability, articulate its
objectives, or prescribe an approach for its implementation. Moreo-
ver, labeling provisions in Directive 2001/18 did not apply to opera-




Regulation 1830/2003, which builds on Directive 2001/18, de-
fines "traceability" as "the ability to trace GMOs and products pro-
duced from GMOs at all stages of their placing on the market through
the production and distribution chains. '166 Regulation 1830/2003 es-
tablishes a unified system of traceability for GMOs and for food and
feed products produced from GMOs. It builds a harmonized frame-
work, with the objectives of "facilitating accurate labelling, monitoring
the effects on the environment and, where appropriate, on health,
and the implementation of the appropriate risk management mea-
Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 on General Food Law (Dec. 2004), http://europa.eu.
int/comm/food/food/foodlaw/guidance/index-en.htm.
162. Parliament and Council Directive 2001/18, pmbl. (42), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 3.
163. Directive 2001/18, arts. 13(2)(f), 19(3)(e), Annex IV, 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 9,
12, 32.
164. Directive 2001/18, art. 21, 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 13.
165. See Caoimhin MacMaoldin, The New Genetically Modified Food Labelling Require-
ments: Finally a Lasting Solution, 28 EUR. L. REV. 865, 874 (2003); Francescon, supra
note 56, at 315.
166. Parliament and Council Regulation 1830/2003, art. 3(3), 2003 OJ. (L 268) 24,
25. This definition differs slightly from the Food Law, which defines traceability as
"the ability to trace and follow a food, feed, food-producing animal or substance in-
tended to be incorporated into a food or feed, through all stages of production,
processing and distribution." Parliament and Council Regulation 178/2002, art. 15,
2002 OJ. (L 31) 1, 8.
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sures including, if necessary, withdrawal of products."'1 67 The Regula-
tion applies "at all stages of the placing on the market" to products
placed on the market under E.C. legislation. These include products
consisting of or containing GMOs, food produced from GMOs, and
feed produced from GMOs.
168
(1) Products Consisting of or Containing GMOs
An "operator" is one who places a product on the market or re-
ceives a product placed on the market. 169 Operators must ensure that
prescribed information is transmitted in writing, at the first stage of
placing on the market and at all subsequent stages. Two types of in-
formation are required: a statement that the product contains or con-
sists of GMOs, and the unique identifier(s) assigned to the GMOs,
under a system developed by the Commission.1 70 Operators must
have systems and standardized procedures to preserve this informa-
tion and the identity of the operators by whom and to whom the prod-
ucts were made available for five years from each transaction.
Pre-packaged products must have language on a label (e.g., "This
product contains genetically modified organisms."). The display of
bulk products offered to the final consumer must include similar
language. 171
(2) Food and Feed Produced from GMOs
Requirements are less stringent for food and feed produced from
GMOs. When placing the product on the market, the operator must
indicate in writing each food ingredient produced from GMOs and
each feed material or additive produced from GMOs; if no list of in-
gredients exists, the operator must indicate that the product is pro-
duced from GMOs. The same five-year retention period applies.
1 72
b. Unique Identifiers
Before most provisions of Regulation 1830/29 could take effect,
the Commission had to establish a system to develop and assign
167. Regulation 1830/2003, art. 1, 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 25.
168. Regulation 1830/2003, art. 2(1), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 25.
169. Regulation 1830/2003, art. 3(5), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 25.
170. Regulation 1830/2003, art. 4A(1), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 26. See infra text ac-
companying notes 172-78.
171. Regulation 1830/2003, art. 4B(6)(b), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 26.
172. Regulation 1830/2003, art. 5(2), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 24, 27.
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unique identifiers to GMOs. That system was described in Commis-
sion Regulation 65/2004 in January 2004.173
Under Regulation 65/2004, all GMOs placed on the market are
to have a unique identifier, which is to be registered with the Commis-
sion and with the Biosafety Clearing-House established in connection
with the Cartagena Protocol. 174 The applicant for new GMOs is to
develop the unique identifier, and the consent or authorization of the
GMO will specify the identifier. Consent holders for GMOs author-
ized before January 2004 must develop identifiers, unless they already
exist.
The annex to the Regulation specifies the formats for unique
identifiers, which are to be coordinated with the OECD BioTrack
product database. 175 Each identifier will have nine alphanumeric dig-
its, divided into three components separated by hyphens. The first
component, two or three digits, identifies the applicant or consent
holder. The second, five or six digits, represents the transformation
event; a unique number should apply to similar transformation events
developed by different organizations or in different organisms. The
final component, a single verification digit, is calculated from the nu-
merical values of the other digits.176
Member States must ensure compliance through control mea-
sures, including sample checks and testing (following technical guide-
lines established by the Commission). 1 77 The Commission must
provide a central register with information about GMOs authorized in
the European Union and, where available, other GMOs.
1 78
3. Labeling
Regulation 1830/2003 imposes labeling requirements for prod-
ucts consisting of or containing GMOs, but is specifically for food or
173. See generally Commission Regulation 65/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 10) 5.
174. Regulation 65/2004, arts. 2-3, 2004 (L 10) at 5-6. For more information, see
Biosafety Clearing-House, Welcome to the Central Portal, http://bch.biodiv.org/.
175. Regulation 65/2004, Annex, 2004 OJ. (L 10) at 8-10; Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, Biotech Database, http://webdominol.oecd.
org/ehs/bioprod.nsf. The Cartagena Protocol is discussed infra text accompanying
notes 243-59.
176. Regulation 65/2004, Annex, 2004 OJ. (L 10) at 8-10.
177. Regulation 1830/2003, art. 9(1)-(2), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 27. Guidelines for
sampling and detection of GM material are in Commission Recommendation 2004/
787, 2004 OJ. (L 348) 18.
178. See Commission Decision 2004/204, art. 3, 2004 OJ. (L 65) 20, 21 (enacted
under Directive 2001/18, art. 31(2), 2001 OJ. (L 106) at 15).
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feed produced from GMOs. 179 For products consisting of or contain-
ing GMOs, operators must use the words "This product contains ge-
netically modified organisms" or "This product contains genetically
modified [name of the organism(s)]." For pre-packaged products,
the words must appear on the label; for non-pre-packaged products,
on or in connection with the product display. Labeling applies at all
stages of placing on the market. Specific requirements in other E.C.
legislation continue to apply.180
Regulation 1829/2003 has similar labeling requirements for GM
foods and feeds.' 8 ' The food labeling provisions apply to foods to be
delivered to the final consumer or mass caterers in the Community
that either contain or consist of GMOs or are produced from or con-
tain ingredients produced from GMOs. Regulation 1829/2003 is
more detailed than Regulation 1830/2003 about the content of the
label. For example, if food consists of more than one ingredient, the
words "genetically modified" shall appear in parentheses following the
ingredient concerned. Moreover, if the ingredient is designated by
category, the words "contains genetically modified [name of organ-
ism]" shall appear in the list of ingredients. Further, if there is no list
of ingredients, "genetically modified" shall appear clearly on the label.
Labels must mention characteristics or properties of the food if the
food is different from its conventional counterpart in composition,
nutritional value or effects, intended use, or health implications, or if
the food may raise ethical or religious concerns. 8 2 Detailed rules for
implementation may be adopted.
Labeling rules for feed are similar, though not identical. GMOs
for feed use and feed containing or consisting of GMOs must indicate
"genetically modified [name of organism]" in parenthesis following
the name of the feed. Feed produced from GMOs will instead indi-
cate "produced from genetically modified [name of organism]. ''185
The Regulation does not require labeling of products produced with
GMOs or products from animals fed with GM feed.'
84
179. Regulation 1830/2003, arts. 4B, 5, 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 24, 26-27.
180. Regulation 1830/2003, art. 4A(5), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 26. For an example of
requirements that continue to apply see Directive 2000/13, as amended by Commis-
sion Directive 2001/101, 2001 OJ. (L 310) 19.
181. Council Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 12-14, 24-26, 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 11-12,
16-17.
182. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 13(2), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 11-12.
183. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 25(2)(b), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 17.
184. For criticism of this regulatory omission, see MacMaoldin, supra note 165.
2005]
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
4. Labeling and Traceability Thresholds
Products that contain "adventitious or technically unavoidable"
traces of authorized GMOs may not have to be labeled, and some trace-
ability requirements do not apply. To prove that the presence of GM
material is adventitious or technically avoidable, operators must be
able to supply evidence that they have taken appropriate steps to
avoid the presence of GM material.18 5 For thresholds, Regulation
1830/2003 refers to Directive 2001/18 and Regulation 1829/2003.
Under Regulation 1830/2003, "traces of GMOs in products" do
not trigger traceability and labeling requirements if the traces do not
exceed the threshold set in Directive 2001/18.186 That Directive indi-
cates that, for products intended for direct processing, labeling is not
required for adventitious or technically unavoidable traces of author-
ized GMOs of no more than 0.9%. Lower thresholds can be
established.
1 87
For traces of GMOs in "products intended for direct use as food,
feed or for processing,"' the traceability and labeling threshold is in
Regulation 1829/2003. That Regulation, like Directive 2001/18, sets
a threshold of 0.9% of food ingredients considered individually or
food consisting of a single ingredient and 0.9% of feed and each feed
ingredient.189
Regulation 1829/2003 applies a three-year transitional threshold
for some unauthorized GM material, if authorization is pending. If the
risk evaluation for a GMO is favorable and the authorization applica-
tion has not been rejected, the adventitious or technically unavoidable
presence of no more than 0.5% of that GM material will not breach
the Regulation. 90 The Commission is to provide a list of GMs that
have received a favorable opinion from the Scientific Committee.' 9 '
This transitional exemption, which lasts until 2007, also applies to the
traceability requirements for products for food and feed produced
from GMOs. 192 In addition, Directive 2001/18 applies this transi-
185. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 12(3), 24(3), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 11, 17.
186. Parliament and Council Regulation 1830/2003, art. 4C(7), 2003 OJ. (L 268)
24, 26; see also Parliament and Council Directive 2001/18, 2001 OJ. (L 106) 1.
187. See Directive 2001/18, art. 21(3), 2001 OJ. (L 106) 1, as amended by Regula-
tion 1830/2003, art. 7, 2003 OJ. (L 268) 24, 27.
188. Regulation 1830/2003, art. 4C(8), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 26.
189. Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 12(2), 24(2), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 11, 16.
190. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 47(1), 2003 OJ. (L 268) at 22.
191. Commission Regulation 641/2004, art. 18(1), 2004 OJ. (L 102) 14, 19.
192. Regulation 1830/2003, art. 5(4), 2003 OJ. (L 268) 24, 27.
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tional threshold to GMOs in products intended for direct use as food
or feed or for processing.
193
A threshold for authorized GM seeds, required by Directive
2001/18,194 has not yet been established. Proposed thresholds were
0.3% for cross-pollinating crops (maize, oilseed rape) and 0.5% for
self-pollinating species, calculated to allow harvested material to meet
the 0.9% threshold for direct use or direct processing. 195 This pro-
posed measure remains controversial.
196
III. SOME OTHER ISSUES
New regulatory measures in the E.C., especially traceability and
labeling requirements, raise several issues. Now that the moratorium
on GM crops has ended, with GM varieties added to the Common
Catalogue of Varieties of Agricultural Plant Species, producers may
plant GM crops in close proximity to traditional or organic crops.
Production of GM crops may lead to cross-pollination through pollen
drift or commingling of GM and traditional seeds. This situation
raises the difficult issue of coexistence and the related question of lia-
bility for cross-pollination and other possible damage. Moreover, the
transboundary movement of living GM materials is the subject of in-
ternational agreement and E.C. regulation. E.C. requirements for
traceability and labeling, which affect imports as well as E.U.-grown
crops, raise questions under international trade regimes. The follow-
ing materials focus briefly on these important issues.
A. Coexistence
1. Background
Coexistence "refers to the ability of farmers to make a practical
choice between conventional, organic and GM-crop production, in
compliance with the legal obligations for labelling and/or purity stan-
dards. ' ' 197 The issue of coexistence "concerns the economic conse-
193. Directive 2001/18, art. 12a, as amended by Regulation 1829/2003, art. 43,
2003 OJ. (L 268) at 20-21.
194. Directive 2001/18, art. 21(2), 2001 O.J. (L 106) at 13.
195. See Draft Commission Decision, supra note 22 and accompanying text.
196. The Danish and Austrian delegations were calling for detection levels of 0.1
percent (the detection level for genetically modified seeds). Press Release, European
Council, 2578th Council Meeting, Agriculture and Fisheries (IP/8350/04, Apr. 26,
2004).
197. Commission Recommendation 2003/556 on guidelines for the development
of national strategies and best practices to ensure the coexistence of genetically modi-
fied crops with conventional and organic farming, 2003 OJ. (L 189) 36.
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quences of adventitious presence" of GM crops in non-GM crops,
which can result from "seed impurities, cross-pollination, volunteers
.... harvesting-storage practices and transport."
198
As Franz Fischler (then agricultural commissioner) indicated,
"[c] o-existence is about economic and legal questions, not about risks
or food safety, because only authorised GMOs can be cultivated in the
E.U."199 Issues raised by coexistence are economic aspects of adventi-
tious presence of GMOs (e.g., labeling and the resultant loss of in-
come from conventional crops; contamination of organic crops,
which cannot be produced from GMOs under E.C. law) and manage-
ment measures required to avoid adventitious presence. The
probability of "admixture" of GM and non-GM crops and the mea-
sures for avoiding it depend on the type of crop and on geographic
factors like natural conditions and field sizes.
200
Some Member States want to ban GM crops in part or all of their
territories, but Mr. Fischler concluded that mandatory GMO-free
zones must be excluded. The protection of mere economic interests
by strong limits on fundamental liberties cannot be justified legally,
and the approach "runs counter to the very principle of co-
existence."
201
As amended in 2003, Directive 2001/18 notes that "Member
States may take appropriate measures to avoid the unintended pres-
ence of GMOs in other products." The Directive directs the Commis-
sion to study the issue and then "develop guidelines on the
coexistence of genetically modified, conventional and organic
crops."2
0 2
198. Communication from Mr. Fischler to the Commission, Co-existence of Geneti-
cally Modified, Conventional and Organic Crops (Feb. 25, 2003), http://www.zs-l.de/
gmo/downloads/Communication.Fischler_02_2003.pdf [hereinafter Communi-
cation].
199. Press Release, European Commission, GMOs: Commission addresses GM crop
co-existence (IP/03/314, Mar. 5, 2003).
200. Communication, supra note 198, at 2-5. A practical example of the issue was
raised in Regina v. Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Watson, 1998
E.W.C.A. Civ. 1250 (July 21, 1998), http://bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1998/
1250.html. Watson, a major organic grower in Britain, feared cross-pollination be-
tween his crop and GM trial plantings on a neighboring farm. The court refused to
order destruction or detasseling of the GM plants because risk of cross-pollination was
slight and the GM producer had the appropriate consent for trial planting. Id.
201. Communication, supra note 198, at 6.
202. Directive 2001/18, art. 26, as amended by Regulation 1829/2003, art. 43, 2003
O.J. (L268) 1, 21.
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2. Commission Recommendation
The Commission issued guidelines in its July 2003 Recommenda-
tion. The Commission agreed with Mr. Fischler that "[n]o form of
agriculture, be it conventional, organic, or agriculture using [GMOs]
should be excluded in the European Union."203 Farmers should be
allowed to choose the type of crops they grow, but consumer choice
should be protected, too.2 0
4
Because coexistence measures necessary to protect health and
the environment are required when GMOs are authorized under Di-
rective 2001/18, economic loss and management measures are of
most concern. Member States, which are diverse, should develop
their own measures for coexistence, with guidance from the
Commission.205
The Commission guidelines, which are nonbinding recommen-
dations to Member States, address commercial seed and crop produc-
tion. The guidelines are not measures to be adopted, but instead
general principles to apply and factors to consider in designing State-
specific measures. Principles include transparency, stakeholder in-
volvement, science-based decision making, a system built on existing
means of crop segregation, focus on authorized GM varieties, and
consideration of liability rules.20 6 Factors focus on more practical con-
cerns like sources of admixture, threshold values for labels, and char-
acteristics of specific crops.20 7 The Commission also provided an
"indicative catalogue" of measure, including on-farm measures, that
might be part of a Member State's coexistence strategy.20 8
Though the Commission rejected the idea of mandatory prohibi-
tions of GM crops, the guidelines indicated that voluntary coopera-
tion of farmers would be appropriate. Farmers could agree to
establish zones of a single production type, which would reduce costs
of crop segregation. Alternatively, producers could cluster fields with
similar crop varieties, plant varieties with different flowering times,
use different sowing dates, or coordinate crop rotations. 209
Directive 2001/18 and the Commission Recommendation antici-
pate that each Member State will enact measures to address coexis-
203. Commission Recommendation 2003/556, pmbl. (1), 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 36.
204. Recommendation 2003/556, Annex § 1.1, 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 39.
205. Recommendation 2003/556, pmbl. (4)-(8), 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 36.
206. Recommendation 2003/556, Annex § 2.1, 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 40-42. Twelve
principles are listed.
207. Recommendation 2003/556, Annex § 2.2, 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 42-44.
208. Recommendation 2003/556, Annex § 3, 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 44-47.
209. Recommendation 2003/556, Annex § 3.3, 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 46.
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tence for its own agricultural conditions. So far, few States have done
so. One exception is Denmark, which enacted its Act on the Growing
etc. of Genetically Modified Crops (the Act on co-existence) in June
2004.210 That law authorizes the Minister for Food, Agriculture and
Fisheries to make rules to manage the coexistence of GM and other
crops.21 1 Rules may require a license for growing, handling and trans-
port of GM crops, issue restrictive authorizations for growing GM
crops, and limit sales of GM materials to authorized growers.2 1 2 The
Minister may impose other obligations, including notification of
nearby owners and producers of GM crops, prescribed separation dis-
tances, and reports on field locations.2 1 3 The Minister also has au-
thority to pay compensation, within limits, to farmers who suffer losses
from unintended GM material in crops, with funds collected through
an annual fee per hectare of GM crops.2 1 4 Germany's new Genetic
Modification Act, passed by the Bundestag 26 November 2004,
prescribes coexistence measures. These include a site register accessi-
ble to the public and a requirement that those who use GM products
take precautionary action (including good farming practices) to avoid
adverse effects. Farmers who cultivate GM crops may be liable for ma-
terial adverse effects, including admixture.21 5 Italy has also enacted a
coexistence law, which authorizes framework regulations for coexis-





The assignment of liability for damages that might arise from de-
velopment or use of GMOs raises difficult issues. Measures enacted to
govern GMOs and their products do not address liability comprehen-
sively, and more general measures apply only in limited circum-
stances.
210. Act No. 436 of 9 June 2004, available at http://www.fvm.dk/file/co-extinse.pdf.
211. Act No. 436 §§ 3-8.
212. Act No. 436 §§ 3-6.
213. Act No. 436 § 6.
214. Act No. 436 §§ 9-12.
215. Gentechnikgesetz (GenTG), art. 1, §§ 16a, 16b, 36a (Bundestag, 26 Nov.
2004).
216. Decreto-Legge 22 novembre 2004, n.279, Gazzetta Ufficiale, serie generale, n.
280; Legge 28 gennaio 2005, n.5, Gazzetta Ufficiale, serie generale, n.22. An English
translation is available in USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, Gain Report No.
IT5003.
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Directive 2001/18 governing deliberate release of GMOs did not
address liability. Its preamble indicates that the Directive is without
prejudice to national legislation on environmental liability. E.C. regu-
lation of GMOs should be complemented by measures that assign lia-
bility for environmental damage, which would be enacted in a more
general liability scheme expected to apply to GMOs and other danger-
ous activities.
2 17
The Commission Recommendation on coexistence recognizes
that liability for GM crops is an issue for Member States.
The type of instruments adopted may have an impact on the appli-
cation of national liability rules in the event of economic damage
resulting from admixture. Member States are advised to examine
their civil liability laws to find out whether the existing national laws
offer sufficient and equal possibilities in this regard. Farmers, seed
suppliers and other operators should be fully informed about the
liability criteria that apply in their country in the case of damage
caused by admixture.
2 18
The Recommendation suggested that an existing or new insurance
scheme might help to compensate damage from admixture of GM
and other crops.
2 19
The E.C. Products Liability Directive, which applies broadly,
prescribes that "The producer shall be liable for damage caused by a
defect in his product."220 A product is defective when "it does not
provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all cir-
cumstances into account."221 To help restore consumer confidence in
safety of agricultural products, the directive was amended in 1999 to
include primary agricultural products. So in some instances, limited
by the Directive's definition of damage and the requirement that the
product be defective (questionable for GMOs), measures enacted
under the Products Liability Directive might be available to redress
damage from GMOs.
222
217. Parliament and Council Directive 2001/18, pmbl. (16), 2001 O.J. (C 304) at 2.
218. Commission Recommendation 2003/556, Annex § 2.1.9, 2003 O.J. (L 189) at
42.
219. Recommendation 2003/556, Annex § 2.1.0, 2003 O.J. (L 189) at 42.
220. Council Directive 85/374, art. 1, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, as amended by Parlia-
ment and Council Directive 1999/34, 1999 O.J. (L 141) 20.
221. Directive 85/374, art. 6, 1985 O.J. (L 210) at 31.
222. Directive 85/374, art. 9, 1985 O.J. (L 210) at 31; Margaret Rosso Grossman,
Genetically modified crops in the United States: Federal regulation and state tort liability, 5
ENVTL. L. REv. 86, 97 (2003). For more information on this Directive and its limited
application to GMOs, see BERGxAmP, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw, supra note 45, at
252-58.
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Some argue that no special liability regime for GMOs is justified
because regulation has reduced risk to "acceptable levels," and both
"scientific knowledge and practical experience" indicate that no sig-
nificant, unreasonable risk remains. 223 Even when policy makers
agree that a liability scheme might be desired, the design of such a
scheme fosters disagreement. For example, negotiations prior to en-
actment of the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol considered numerous al-
ternative liability regimes for biotechnology, but no agreement could
be reached. Instead, the Protocol calls for further study.2 2 4 Nor do
other liability regimes (e.g., the Council of Europe's Lugano Conven-
tion) impose liability on agricultural producers. Some national liabil-
ity regimes provide remedies through laws imposing strict liability for
defective goods or substances or through fault-based principles of
negligence or nuisance. 225 Specifically for GMOs, the new German
Genetic Engineering Act imposes liability on producers whose crops
cause a material adverse effect on other property owners, 226 whereas
the Danish coexistence law authorizes a compensation system.2 27
2. Environmental Liability Directive-Directive 2004/35
The Commission's White Paper on Environmental Liability228 reflects
the concerns of the European public about environmental damage
from deliberate release of GMOs. The White Paper recommended that
liability from GMOs-including both damage to biodiversity and dam-
age to persons and property-be treated in a horizontal measure that
would provide a general framework for liability in a number of
sectors.
That horizontal measure is Directive 2004/35 on environmental
liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmen-
tal damage, enacted in April 2004.229 Invoking the polluter pays prin-
ciple and the principle of sustainable development,230 the Directive
223. See Lucas Bergkamp, Allocating unknown risk: Liability for Environmental Damages
Caused by Deliberately Released Genetically Modified Organisms, 2000 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
MILIEUAANSPRAKELIJKHEID (Part I) 61, (Part II) 104, 110.
224. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
(Montreal 2000), art. 27, 39 I.L.M. 1039; Bergkamp, supra note 223, Part I, at 66-67.
225. See Bergkamp, supra note 218, Part I, at 68-70, Part II, at 104-107. This section
was adapted from Grossman, supra note 222, at 97.
226. Gentechnikgesetz, supra note 215, § 36a.
227. Act on the Growing etc. of Genetically Modified Crops, supra note 210.
228. COM(2000)66 final.
229. Parliament and Council Directive 2004/35, 2004 oJ. (L 143) 56.
230. Directive 2004/35, art. 1, 2004 OJ. (L 143) at 59; see also EC TREArY art.
174(2).
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on environmental liability governs only environmental damage, rather
than traditional damage to persons and property.231
Environmental damage under the Directive includes damage to
protected species and natural habitats (generally those protected by
the Wild Birds23 2 and Habitats Directives233 or by national nature con-
servation legislation). It also includes water damage and land dam-
age.2 34 The latter is contamination that creates "a significant risk of
human health being adversely affected as a result of the direct or indi-
rect introduction, in, on or under land, of substances, preparations,
organisms, or micro-organisms."23 5 The Directive does not give pri-
vate parties a right to compensation from environmental damage,
though it does not prevent Member States from doing so.
236
Member States implement the Directive through a competent au-
thority, and by 30 April 2007 must have national measures to comply
with the Directive. The Directive is not retroactive and does not apply
to damage caused before that date.23 7 Member State measures must
require operators (those who carry out the listed activity or hold the
authorization for the activity) to take preventive action to avoid envi-
ronmental damage, to apply measures to remediate the damage, and
to bear the costs for preventive and remedial actions. 238
GMOs are one focus of the Directive, which applies to environ-
mental damage, and imminent threat of damage, caused by activities
listed in Annex 111.239 Among the listed activities are contained use of
GM micro-organisms, as defined by Directive 90/219, and deliberate
release and marketing of GMOs, as defined by Directive 2001/18.240
Thus operators have the duty to prevent damage and to remediate
damage from GMOs. But Member States may allow the operator not
to bear the cost of remedial actions under some conditions-if the
operator was not at fault or negligent and the damage was caused by
an emission or event expressly authorized and in compliance with na-
tional measures that implement E.C. measures (for GMOs, Directives
90/219 and 2001/18) or by an emission or activity that the operator
231. Directive 2004/35, pmbl. (14), art 3, 2004 O.J. (L 143) at 57, 60-61.
232. Council Directive 79/409, 1979 O.J. (L 103) 1, as amended.
233. Council Directive 92/43, 1992 O.J. (L 206) 7, as amended.
234. Directive 2004/35, art. 2(1), 2004 O.J. (L 143) at 59.
235. Directive 2004/35, art. 2(1)(c), 2004 O.J. (L 143) at 59.
236. Directive 2004/35, art. 3(3), 2004 O.J. (L 143) at 60-61.
237. Directive 2004/35, arts. 17, 19(1), 2004 O.J. (L 143) at 64-65.
238. Directive 2004/35, arts. 2(6), 6-8, 2004 O.J. (L 143) at 60, 61-63.
239. Directive 2004/35, art. 3(1), Annex III, 2004 O.J. (L 143) at 60, 70.
240. Council Directive 90/219, Annex I, as amended by Council Directive 98/81,
1998 O.J. (L 330) 13, 19; Parliament and Council Directive 2001/18, Annex III, 2001
O.J. (L 106) at 23.
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can show was not considered likely to cause environmental damage
"according to the state of scientific and technical knowledge" when
the emission or activity took place. 241 This exemption would seem to
apply to GMOs that are authorized and used in accordance with their
authorizations.
Member States can maintain or adopt more stringent measures to
prevent and remedy environmental damage and can identify addi-
tional activities and responsible parties.242 Because of the intention-
ally limited scope of the Directive, Member State legislation will apply
to redress traditional damage to persons and property.
C. Transboundary Movement of GMOs-Directive 1946/2003
International law has influenced E.C. measures that govern GM
crops, especially labeling for transboundary movement. The Carta-
gena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity
2 4 3 adopts a precautionary approach to the "transfer, handling and
use of living modified organisms [LMOs] resulting from modern bio-
technology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sus-
tainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to
human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary
movements. '24
4
The Protocol establishes an "advance informed agreement proce-
dure" to govern the first intentional movement of LMOs for inten-
tional introduction into the environment of an importing country.
245
In brief, the procedure involves notice by the Party of export, ac-
knowledgement by the Party of import, opportunity for a risk assess-
ment, and a decision, in writing, from the Party of import that
approves or prohibits the proposed import. The Protocol requires la-
beling of LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed or for process-
ing, for contained use, or for intentional introduction into the
environment. 246 The Protocol on Biosafety does not establish liability.
Instead it provides for adoption of a process for elaboration of inter-
national rules governing liability and redress for damage from trans-
boundary movements of LMOs.
247
241. Directive 2004/35, art. 8(4), 2004 OJ. (L 143) at 62-63.
242. Directive 2004/35, art. 16, 2004 OJ. (L 143) at 64.
243. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
(Montreal 2000), 39 I.L.M. 1027, available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/carta-
gena-protocol-en.pdf.
244. Id. art. 1, at 1027.
245. Id. arts. 7-13, at 1030-33.
246. Id. art. 18(2), at 1035.
247. Id. art. 27, at 1039.
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The Protocol creates the Biosafety Clearing-House to facilitate ex-
change of information and other activities. 248 In 2004, the Confer-
ence of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol enacted a Decision that
outlines identity requirements for transboundary shipment for LMOs
and recommends use of the OECD BioTrack unique identifiers. A
technical experts group will develop more detailed guidelines. 249
The European Community and its Member States are parties to
the Protocol. Directive 2001/18 refers to the Cartagena Protocol and
the E.C.'s obligations. 2 50 The Directive invited a Commission propo-
sal with measures to implement the procedures for advance informed
agreement and other requirements of the Cartagena Protocol. In ad-
dition, Regulation 1829/2003 requires notification of authorizations
and other actions concerning GMOs to the Biosafety Clearing-House
and other cooperation with the Protocol. 251
To comply with the Protocol, the E.C. enacted Regulation 1946/
2003 on transboundary movements of GMOs. 252 That Regulation
takes account of the precautionary principle and supplements, but
does not interfere with, already-existing E.C. measures, for example,
the provisions of Directive 2001/18. The Protocol requires the identi-
fication of GMOs exported from or imported into the Community.
Because E.C. measures already govern traceability, labeling, and iden-
tification of E.C. products and imports, the heart of Regulation 1946/
2003 enacts similar rules for exports. 253 Exporters are required to en-
sure accurate, written notification to the party of import and may not
export without express written consent from the importing coun-
try.2 5 4 No notice is required for contained use. GMOs intended for
direct use as food or feed or for processing need no notice and con-
sent for import, but Member States must notify the BioSafety Clearing-
House of relevant GM authorizations.
255
When GMOs are exported, documentation must indicate that the
product contains or consists of GMOs and provide the unique identifi-
248. Id. art. 20, at 1036-37.
249. Report of the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the
Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol on Biosafety, Apr. 14, 2004, BS-I/6, 85, http://
www.biodiv.org/doc/meetings/bs/mop-01/official/mop-01-15-en.pdf.
250. Parliament and Council Directive 2001/18, pmbl. (13), art. 32, 2001 OJ. (L
106) at 1-2, 16.
251. Parliament and Council Regulation 1829/2003, art. 44, 2003 OJ. (L 268) at
21. The Biosafety Clearing-House plays a role in the system of unique identifiers; see
supra note 174.
252. Parliament and Council Regulation 1946/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 287) 1.
253. Regulation 1946/2003, pmbl. (16), arts. 4-13, 2003 OJ. (L 287) at 4-6.
254. Regulation 1946/2003, arts. 4-5, 2003 OJ. (L 287) at 4.
255. Regulation 1946/2003, arts. 8(1), 9, 2003 O.J. (L 287) at 5.
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cation codes for those GMOs. Food or feed products must indicate
that the GMOs are intended for food, feed, or processing and not for
deliberate release into the environment. GMOs exported for deliber-
ate release must include additional information about traits and
characteristics.
256
Critics have argued that the provisions of the Biosafety Protocol
were "never intended to apply to food products but are in fact the
basis for the entire E.U. [regulatory] revision process. '2 57 Indeed, in-
tentional introduction into the environment, for purposes of the ad-
vance informed agreement procedure, does not include LMOs
intended for direct use as food, feed, or for processing, though parties
to the Protocol must receive notice of approval of those products
through the BioSafety Clearing-House. 258 The Protocol also requires
documentation that LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed
"may contain" LMOs and are not intended for intentional introduc-
tion into the environment.
259
D. WTO
E.C. regulation of GMOs affects trading partners, including the
United States.260 E.C. measures that govern GMOs apply within the
E.C., but those measures also apply to imports. Thus the defacto mora-
torium on authorization of GMOs under Directive 2001/18 had a sig-
nificant effect on US trade. E.C. measures enacted in 2003 to require
traceability and labeling will impose significant burdens on US
exporters.
This article has focused only on E.C. regulation of GM crops,
food, and feed, but many nations have enacted laws and regulations to
govern GMOs. Moreover, international institutions also govern bio-
technology for various purposes (e.g., health, trade, environment).
Researchers have identified seven international organizations involved
with biotechnology (most beyond the scope of this article).261 Among
international measures are the Biosafety Protocol with its advance in-
formed agreement procedure, international food standards of the Co-
256. Regulation 1946/2003, art. 12, 2003 O.J. (L 287) at 6.
257. Mansour & Key, supra note 1, at 66.
258. Cartagena Protocol, arts. 7, 11, 39 I.L.M. at 1027, 1030, 1032.
259. Id. art. 18, at 1035.
260. See generally PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, U.S. vs. EU: AN Ex-
AMINATION OF THE TRADE ISSUES SURROUNDING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD (Aug.
2003), available at http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/issuebriefs/europe.pdf.
261. Donald E. Buckingham & Peter W.B. Phillips, Issues and Options for the Multilat-
eral Regulation of GM Foods, 2 EsTEY CENTREJ. OF INT'L. L. & TRADE POL'Y 178, 179-80
(2001).
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dex Alimentarius Commission, and agreements of the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
Most trade disputes focused on GM issues will be directed to the
WTO dispute settlement procedure. The WTO relies on scientific
knowledge developed by other organizations and is likely to "deliver
pro-trade, science- and rules-based decisions," albeit limited to the
cases brought to the dispute resolution body.
262
1. Current Dispute and the SPS Agreement
In response to the E.C.'s long moratorium on authorization of
GM products and to individual Member State bans of GM products,
the United States, joined by Argentina and Canada, invoked the WTO
dispute settlement system. In May 2003, the United States filed a con-
sultation request, and in August 2003 requested establishment of a
dispute settlement panel.
263
The United States alleged that the long E.C. moratorium violates
numerous obligations under the WTO, including the Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agree-
ment). The SPS Agreement applies to measures designed to protect
life and health that also affect international trade. The Agreement
indicates that Members must ensure that "any sanitary or phytosani-
tary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is
not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence." 26 4 Among
other alleged violations, the United States noted that the E.C. had
failed to use the types of scientific risk assessment required by the SPS
Agreement and failed to base its moratorium on risk assessment.
265
Moreover, though the establishment of procedures for approval of bi-
otech products does not violate the SPS agreement, the United States
argued that the E.C. moratorium violates the requirement that those
procedures must be completed "without undue delay."
266
262. Id. at 185, 187. The WTO Agreements do not apply neatly to issues concerning
biotechnology. See Arthur E. Appleton, The Labeling of GMO Products Pursuant to Inter-
national Trade Rules, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 566, 570-78 (2000).
263. Case WT/DS291; see also US, Executive Summary of the First Submission of the
United States, WT/DS291, 292, 293, 30 April 2004.
264. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, April
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 2.2,
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legale/15-sps.pdf [hereinafter SPS Agree-
ment].
265. Id. art. 5.
266. Id. art. 8; Annex C, 1 (a). But see Aaron A. Ostrovsky, The European Commis-
sion's Regulations for Genetically Modified Organisms and the Current WTO Dispute-Human
2005]
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
The United States also objects to Member State restrictions on
authorized GMOs. Six Member States (Austria, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy and Luxembourg) have enacted marketing (five States)
or import (Greece) bans on approved GM products, using safeguard
provisions under E.C. legislation.267 The safeguard provisions require
evidence that the product is a risk to human health or the environ-
ment. The E.C. Scientific Committee found no scientific basis for the
bans, but the State bans have continued. Therefore, the United States
alleges, the measures are not based on risk assessment and also violate
the SPS Agreement.
268
The dispute settlement panel assigned to the case has agreed to
seek expert scientific testimony before deciding the dispute. A panel
report is expected sometime in 2005.
2. Other WTO Issues
E.C. reluctance to authorize and import GMOs and their prod-
ucts raises other trade issues. Under the GATT, the national treat-
ment rule requires that products imported from WTO members "be
accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like prod-
ucts of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and require-
ments . -269 One relevant question under this provision is whether
GM and conventional crops are "like products."2 70 If they are not, the
national treatment rule does not apply. If they are like products,
GATT article XX provides general exceptions for measures "necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health."27 1 The SPS agree-
Health or Environmental Measures? Why the Deliberate Release Directive is More Appropriately
Adjudicated in the WTO Under the TBT Agreement, 15 CoLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
209 (2004).
267. See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
268. SPS Agreement, arts. 2.2, 5.1, and Annex A, 4. For more information on the
SPS Agreement, see Chris Hilson & Duncan French, Regulating GM Products in the EU:
Risk, Precaution and International Trade, in AGRICULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
LAW, POLICY, AND THE WTO 215, 228-31 (Michael N. Cardwell et al. eds., 2003).
269. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 1947, art. 11. 4, http://
www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/gatt47_e.pdf [hereinafter GATT].
270. SeeJulian Wong, Note, Are Biotech Crops and Conventional Crops Like Products? An
Analysis under GATT, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 27 (2003).
271. See GATT art. XX, chapeau & (b):
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restric-
tion on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures
.... (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.
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ment, with its risk assessment, may provide the standard for determin-
ing whether measures are necessary. 272
The E.C. Regulation that governs traceability and labeling may
give rise to further claims under the WTO, especially because label
requirements apply to imports.273 The Agreement on Technical Bar-
riers to Trade (TBT Agreement) is intended to ensure that technical
regulations made to fulfill a legitimate objective do not create unnec-
essary obstacles to international trade. Because labeling is a technical
regulation, E.C. measures must be compatible with the TBT Agree-
ment. Thus, the measures must fulfill a legitimate objective, which
include, e.g., "protection of human health or safety, animal or plant
life or health, or the environment. '274 If challenged under the TBT
Agreement, E.C. justifications for labeling (environmental protection,
consumer choice) must be found to be a legitimate objective. The
TBT Agreement also requires non-discriminatory treatment for like
products; discrimination triggers application of GATT Article XX.275
The Cartagena Protocol affects trade through its advance in-
formed consent procedure and required labels for imports of LMOs.
Its provisions may raise questions under the WTO, especially where
Protocol restrictions seem to conflict with WTO goals of free trade.
Differences in approach exist; the Protocol, for example, encourages
adoption of the precautionary approach in the face of scientific uncer-
tainty,276 while the SPS Agreement allows only a provisional measure,
followed by an objective risk assessment within a reasonable time.
277
Further, some have questioned whether the label requirement ("may
contain LMOs") under the Cartagena Protocol complies with the SPS
or TBT, and whether the E.C. might use its obligations under the Pro-
tocol to support its own measures in a WTO dispute.
278
272. See Norman W. Thorson, International Trade in Genetically Altered Agricultural
Products: Impact of the Biosafety Protocol, in AGRICULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE,
supra note 268, at 239, 257-61.
273. Appleton, supra note 262, at 570.
274. The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (GATT Standards
Code), art. 2.2, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt-e/tbtagr.htm.
For a detailed description see Ostrovsky, supra note 266, at 225-31.
275. See Hilson & French, supra note 268, at 231-33.
276. Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, arts. 10(6), 11(8), 39 I.L.M. 1027, available at
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf.
277. SPS Agreement, art. 5.7.
278. Hilson & French, supra note 268, at 235.
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IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The major components of the updated E.C. regulatory system for
GM crops, food, and feed are now in effect, and regulators have au-
thorized several new products under these measures. Nonetheless,
Member States are divided about GMOs, and fears about their impact
on health and the environment continue, even after successful risk
assessments. These Member State divisions and fears may help to ex-
plain the November 2004 failure of the regulatory committee to ap-
prove import of Monsanto's maize, MON 863.279 Moreover, several
Member States continue to ban products already approved by the E.C.
The new regulatory system for GMOs exerts significant influence
beyond the borders of the E.U. and its now-25 Member States. The
E.C. reluctance to approve new products limits trade by preventing
the import of non-approved GMs that have been used without inci-
dent in the United States and elsewhere. Even when GM crops, food
and feed have been approved in the E.C., regulatory requirements
impose significant burdens on US food and feed companies, as well as
producers.
Regulation 1830/2003, the labeling and traceability measure, is
particularly burdensome. 280 It imposes obligations and additional
costs on agribusiness firms, which must ensure segregation of GM and
traditional crops in the complex grain-handling system. Though
some firms already have systems for traceability, others must develop
and implement them. The Regulation affects United States farmers as
well. Some will choose to plant only traditional crops for export;
those who grow GM varieties segregate GM from other crops. Produc-
tion practices that minimize pollen drift and other causes of admix-
ture are important for both traditional and GM varieties. The low
threshold for labeling products with adventitious or technically una-
voidable presence of GMOs, with an even lower threshold expected
for seed, makes the avoidance of admixture critical. Moreover,
though labeling facilitates consumer choice, labeling may also stigma-
279. Press Release, European Commission, Midday Express of 2004-11-29, News
from the Press and Communication Directorate's Midday Briefing (MEX/04/1129,
Nov. 29, 2004). Because the regulatory committee failed to reach a qualified majority,
the authorization proposal will go to the Council of Ministers. If the Council neither
adopts nor rejects the decision, the Commission can adopt the decision to authorize
MON 863.
280. See USDA Advisory Committee on Biotechnology and 21st Century Agriculture,
Global Traceability and Labeling Requirements for Agricultural Biotechnology-De-
rived Products: Impacts and Implications for the United States (May 2005), http://
w3.usda.gov/agencies/biotech/ac2l /reports/tlpaperv37final.pdf.
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tize GM products and discourage consumption of foods with no
known health risks.281
Different attitudes in United States and the E.U. toward GMOs
on the part of citizens, the agricultural community, and regulatory
agencies help to account for differences in regulatory requirements
for GM crops and their products. The European approach, based on
process and heavily influenced by the precautionary principle, has
limited the market for GM varieties, which are a significant percent-
age of United States agricultural production. It is to be hoped that
incompatibilities in the U.S. and E.C. regulatory systems can be re-
solved without further damage to trade and to U.S.-E.U. relations.
281. See Mansour & Key, supra note 1, at 64-68; Appleton, supra note 262.
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DO EUROPEAN UNION NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
CREATE ECONOMIC NUISANCES IN
THE UNITED STATES?
Thomas P. Redick & Michaelj Adrian*
ABSTRACT
The European Union's new traceability system for biotech crops will lead
to the proliferation of non-tariff barriers affecting biotech crops. This, in
turn, will lead to economic dislocation and attendant liability in the United
States, which is losing billions of dollars in export trade. A chain of complex
legal problems will arise for United States-based companies as they strive to
trace particular genetically modified (GM) events and avoid commingling.
The European Union (E. U) tracing law for biotech crops applies at each
stage of commodity commerce, from grain shippers leading back through ele-
vators, growers, and seed companies. Warranty liability could arise from
denial of entry in the ports of the E. U, and any trading partners following a
similar "zero tolerance" approach (e.g., China, New Zealand, Japan, etc.) as
shippers denied entry use the E. U-imposed tracing system to trace unap-
proved-in-E. U, biotech crops back to growers or biotech seed companies. Nui-
sance liability could arise as growers look to their neighbors for the source of
their warranty violation. E. U-mandated documentation will expedite the
process of establishing liability for commingling of the variety of biotech crop.
Given the economic impact that the E. U, 's zero tolerance could have
upon grain trading and agricultural innovation in the United States, and
the legal claims arising from such an impact, United States agribusiness
needs legal mechanisms to prevent liability (or allocate it fairly) for those
impacted at every stage in the chain of commerce. Without such prevention,
growers, seed companies, and grain buyers could become embroiled in claims
* Thomas P. Redick is the principal of Global Environmental Ethics Counsel,
which addresses the prevention of environmental liability through environmental
management, regulatory compliance, and predicting the evolution of future
environmental policies that help to prevent environmental liability. His practice is
focused on emerging high technology sectors (semiconductor-electronics and
nanotechnology) and agricultural biotechnology, representing growers, grain
handlers, and grocery manufacturers on legal issues relating to biotech crops.
Michael J. Adrian is an associate with Gallop, Johnson & Neuman LC in Clayton,
Missouri. He is a graduate of the St. Louis University School of Law, where he served
as Note & Comment Editor of the St. Louis University Public Law Review.
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against one another (i.e., common law claims of warranty, nuisance, tres-
pass, etc.). To prevent liability, businesses need legal tools that could help
prevent economic loss and liability claims. These tools include grower or
stewardship agreements, grower districts, and industry stewardship (stan-
dards for identity preservation).1
To reverse E. U. tracing policy and the proliferation of these trade barri-
ers, the United States may need to maintain a "biosafety body count" that
measures the human health and ecological impact of E. U. tracing policy. If
scientific analysis shows a genuine benefit from biotech crops for human
health or the environment, then both regulatory law and products liability
law will dictate the increased use of the "best available" technology-biotech
crops-as a tool for environmental conservation and avoiding products lia-
bility claims arising from impacts to health.
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 18, 2004, the E.U.'s Directives on Traceability and La-
beling went into effect.2 The laws apply at "each stage" of commodity
commerce, from grain shippers leading back through elevators, grow-
ers, and seed companies. The practical effect of the E.U. laws is to
impose a "zero tolerance" standard for biotech crops that have not
received regulatory approval from the E.U., and the Traceability &
Labeling ("T & L") Directives will lead to genetic testing of shipments
of United States commodities exports. The E.U. is showing signs of an
intent to use genetic tests to trace every kernel, bean, or cottonseed
that contains the wrong genes (those lacking regulatory approval in
the E.U.), using a "zero tolerance" standard. Even approved biotech
crops will be subject to labels, with a 0.9 percent tolerance that will be
difficult to meet in United States production without high costs.
1. "Identity Preservation" is a term for growing crops in a manner that ensures a
contractually agreed to level of genetic purity at delivery. The American Soybean
Association ("ASA") has created guidance on Identity Preservation. See American Soy-
bean Association, Grower Opportunities for Identity Preserved Value-Added Soybeans, at
http://www.amsoy.org/ipvas/default.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
2. Commission Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1, 2; Commission Regu-
lation 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September
2003 concerning the traceability and labeling of genetically modified organisms and
the traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically modified orga-
nisms and amending Council Directive 2001/18/EEC, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 24, 25. The
European Union ("E.U.") directives on traceability and labeling 1829 and 1830 (9/
22/03) are collectively called "T&L Directives" throughout this article. See also Mar-
garet Rosso Grossman, Traceability and Labeling of GM Crops, Food, and Feed in the Euro-
pean Union, I J. OF FOOD L. & POL'Y 43 (2005).
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E.U. officials said these new T&L Directives would be followed by
a lifting of the de facto moratorium 3 on regulatory approval of bi-
otech crops,4 which has created a non-tariff barrier to trade with the
United States. In actuality, the new laws appear to be tailored to avoid
a legal challenge at the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), while
maintaining a regulatory system that denies entry to small traces of
biotech crops that have well-documented benefits to the environment
or public health.
This "zero tolerance" standard for unapproved biotech crops
(most of which are grown in the United States) will persist for years to
come, pending a WTO challenge and subsequent E.U. compliance
with a pro-U.S. ruling. E.U. trading partners will follow a similar "zero
tolerance" approach (e.g., China, New Zealand, Japan, etc.). Liability
for the grower could begin with a grower in the United States who
unwittingly purchased impure seed and knowingly or unknowingly
waived his right to a warranty of merchantability for fitness for the
intended purpose of export.
This article is structured to provide the reader with a brief over-
view, at Part II, of the E.U.'s complex regulatory policy and the United
States' reaction to the new E.U. laws. Over a dozen common forms of
crops (e.g., potatoes, tomatoes, etc.) have been dropped to date, in
large part due to antibiotech laws in the E.U.; these crops had passed
regulatory approval in the United States and had shown no signs of
adverse food safety or environmental effects. 5 While there are genu-
3. See CNN, Brussels Lfts E. U. Ban on GM Food, May 14, 2004, at http://edition.
cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/05/19/commision.gm/index.html/ (last visited
Jan. 20, 2005). The intervening years have featured no new regulatory approvals of
U.S.-based companies' applications for E.U. approval until early 2004, when
Syngenta's sweet corn was approved. See id. The European system for approval of
genetically modified crops for use in food and feed ground to a virtual halt in late
1997, catching the biotech industry and U.S. trade representatives by surprise. At
least two billion dollars in corn trade has been lost due to E.U. policies. See, e.g.,
Commission Brings GMO Moratorium to an End, AGRA EUROPE (May 21, 2004).
4. For purposes of this paper, crops produced using recombinant DNA ("rDNA")
methods will be referred to as "biotech crops."
5. See, e.g., Lance Gay, Hope for Biotech Foods Fizzles: Economics, Regulations Blamed,
and Market Fails to Materialize, DETROIT NEWS, May 16, 2004, available at http://www.
detnews.com/2004/business/0405/16/al 1-153949.htm.
A decade ago, amid much fanfare, the Food and Drug Administration ap-
proved for supermarket sales the first of what promised to be a new genera-
tion of genetically modified crops: an ordinary-looking tomato called the
Flavr Savr. Now, the Flavr Savr is nowhere to be found on market shelves.
Neither are any of the other genetically modified crops (e.g., strawberries,
melons, lettuce, potatoes, etc.) that won government approval after millions
of dollars spent on research and development. Id.
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ine concerns that have to be addressed, 6 these risks are manageable
and do not justify the worldwide moratorium on biotech crop market-
ing that E.U. policies will create.
In Part III, the authors review the case law on "nationwide nui-
sance" class action lawsuits-legal mechanisms that secure compensa-
tion for those impacts at stages in the chain of commerce where the
growers, seed companies, and grain buyers meet (i.e., common law of
warranty, nuisance, trespass, etc.). This article also reviews legal tools
available to U.S.-based businesses that could help prevent economic
loss and liability claims. These tools include grower agreements,
grower districts, and industry standards for "identity preservation.
' 7
After reviewing the tools proposed for preventing liability, in Part
IV this article further examines the E.U. policies on biotech crops and
briefly outlines the potential implications for the environment and
human health in the United States, the E.U., and their trading part-
ners around the world. The authors suggest that the E.U. policy can-
not be sustained, given troublesome "relative risks" posed by
traditionally-bred counterparts to existing biotech crops (from carcin-
ogen-free corn to soil-conserving biotech soybeans). If scientific anal-
ysis shows a genuine benefit from biotech crops for human health or
the environment, then both regulatory law and products liability law
will dictate the increased use of the "best available" technology (bi-
otech crops) as a tool for avoiding products liability and promoting
environmental conservation. History will not look kindly upon our
"Biotech Century" if we have banished from the marketplace the best
biotech innovations at the cost of countless harms, in terms of lives
and species lost.
See also E-mail from Kimball Nill, Technical Issues Director, International Marketing,
American Soybean Association to Thomas P. Redick (Sept. 21, 2004) (on file with
author) (stating that the following crops had each lost the ability to utilize biotech
due to commercial barriers: Flax, Tomato, Sugarbeet, Potato, Lettuce, Rice, Tobacco,
Wheat, and Melons). At the time of this article's publication, such crops are only
grown in field trials or tight containment to avoid commingling. See Andrew Pollack,
Narrow Path for New Biotech Food Crops, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at C1.
6. For example, there are wild relatives of the squash plant growing in the United
States that provide a genetic reservoir of genes of use for future plant breeding. If
biotech squash were to become so prevalent that it evolved into a weedy species (par-
ticularly one with herbicide resistance), there could be a potential environmental im-
pact to be managed. See, e.g., Jane Rissler of the Union of Concerned Scientists,
Comments at a USDA Public Meeting on a Transgenic Virus-Resistant Squash, June
21, 1994, at http://www.ucsusa.org/food and environment/biotechnology-archive/
page.cfm?pageID=380 (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
7. See generally supra note 1.
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II. The Trouble with "Zero Tolerance" Traceability
Voluntary traceability of food is common in certain industry sec-
tors. Many food companies use the voluntary international quality
standard ISO 9000 as a form of quality control,8 and some biotech
seed companies use traceability under the same standard.9 The
United States has entered into the realm of mandatory traceability for
food products as a counter-terrorism measure,1 0 using the "national
security exemption" to international trade agreements to justify the
costs these measures impose upon importing food products to the
United States.
The E.U. does not have a national securityjustification for tracing
and labeling GM products, so it relies upon a combination of food
safety and environmental protection concerns. Given the recent his-
tory of the regulation of food safety in the E.U., it is easy to under-
stand how the E.U. arrived at its embrace of the "precautionary
approach" to biotech crops. The E.U.'s fragmented and inadequate
regulatory system for food safety has failed consumers in many differ-
ent instances. The loss of faith in E.U. regulatory officials began with
the E.U.'s inability to prevent the outbreak of mad cow disease (bo-
vine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE), despite warning signs that
many scholars argue appeared all too clear in the harsh light of hind-
sight.11 The mad cow disease crisis arose from a protectionist refusal
to switch from domestic protein (other cows) to safe foreign soy pro-
tein sources, and a refusal to act quickly in response to early signs.
E.U. consumers on the mainland also endured other food safety cri-
ses, such as toxic dioxin-tainted poultry scandals in Belgium.1 2
Compounding these E.U. food safety failures, the United States
biotechnology industry suffered through two widely reported inci-
dents of illegal commingling of biotech crops not approved in the
United States for food. These incidents involved StarLink (seed only)
8. See generally International Organization for Standardization, Homepage, at http:
//www.iso.org (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
9. See, e.g., Pioneer, ISO 9000 Program at Pioneer, at http://www.pioneer.com/
pioneer__info/corporate/isoprog.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
10. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 596 (to be codified in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
11. See, e.g.,Joseph S. Levine, 20/20 Hindsight, Nova, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
nova/madcow/hindsight.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
12. See, e.g., Kelly Mescher, U.S. Exports to Europe Remain High; Concern over E. U 's
Traceability Laws Linger, SoYBEAN REv., Oct. 2002, at 14-15.
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corn 13 and ProdiGene corn containing piglet diarrhea vaccine, which
was plagued by two unintentional environmental releases in violation
of permits. 14 With both the E.U. regulations and the biotech industry
suffering from this recent disappointing track record, European con-
sumers are understandably suspicious of biotech crops from the
United States.
A. Regulation Nos. 1829 and 1830 of the European Parliament
The E.U. T&L Directives are intended to enhance the protection
of the health and welfare of humans, animals and the environment.
15
The new regulatory scheme establishes procedures authorizing GM
food and feed for distribution within the European Community
(E.C.). Biotech crops exported from the United States in shipments
of grain (known in the industry as "commodities") 16 must comply with
laws and regulations mandating labeling of both GM food and feed.
17
1. Regulation 1829-Labeling
Regulation 1829 amends existing E.U. directives on GM labeling
of imports, significantly expanding the scope of products that must be
labeled.18 While labeling has been required in the E.U. for some GM
food products since 1997 (i.e., those with detectable traces of biotech
GM crops), those regulations only required the labeling of GM seeds,
plants, and foods derived from GM plants that exhibited DNA or pro-
tein of a GM origin. If no trace of GM DNA or protein was present in
a final product, no GM label was required.19 GM animal feed was not
covered under the previous GM labeling system. 20 Under the new sys-
tem, however, all foods and animal feed with ingredients derived from
13. See In re Starlink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834-35 (N.D. Ill.
2002).
14. See Peter Montague, Bumpy Road for Biotech, Environmental Research Founda-
tion, at http://www.rawfoodinfo.com/articles/art-bumpyroadforGE.html (last visited
Apr. 27, 2005).
15. Commission Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1.
16. See, e.g., Army Corps of Engineers, Navigation Data Information System, Great
Lakes Grain Traffic, at http://outreach.lrh.usace.army.mil/Industries/Grain/Grain%
20GL.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
17. Commission Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 2, 3.
18. See generally Grossman, supra note 2, for information on the E.U. regulatory
system for biotech crops.
19. See PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, U.S. vs. EU: AN EXAMINATION





GM crops must be labeled, subject to a tolerance of 0.9 percent for
"accidental" (or "adventitious") presence of approved biotech crops. 21
The Labeling Directive tolerance of 0.9 percent only applies to bi-
otech crops that the E.U. has approved for food use.
Perhaps the most controversial section of Regulation No. 1829 is
Paragraph 16, which states that the regulation should cover food and
feed produced from a genetically modified organism ("GMO") that
has no detectible residue of genetic modification (e.g., soybean oil)
but not food and feed produced with a GMO. 22 This "distinction by
preposition" has vague determining criteria: that which is "from"
GMOs, like soybean oil, is subject to labeling and traceability, even if
any detectible residues derived "from" the GM source material are not
present. 23 That which is made "with" a GMO (e.g., cheeses using ren-
net enzymes derived from GM bacteria) is not subject to GM labels or
traceability, as long as no residue or the microbe remains in the
product.
The regulation elaborates upon this by describing a few different
scenarios where the regulation would not apply (e.g., products from
an animal fed "with" GMO feed) 24 Most notably, the enzymes and
processing aids manufactured by major E.U. companies, such as Novo
Nordisk,25 are exempt from regulation under the T&L Directives,
while soybean oil produced "from" soybeans grown in the United
States will be subject to labeling and tracing. The increased costs led
E.U. food manufacturers to switch to alternative sources of vegetable
oil, abandoning soybean oil inputs to avoid GM labels. The European
Commission officials have attempted to rationalize this distinction by
claiming that these are not GM ingredients, but merely processing
aids not present in the final product.
The following hypothetical involving beer manufacturers illus-
trates how the E.U.'s "distinction without a difference" could lead to
unfair discrimination against imports. By law, beer made in Germany
is subject to restrictions on the use of corn inputs, which is not the
case for beer in the United States and Japan. Beer in Germany can
use GM yeast, however, and comply with the E.U.'s T&L Directives,
21. See id.
22. See Commission Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 2, 3.
23. See Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 2, 3.
24. See Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 2, 3.
25. Novo NoRDISK, Novo NORDISK ANNUAL REPORT 2004 32-33 (2004), available at
http://www.novonordisk.com/investors/reports/reports.asp (explaining Novo Nor-
disk is a pharmaceutical company headquartered in the E.U. with offices in seventy-
eight countries).
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provided no detectible residue of micro-organisms is present. The fol-
lowing chart illustrates this "distinction without a difference."
PRECAUTIONARY PROTECTIONISM BY PREPOSITION:
THE E.U.'s "FROM V. WITH" DISTINCTION
Genetically Genetically European European
Modified Modified Union Union
Product YEAST? CORN? LABEL? TRACING?
Non-E.U. Beer No Yes Yes Yes
E.U. Beer Yes No No No
To the extent that beer from the United States or Japan has corn in-
puts, it may be forced to apply GM labels and maintain paperwork at
each stage of commerce, even if no GM yeast was used in the manufac-
turing process.
2. Regulation 1830-Traceability
As defined by Regulation No. 1830, traceability refers to the abil-
ity to trace GMOs and products produced from them (but not prod-
ucts made "with" them, such as cheese and beer) at all stages of their
production and distribution. 26 This regulation mandates tracing of
GM products from "farm to fork,"27 or more accurately "seed to shelf."
The grain industry and its suppliers will have to develop systems that
can identify to whom and from whom GM products were received.
These records of tracing must be made available to E.U. inspectors,
and all parties must retain their records for five years.
28
3. "Zero Tolerance" for Unapproved-in-E.U. Varieties
To reach the "zero tolerance" for unapproved-in-E.U. biotech
crops at every stage in the seed production, commercial harvest, and
26. See Commission Regulation 1830/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 24, 25.
27. See Douglas Powell, What's in a GM Label?, Mar. 30, 2003, available at http://
www.foodsafetynetwork.ca/gmo/labelgm.htm.
[Consumers need a] full farm-to-fork tracing and segregation process that
can guarantee the origins of even the most minor of ingredients (such as the
cornstarch used to thicken the gravy in that frozen meat pie). Although
theoretically achievable, such a process is both difficult and enormously ex-
pensive. That's why every country that has implemented a mandatory label-
ing regime has also included an extensive network of exemptions and
loopholes. Id.
28. See Ferriere, infra note 41 ("Traceability will impose a five-year recordkeeping
requirement.")
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distribution process, U.S. producers must completely segregate GM
varieties from conventional varieties. The E.U. will allow some unin-
tentional mixing of approved or partially approved varieties at some
point in this process (e.g., through pollen drift, commingling in bins
that are not completely cleaned of grains, or even dust), if the amount
of detectable GM content does not rise above the applicable threshold
(0.5 percent or 0.9 percent) tolerances. 29 For biotech crops contain-
ing particular genetic events that are not yet approved, the permissi-
ble percentage of commingling is zero.
The E.U. regulatory approval system adds an extra layer of com-
plexity by creating a middle ground category for the "partially ap-
proved" biotech crop.30 This category allows a tolerance of 0.5
percent of particular GM genetic events that have not been fully ap-
proved by the European Commission but have initial clearance from
the European Commission Scientific Committee. That food will not
be barred from the European markets. 31 For biotech crops that do
not have such clearance, the regulatory tolerance remains at the com-
mercially impossible3 2 threshold of zero.
4. E.U. Officials Defend Their Directives
As part of its rationale for the tracing system, the E.U. cited in its
regulations the need for consumers to be fully informed as to GMOs
and products that contain them. 33 The E.U. believes this will help
restore consumer confidence in the food regulatory system, allowing
consumers to make better-informed decisions regarding foods that
may or may not contain GM ingredients.
Within the past three years, nearly every major official with a posi-
tion relating to the regulations, including E.U. Health and Consumer
Protection Commissioner David Byrne, 34 E.U. Environment Commis-
29. Id. Zero for varieties unapproved in European Union, 0.5 percent for prelimi-
nary clearance, 0.9 percent for labeling. Sonja Hillgren, Biotech and Fortress Europe,
FARM J., July 28, 2003, available at http://www.agweb.com/get-article.asp?pageid=
99799&newscat=GN.
30. See Grossman, supra note 2.
31. See Hillgren, supra note 29.
32. The legal doctrine of "commercial impossibility" is discussed infra at III.D.1.
While the European Union was perhaps unaware of this readily foreseeable complica-
tion, its traceability system introduces a "zero tolerance" for products that do not pose
a wider recognized health risk.
33. Commission Regulation 1830/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 25.
34. News Release, European Union, Authorizations, Consumer Confidence Key to
GMO Acceptance in Europe, Feb. 3, 2004, available at http://www.eurunion.org/
news/press/200 4 / 2 0 0 4 0 0 13.htm.
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sioner Margot Wallstrom,35 and the Minister-Counselor for Agricul-
ture, Fisheries and Consumer Affairs of the European Commission,
Tony Van der Haegen,3 6 have all gone on record as justifying the new
rules with similar rhetoric about "consumer confidence" and "collec-
tive preferences." In evocative language, European activist groups
have also argued that GM food should not be "crammed down the
throats" of E.U. consumers,3 7 while also noting that the new regula-
tions will accompany an opening of the closed E.U. approval process
for biotech crops.
However, with the ostensible "lifting of the moratorium" 38 that
accompanied the passage of the T&L Directives (and the approval
E.U.-wide of some biotech corn varieties) the backlash in E.U. mem-
ber states has begun. As this article was being submitted for publica-
tion, the Friends of the Earth activist group announced an initiative
that would encourage member states in the E.U. to create "GM free"
zones within their borders.
39
Member of the European Parliament Janusz Wojciechowski, Vice-
President of the Agriculture Committee, said:
Poland and other new E.U. Member states want to avoid the errors
that the old E.U. Member states made in the past in order to pre-
serve our traditional agriculture. We may produce less than them
but our food must be natural and consumer-friendly. Only such a




In a presentation given at Iowa State University on November 14,
2003, Jean Ferriere of the E.U.'s Trade Directorate informed an audi-
ence of United States growers and grain shippers that the E.U.'s new
35. See Farming: "Genuine Fear" of GMOs in Europe, NATIONALIST (CARLOW, IRELAND),
July 15, 2002, available at http://archives.tcm.ie/carlownationalist/2002/07/15/
story2310.asp.
36. Press Release, Pew Initiative, Consumer Trust in Government Is Key to Policies
on Genetically Modified Food - on Both Sides of the Atlantic, Oct. 24, 2001, available
at http://pewagbiotech.org/newsroom/releases/102401.php3.
37. See, e.g., Commission Brings GMO Moratorium to an End, AGRA EUROPE (May 21,
2004).
38. See Grossman, supra note 2, at 45-46.
39. Barbara Thauront, Independent Media Centre, Campaign for GM Free Zones and
Regions Gathers Force, Sept. 14, 2004, available at http://www.indymedia.ie/newswire.
php?story-id=66573%26printpage=true%26includecomments=true; see also infra
Section III D (discussing the creation of such "GM free" zones).
40. See Thauront, supra note 39.
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T&L Directives would target non-GMO shipments. 41 When pressed
about enforcement capacity, he acknowledged the role that non-gov-
ernmental organizations would play in conducting independent tests
that could find traces of unapproved-in-E.U. varieties in grain ship-
ments arriving at E.U. ports. The E.U. is adding testing centers to
help activists currently enforcing its regulatory program track biotech
crop content in United States products that were not previously sub-
ject to scrutiny for unapproved-in-E.U. biotech content.
Reports of Greenpeace 42 testing commodities, shipments, and
food products are fueling concerns that United States commodity
shipments may be denied entry.43 As explained later in this article,
the testing of shipments for evidence of unapproved events (each vari-
ant of a new trait introduced by biotech methods is a regulated "ge-
netic event") can lead to liability-triggering events that trace back, via
contractual warranties, to a producer who sold an unapproved-in-E.U.
variety to a grain buyer. Like a row of dominoes toppling by prior
agreement, each seller of the unapproved variety can be held liable
under commercial law (breach of warranty) for causing the "contami-
nation" of a large quantity of export soybeans with varieties of biotech
crops that lack approval in major overseas markets. In anticipation of
such claims, insurers have rewritten policies for grain shippers and
growers, excluding liabilities relating to biotech crops (with the risks
of unapproved varieties of biotech crops driving the change).44
B. U.S. Critique: Pretextual Regulations and the Cheese/Beer Loopholes
The E.U.'s T&L Directives did not arrive without significant ad-
vance notice and discussion among United States and E.U. govern-
ments and their respective industry leaders. The U.S. government
and the E.U. governments have engaged in a "Transatlantic Business
41. Notes from speech by Jean Ferriere, Presentation to Public Forum on the Eu-
ropean Union Traceability and Labeling Regulations, Iowa State University (Nov. 14,
2003) (explaining that "non-GMO" shipments will be periodically tested to verify that
non-declarations are true) (on file with authors).
42. See generally Greenpeace, About Us, at http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/
aboutus/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2005) (explaining that Greenpeace is a well-known
organization that is concerned with environmental issues); Greenpeace, Global Action
for a Global Problem, at http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/news/global-action-for-a-
global-pro (last visited Apr. 11, 2005) ("To protect the public's health and prevent the
contamination of the environment, [Greenpeace is] confronting genetic engineering
everywhere [they] can, be it along the export routes or along the food chain.").
43. See Reuters Newswire, Greenpeace Bars Argentine GMO Soy From Brazil Port (May 3,
2004) (on file with author).
44. See, e.g., Marc S. Mayerson, Insurance Recovery for Losses from Contaminated or Ge-
netically Modified Foods, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. J. 837 (2004).
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Dialogue" ("TABD") 45 for nearly a decade that has discussed various
trade issues, including E.U. member nations' objections to biotech
crops.4 6 The TABD recommended the formation of an E.U.-U.S. in-
dustry and government group that allowed E.U. and U.S. biotechnol-
ogy and food corporations to meet regularly. The TABD's biotech
initiative, led by Unilever 4 7 and Monsanto,48 was formed "to identify
potential causes for trade difficulties and propose ways to eliminate
them."4 9 In 1998, this process was viewed by the United States as a
lever for lifting the E.U. "moratorium" on regulatory approval for bi-
otech crops, such as Bt corn (a category of biotech crop that had sev-
eral unapproved varieties commingled in U.S. corn supply in 1998).50
Over time, however, the TABD came to realize that the E.U. vision of
biotechnology process-based labels would create barriers to trade.
51
45. See, e.g., Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue U.S. Office, Trans-Atlantic Business Di-
alogue Report to the U.S.-E. U. Summit in Ireland, 26 June 2004: Establishing a Barrier-Free
Transatlantic Market: Principles and Recommendations, available at http://128.121.v145.19
/tabd/media/TABDReportFINAL22AprilUS.pdf (mentioning agriculture, including
subsidies but not biotech crops). The TABD group provides recommendations and
agenda items for U.S.-E.U. economic summits, not exclusive to biotech issues. See,
e.g., Transatlantic Business Dialog, About the TABD, at www.tabd.com/about (last vis-
ited Apr. 27, 2005).
46. See generally TABD, Rome Communiqug, Nov. 7, 1997, available at http://128.121.
145.19/tabd/media/1997RomeCEOReport.pdf) (forming joint TABD group on bi-
otech issues and indicating "agri-biotechnology" is a particular area for reform); see
also Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman, TransAtlantic Business Dialogue: Corporate
Conspiracy, Nov. 20, 2000, available at http://www.commondreams.org/views/112000-
103.htm (referring to the "top U.S. side concerns: Italian restrictions on genetically
modified foods").
47. E.U.-based Unilever is comprised of various entities that make up one of the
world's largest food and personal care products companies. See generally UNILEVER,
UNILEVER ANNUAL REVIEW 2003 (2004), available at http://www.unilever.com/images/
annualreview English -03 -tcm3-4018_tcm13-5396.pdf.
48. U.S.-based Monsanto is a biotech company focused on increasing agricultural
productivity through science. See Monsanto Company, About Us, at http://www.
monsanto.com/monsanto/layout/about-us/default.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
49. TABD: Tiptoeing Toward a Transatlantic Market, CORP. EUROPE OBSERVER (CEO
Quarterly Newsletter, Amsterdam), May, 1998 at 1, available at http://www.corporate
europe.org/observerl/tabd.html.
50. Id. (stating that "Franklin Vargo, acting assistant secretary of commerce, is jubi-
lant about this 'closer and more productive U.S.-European cooperation."' In particu-
lar, Vargo mentions that the NTA process has "solved obstacles that had prevented
U.S. exports of genetically engineered 'BT corn."').
51. See, e.g., TABD, Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue Report (TABD) 2001 CEO Report,
at 10, available at http://128.121.145.19/tabd/media/2001DCBrusselsCEOReport.
pdf (noting potential "technical barriers to trade" including "process and production
labeling (PPMs) [such as] mandatory biotechnology labeling" that would create trade
barriers); see also TABD, Chicago Conference Report, at 32, available at http://128.121.
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1. United States Government
When the E.U. proposed its T&L Directives, the Bush Administra-
tion asserted that the E.U. labeling scheme was unnecessary and
pretextual (i.e., illegal trade discrimination favoring domestic inter-
ests). On May 21, 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush referred to
the theme of "unfounded, unscientific fears" that allegedly motivated
the E.U. in pursuing its biotech agenda.52 In the same speech, Presi-
dent Bush reiterated the belief that the E.U.'s stance has brought
about a secondary problem, as its policy contributed to the hunger
problems in Africa. 53 Moreover, this unwarranted focus on a non-exis-
tent threat posed by tiny bits of DNA, in a world that happily con-
sumes traces of animal feces, insect parts, and known carcinogens, 54
may distract regulatory agencies from their appointed task of regulat-
ing actual risks to health.
U.S. Undersecretary for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Af-
fairs Alan Larson questioned the scientific basis for the E.U.'s require-
ment of labels on GM foods and called upon the E.U. to utilize
rigorous, legitimate scientific risk assessment to dictate policy.55 Lar-
son cited a European Commission study that reviewed eighty studies
on biotech crops, and this study found that classical (i.e., conven-
tional) food safety risks could exceed those posed by biotech crops.56
Paragraph 16 of Regulation No. 1829 distinguishes between food
and feed produced "from" a GMO and food and feed produced "with"
a GMO without a scientific basis.5 7 This distinction fails to recognize
that the only arguable human injury to be documented in scientific
145.19/tabd/media/2002ChicagoCEOReport.pdf (stating that "mandatory labeling
should be limited to only what is necessary to ensure public and environmental
safety").
52. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Bush Lashes Out at Europe on GMO-Ban: President Says
Aversion to Biotech Perpetuates African Hunger, WASH. POST, May 22, 2003, at AOI, availa-
ble at http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/wto/news/O522bush-europe-
gmo_ban.htm.
53. Since this speech, new evidence of mycotoxin-related deaths in Kenya adds
potential toxicity to the threats faced by Africans.
54. See, e.g., U.S. FooD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, Good Manufacturing Practices
(GMPs) for the 21st Century-Food Processing § 2 ("Fruit is usually contaminated by
direct or indirect contact with animal feces."), available at www.cfsan.fda.gov/-acro-
bat/gmp-2.pdf.
55. Undersecretary Alan P. Larson, U.S. Differences with Europe on Plant Biotech-
nology, Remarks Before the Cato Institute (Sept. 25, 2002), available at http://www.
state.gov/e/rls/rm/2002/13793.htm.
56. See id.
57. Commission Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 2; see also supra notes 24-
28 and accompanying text.
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literature and associated (however hypothetically) with biotechnology
arose from a product made "with" a GM bacterium. 58 The E.U. would
place GMOs in a higher-risk category than GM bacteria or other mi-
crobes, even if this category has been accused of causing thirty-seven
deaths.59 Since the E.U.'s "from v. with distinction" is based upon hy-
pothetical fears, the "with" exception to GM labeling lacks any scien-
tific basis.
60
2. World Trade Organization Action
To combat the E.U.'s mistaken application of the "precautionary
principle" to biotech crops that have proved their worth, the United
States has initiated an action at the WTO. The Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations (1986-1993)61 created the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Agreement. This granted countries the right to regu-
late food products but required that they be "based on scientific prin-
ciples. '62 By this, a product must be scientifically shown to be harmful
before a country may restrict imports of it.63 Under the WTO agree-
ment, the E.U. must prove through scientific principles that biotech
crops are inherently less safe than traditionally-bred crops.64
In addition to this WTO attack against E.U. policy, the United
States also claims that many other trade violations stem from the
E.U.'s treatment of GMOs. These arguments were included in the
WTO action brought by the United States, Canada, and Argentina on
58. The activist groups promoting a genetically modified free Europe repeatedly
refer to "thirty-seven deaths" caused by L-tryptophan produced in genetically modi-
fied bacterium in the late 1980s. See, e.g., Ronnie Cummins, Exposing Biotech's Big Lies,
IN MOTION MAGAZINE, May 23, 2002, available at www.inmotionmagazine.com/ra02/
geffl4.html. But see Hong Kong Gov., Food and Envir. Hygiene Dep't, Safe Food &
Public Health, at http://www.fehd.gov.hk/safefood/gmf/gen-info3.html (last visited
Apr. 14, 2005) (assuring consumers that the deaths were caused by contaminants
rather than by the bacterium itself).
59. See, e.g., Soil Association, L -Tryptophan: What Made This GM Food Supplement Kill
37 People and Disable 1500?, available at http://www.soilassociation.org/web/sa/
saweb.nsf/library?openform&catGMO:_technicalinformation.
60. See, e.g., John Fagan, Ph.D., The Facts About Genetic Tryptophan: A Summary, No-
vember, 1997, available at http://www.zmag.org/Bulletins/ptry.htm (concluding "it is
highly likely that genetic engineering was the determining factor in generating this
toxin").
61. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Genetically Modified Organisms
Still Source of US-EU Tension, July 30, 2003, at http://www.globalizationlOl.org/news.
asp?NEWSID=55 (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See generally id.
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May 13, 2003,65 which attacked the E.U.'s use of the "precautionary
principle" for biotech crop approval on the grounds that it violates
trade law.
66
A five-year "moratorium" on regulatory approval of biotech crops
was created by the E.U.'s failure to approve any new GM crops during
that time frame. 67 This blocked American exports from entering the
E.U. U.S. Speaker of the House of Representatives Dennis Hastert
estimated that American farmers experienced a monetary loss during
that time of $300 million per year on corn alone, and that number
could exceed $4 billion by 2005.68 An academic based in Switzerland
reported both soybeans and corn from the United States suffered a
combined loss of up to $1.9 billion per year in lost trade with the
E.U.
6 9
In March 2003, E.U. Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy con-
tended that the E.U. would prevail in this trade dispute before the
WTO.70 The VTO allows legislation that addresses the health and
welfare of the E.U.'s population if the regulations are based upon
"proportional, transparent, scientific advice. ' 71 The E.U. specifically
disclaimed the idea that the regulations were protectionist mea-
65. BBC NEWS, WORLD EDITION, VVTO to Probe Europe's GMO Policy, Aug. 29, 2003,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3191395.stm.
66. See id.
67. See generally BBC NEws, WORLD EDITION, EU "Regrets" U.S. Action on GM Crops
(Aug. 8, 2003), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/
3135763.stm.
68. See PEW INITIATIVE, supra note 19.
69. THOMAS BERNAUER, GENES, TRADE AND REGULATION: THE SEEDS OF CONFLICT IN
FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY, 126-28 (2003). Bernauer estimates $200-400 million annual
loss since 1997 in corn and corn byproducts (e.g., gluten). Soybean exports declined
from $2.6 billion in 1996 to $1.1 billion in 2002 due in large part to labeling and
substitution of soy by food producers who purchased Brazilian non-GMO soy instead.
Bernauer considers traceability and labeling for all food and feed "more worrying"
since "all U.S. corn and soybean exports" to the European Union could collapse.
In the worst case, U.S. producers will find that the cost of forgoing exports to
the European Union is smaller than the cost of restructuring the U.S. crop
handling system so as to comply with E.U. regulations . . . U.S. farmers are
likely to face a disadvantage vis-i-vis countries that opt entirely for non-GE
production. For obvious reasons, it will always be cheaper to operate the
entire crop-handling system of a country on a non-GE crop basis than to
segregate GE and non-GE crops. In brief, the prospects for U.S. corn and
soy exports to Europe are rather bleak. Id. at 128-29.
70. Press Conference with Pascal Lamy, E.U. Trade Commissioner, Washington
D.C. (Mar. 4, 2003), at http://www.eurunion.org/news/speeches/2003/030304Pr-
Confpl.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
71. See id.
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sures. 72 However, E.U. corn farmers certainly reaped benefits from
the exclusion of U.S. corn as the E.U. can easily meet its corn needs
with a combination of its own production and non-United States im-
ports. 73 For feed, however, Bernauer suggests that there are not ade-
quate non-GMO supplies of soybeans and that the outlook for United
States genetically engineered soy exports to the E.U. is somewhat bet-
ter than for genetically engineered corn because it appears harder for
the E.U. to find substitutes for genetically engineered soy at similar
cost.
7 4
3. United States' Growers React To Economic Impacts of
Traceability
One of the biggest stakeholders in the United States is the Ameri-
can Soybean Association ("ASA"), which sold $9.7 billion in annual
exports of U.S. soy products worldwide in 2004.75 ASA has taken the
position that biotech crops approved for food are completely safe for
E.U. consumers, but the regulatory scheme established by the E.U.
presents a standard that is too burdensome for most companies in the
United States to attain. 76 For the seed companies, a one hundred per-
cent guarantee of seed purity is not commercially feasible, 77 yet grow-
ers are asked by grain buyers to provide them with a one hundred
percent pure warranty due to the grain buyers' need to meet "zero
tolerance" under the E.U. T&L Directives. These growers face the risk
of their 99.9 percent pure product being rejected, or even worse, caus-
ing an entire ship's cargo to be lost.
The ASA has repeatedly reiterated its opposition to the T&L Di-
rectives, referring to the regulations as non-tariff barriers to trade and
72. See id.
73. See BERNAUER, supra note 69 at 129. For soy, however, the E.U. has a self-suffi-
ciency level of around 10 percent for whole soybeans, 5 percent for soy meal, and 20
percent for soy oil. Food soy consumption amounts to only one million tons annually
which is easily supplied by non-genetically engineered sources. See id. at 129.
74. See id.
75. See American Soybean Association, Statistics, at http://www.asa-europe.org/
Statistics/statistics.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
76. See generally American Soybean Association, ASA Supports WTO Biotech Case
Against European Union, at http://www.iasoybeans.com/whatnew/relatednewsarchive/
asa051503.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
77. Kelly Mescher, U.S. Exports to Europe Remain High; Concern Over E. U 's Traceability




violations of the E.U.'s WTO obligations. 7 ASA fears that the E.U.
and activist groups would pressure other countries and trading part-
ners to implement similar standards, perpetuating the
discrimination.
79
The United States government and the E.U. government en-
gaged in a dialogue in 2001 that considered lifting the E.U. "morato-
rium" on regulatory approval in exchange for the United States
agreeing to a mandatory "traceability" system to make regulatory ap-
proval more palatable for E.U. Member States (and also reversible, in
terms of recalling any varieties that were approved in error).80 While
persons within the seed industry made several public statements indi-
cating support for such a trade-off, the ASA, the United Soybean
Board, and the National Oilseed Processors Association (ASA/USB/
NOPA) disagreed and communicated with the seed industry in 2001
to express the concerns of commodity exporters regarding the poten-
tial adverse impact of traceability upon the shipment of commodities
worldwide. ASA/USB/NOPA predicted that the E.U. would try to
make the traceability system a global standard for managing grain
shipments, and the E.U. is currently engaged in doing precisely that
via Article 18.2 of the Biosafety Protocol.
8 1
Taking the soybean producers as an example, the challenges of
E.U.-style tracing can be demonstrated by following the soybeans from
harvest to market. Soybeans are first harvested throughout the region
of the Midwest United States and transported by wagons or trucks to a
common holding bin. They are then taken to a regional center
before being loaded onto barges for transport down the Mississippi
River. After they reach the Gulf of Mexico, they are transferred onto
ocean-going vessels for transport to Europe. At each stage of trans-
port and storage, the soybeans mix and commingle with each other,
rendering specific identification and tracing impossible.8 2 "Grower
districts" have been discussed as a possible option for segregating bi-
otech crops; these are commonly used in Idaho and Washington to
78. See, e.g., Press Release, American Soybean Association, ASA Urges USTR to Chal-
lenge EU Traceability and Labeling Requirements (Nov. 25, 2003), available at http://www.
soygrowers.com/newsroom/releases/2003%20releases/rl 12503.htm.
79. See id. (quoting ASA President Ron Heck).
80. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
81. See E-mail from Kimball Nill, Technical Director of International Marketing,
American Soybean Association, to Thomas Redick, author of this article, dated Dec.
13, 2004 (on file with author).
82. See id. See also Mescher, supra note 77.
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avoid commingling of industrial rapeseed with its related food crop,
rapeseed used for canola oil.83
C. Global Tracing of Commodity Shipments Via the Biosafety Protocol
The E.U. traceability regime specifically invokes environmental
protection as one of the reasons for its passage, singling out biotech
crops for scrutiny under a "precautionary approach" due to the poten-
tial environmental impacts of biotech products. A new international
treaty, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety ("Biosafety Protocol"), is
designed to address these impacts. The Biosafety Protocol entered
into force on September 11, 2003 and will become the law mandating
traceability for genetic events for its parties on September 11, 2005.
s 4
The Biosafety Protocol could provide the E.U. with an argument that
customary international law has evolved to recognize the "precaution-
ary principle" (as implemented in a "precautionary approach") as a
legally justified approach to regulatory approval for GMOs (or "living
modified organisms" and "LMOs" under the Biosafety Protocol).85
The provision of the Biosafety Protocol that mandates tracing of
biotech crop inputs in global grain commodity commerce is Article
18.2(a), which reads as follows:
Living modified organisms that are intended for direct use as food
or feed, or for processing, clearly identifies that they "may contain"
living modified organisms and are not intended for intentional in-
troduction into the environment, as well as a contact point for fur-
83. See, e.g., Canola and Rapeseed Production and Development Act, IDAHO CODE
§ 22-4701. (Michie 2004); Rapeseed Production and Establishment of Districts, WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 16-570-010 (Wash. Dep't of Agric. 2004) (setting forth the administra-
tive provisions governing the Washington production districts).
84. See SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIvERsITY & U.N. ENVI-
RONMENT PROGRAMME, BIOSAFETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY 5 (2003), available at http://www.biodiv.org/
doc/press/presskits/bs/cpbs-unep-cbd-en.pdf. While the Biosafety Protocol techni-
cally entered into force on September 11, 2003, the parties to the protocol needed a
meeting to establish the ground rules for implementing the protocol. Biosafety Clear-
ing-House, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, at http://bch.biodiv.org/about/protocol.
shtml (last visited Apr. 27, 2005). The first Meeting of the Parties ("MOP") to the
Biosafety Protocol was held February 23-27, 2004, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties of the Conven-
tion Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol, at http://www.biodiv.org/
meetings/mop-01 (last visited Apr. 27, 2005). The seventh meeting of the Confer-
ence of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP-7), which pro-
vided the terms of reference for the Biosafety Protocol, met in Kuala Lumpur from
February 9-20, 2004. Id.
85. See BIOsAFETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 84, at 4 (explaining that
"LMOs" is another term for "GMOs").
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ther information. The Conference of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall take a decision on the
detailed requirements for this purpose, including specification of
their identity and any unique identification, no later than two years
after the date of entry into force of this Protocol. 86
As the E.U. enforces "zero tolerance" traceability for unapproved-
in-E.U. varieties, other countries could follow its lead. These coun-
tries could possibly include nations that do not export to the E.U., but
which export to a nation that has trade with the E.U.
The E.U. will use the Biosafety Protocol Article 18.2(a) to estab-
lish itself as the Slowest Common Unapproved Denominator
("SCUD"), leading other nations to deny imports of commodities con-
taining any trace of unapproved-in-E.U. biotech crops. Since those
nations will then be denied any health benefits or environmental con-
servation advantages of these biotech crops, they will all share in the
E.U.'s lowered levels of protection of environmental and human
health. 87 This is the "SCUD" effect, aptly named for the devastating
long-range impact that E.U. policy can have;88 if Article 18.2 (a) of the
Biosafety Protocol is implemented in a manner that encourages the
SCUD effect, this could cause a rapid spread of trade barriers that
would be comparable to the long-standing E.U. moratorium on entire
U.S. corn shipments.
Indeed, in late 2004, the scientific advisory group appointed to
advise the parties to the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") issued a report suggesting that all corn shipments to Mex-
ico from the United States should be milled prior to entry into Mex-
ico.8 9 The advisory group, the North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation ("CEC"), made this suggestion to protect
86. See Council Decision 2002/628, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 48, 55 (emphasis added).
87. See Biotechnology Industry Organization, Benefits of Agricultural Biotechnology, at
http://www.bio.org/foodag/background/epabenefits.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2005);
German Research Foundation, Statement by the DFG on the Draft Legislation to Reform the
Law on Genetic Engineering, at http://www.dfg.de/aktuelles-presse/reden-stellung
nahmen/2004/ (stating biotech crops can be specifically adapted to developing na-
tions' yield needs for food crops) (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
88. See Nathan A. Canestaro, Legal and Policy Constraints on the Conduct of Aerial Preci-
sion Warfare, 37 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L., 431 n.181 (2005) (describing a scud missile as
a "weapon incapable of [the proper] accuracy that would [be needed to] allow the
proper selection of military targets over civilian population").
89. See COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, MAIZE & BIODIVERSlTY: THE
EFFECTS OF TRANSGENIC MAIZE IN MEXICO: KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
("CEC Report"), available at http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/Maize-and-Biodiversity-
en.pdf (suggesting that Mexico "strengthen the moratorium on commercial planting"
by "milling transgenic grain at the point of entry").
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Mexico's corn production from unwanted commingling with unap-
proved genetic events that may be present in United States corn ship-
ments and are not approved for environmental release in Mexico.
Fourteen industry associations including corn, soy, cotton, and wheat
growers, as well as the Biotechnology Industry Organization, promptly
forwarded a letter objecting to the suggestion that milling of corn
shipments from the United States be required to protect
biodiversity. 90
The CEC's report will rightfully endure intense scrutiny because
it appears to have ignored the potential health effects of forced mill-
ing, which leads to transportation and storage methods that may allow
the formation of harmful mold and other mycotoxins (which are
known to cause health problems in Mexico).91 It also appears to have
ignored the less burdensome alternatives to milling, including the
measures used to contain certain weed seeds present within commodi-
ties under the International Plant Protection Convention, 92 which
mandates the use of tarps, mowing of areas adjacent to rail lines, and
other related measures to prevent the release of certain weed seeds
into the environment that are already present within commodities
shipments.
Even if drastic measures such as the "mill at the border" are
averted, United States grain shippers will still face a serious dilemma
under the emerging traceability regimes mandated by the E.U. and
the Biosafety Protocol. If grain shippers from major grain-exporting,
biotech-growing nations (e.g., United States, Canada, Argentina, Bra-
zil, etc.) ship unapproved varieties into a nation and successfully off-
load all product, the shipper could still be liable for traces of unap-
proved varieties under a warranty obligation (applying international
commercial law) and possibly a regulatory violation under the domes-
tic law of the importing nation. At its logical extreme, even a nation
receiving food aid could set up trade barriers because it hopes to ex-
90. See Letter from American Farm Bureau Federation, et al. to Michael Leavitt,
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency (Oct.18, 2004), available at http://
www.nopa.org/content/newsroom.
91. See, e.g., Margorie A. Peraza et al., Modulation of Chemical Toxicity and Risk Assess-
ment, ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES, Aug. 1997, available at http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/
members/ 1997/105-8/peraza-full.html ("Mycotoxins are by-products of fungal con-
tamination of food crops, most common in corn, peanuts and cottonseed .... in
Mexico [ ] the rural, tropical conditions often result in contamination of corn, a ma-
jor agricultural product and food source.").
92. The International Plant Protection Convention is an international treaty re-
lated to plant health that has been signed by over 135 countries. See The Interna-
tional Plant Protection Convention, at http://www.ippc.int (last visited May 16, 2005).
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port to the E.U., which Zambia has already done, citing the Biosafety
Protocol as its legal support.93
The Biosafety Protocol also has a specific "liability and redress"
element (Article 27) still under negotiation that would create liability
for biotech crops under an international liability protocol.94 In the
future, as a result of Article 27 of the Biosafety Protocol or national
laws on liability, businesses in the United States may see strict liability
applied to require "remediation" of biotech crops growing in places
where they are not wanted (comparable to the StarLink testing, recall
and remediation process) 95 via United States court claims filed for
"harm" to biodiversity that occurs abroad.
III. LIABILITY FOR BIOTECH CROPS UNDER UNITED STATES
COMMON LAW TORTS
The primary United States liability events that may be triggered
by this regulatory regime include: (1) shipments that are turned away
at foreign ports for unapproved-overseas biotech content, (2) food
product recalls, and (3) environmental remediation costs. The latter
two would arise from shipments of unapproved-overseas varieties that
are not detected and turned away, leading to the spread of crops
within a food supply or ecosystem long after they are released into
commerce or the environment.
The legal claims that would arise from these factual settings
would include: (1) nuisance liability claims for neighbors who are
sued for breach of warranty and are left looking for someone to
blame, (2) contractual breaches of warranty obligations to customers,
and (3) various regulatory-based liability theories that arise when im-
port controls are violated and a regulatory recall is ordered (as oc-
curred with StarLink corn in the United States and Pringles potato
chips, which were recalled from the Japanese food supply when an
unapproved-in-Japan GM potato event was discovered in Pringles pul-
93. M.M. Lewanika, Establishing Acceptance: Biosafety Regulation in Zambia, 47 Bio-
TECHNOLOGY AND DEV. MONITOR, Sept. 2001, available at http://www.biotech-monitor.
nl/4706.htm.
94. Compare the Biosafety Protocol to what emerged ten years after the Basel Con-
vention on Hazardous Waste, which passed a non-retroactive, joint and several liability
protocol, see generally Secretariat of the Basel Convention, United Nations Environ-
ment Programme, Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazard-
ous Wastes and Their Disposal Adopted by the Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on 22 March
1989, available at http://www.basel.int/text/con-e.htm.
95. See, e.g., In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill.
2002).
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led from the shelves of a grocery store in Japan).96 This article will
confine itself to a discussion of nuisance and warranty liability scena-
rios, and leave the international regulatory enforcement scenario for
another author.
Since grain shippers will want to avoid these liability issues, sup-
pliers (such as elevators growers) who sell their grain may be asked to
warrant the genetic purity of their product. For any liabilities that
arise in the future, grain shippers in the United States may seek to
enforce the typical "pass-through" warranties going back to the grow-
ers. These grain suppliers may be asked at some point in the future to
contribute toward the cost of recalling unapproved varieties that were
released in small amounts but are technically illegal due to "zero toler-
ance" standards. Growers may encounter seed companies who suc-
cessfully disclaim liability for warranty. In the end the liability may be
contractually allocated to growers, who are not insured or adequately
capitalized to handle this level of commercial risk.
A. The StarLink Decision
Biotech crops lacking regulatory approval in major overseas mar-
kets are potentially an "economic nuisance," which is a relatively new
invention of the common law when applied to biotech crops. This
can include "private" nuisance (such as neighbor to neighbor,
through pollen flow or other commingling) 97 and "public" nuisance
(such as public harms caused by a biotech seed company). Commin-
gling of an unapproved-in-E.U. variety may be found analogous to
blocking a public road, contaminating a river or an air purifier, or
rendering an entire county's corn crop unfit for its intended market.
While the boundary between nuisance and trespass is not well de-
fined doctrinally,98 the modern trend in trespass recognizes airborne
96. See generally JUAN LOPEZ VILLAR, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH INTERNATIONAL, GMO
CONTAMINATION AROUND THE WORLD, Oct. 2001, available at http://www.foe.org/
camps/comm/safefood/gefood/foodaid/contamination.pdf. On June 21, 2001, Ja-
pan's Calbee Foods Co. Ltd. voluntary recalled some of its snack products after traces
of illegal genetically modified NewLeaf Plus Potato were found. The same type of GM
potato was found in "Pringles" chips manufactured by Procter and Gamble, which was
forced to pull 800,000 packets off the Japanese market. Id. at 15.
97. See E. Ann Clark, The Implications of the Schmeiser Decision, available at http://
www.percyschmeiser.com/crime.htm (discussing the farmer Percy Schmeiser, who
made headlines with his alleged theft of Monsanto's intellectual property which he
claimed was a nuisance); see also Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser and Schmeiser,
[2001] F.C. 256.
98. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 16.03[1] ("It is practical to
consider a trespass cause of action along with nuisance where appropriate, although
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pollution as a trespass where the plaintiff can demonstrate physical
damage to his property (including loss of marketability).99 The Star-
Link case extended this to include economic loss caused by a biotech
crop's pollen drift or post harvest commingling, recognizing claims
for both trespass and nuisance. 100
On July 11, 2002, a federal district court judge in Chicago denied
a motion to dismiss a "novel" claim whereby growers injured by the
FDA-mandated recall of StarLink corn sought compensatory damages
and an injunction for a public and private nuisance.101 This decision
was a groundbreaking and fairly comprehensive precedent suggesting
liability standards for biotech crops in a variety of states. 10 2 U.S. Dis-
trictJudge James B. Moran denied a motion to dismiss farmers' claims
for strict product liability, consumer fraud, negligence, and public
and private nuisance alleging economic loss 103 in twenty-seven consol-
some courts differentiate between the two... Some courts do not differentiate but
just treat nuisance and trespass as identical, with the same evidence requirements.").
99. See, e.g., Born v. Exxon Corp., 388 So. 2d 933, 934 (Ala. 1980) (quoting Bor-
land v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979)); Wilson v. Interlake Steel
Co., 649 P.2d 922 (Cal. 1982); Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 709 P.2d 782, 786
(Wash. 1985); see Larry D. Scheafer, Annotation, Recovery in Trespass for Injury to Land
Caused by Airborne Pollutants, 2 A.L.R.4th 1054 (1980).
100. See In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002);
see also Sample v. Monsanto, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (discussing
"physical injury" and g--anting summaryjudgment in favor of Monsanto on tort claims
alleging economic loss from unapproved-in-E.U. crops but alleging no actual com-
mingling or "physical injury").
101. See In re StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
102. See, e.g., id. As previously noted, StarLink corn was approved for feed by the
EPA, but not for food uses. As a condition of approval, Aventis was required to main-
tain an adequate identity preservation program to keep StarLink out of the food sup-
ply. Aventis apparently thought that commingling problems, should they arise, would
be worked out with food regulators to allow some percentage of unapproved StarLink
in food. Id.
103. See id. While the "economic loss" doctrine is a matter for strict products liabil-
ity analysis beyond the scope of this article, it could represent a barrier to recovery in
some settings arising from environmental releases of biotech crops causing economic
loss. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866-75
(1986). Some federal courts have applied the East River economic loss doctrine to
consumer, as well as commercial, purchasers of vessels. See, e.g., Somerset Marine,
Inc. v. Forespar Prods. Corp., 876 F. Supp. 1114, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that
East River applies in consumer as well as commercial transactions); Cf Sherman v.
Johnson & Towers Balt., Inc., 760 F. Supp. 499, 501-02 (D. Md. 1990) (holding that
East River is not applicable to consumer losses) and Margaret Rosso Grossman, Biotech-
nology, Property Rights and the Environment, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 215, 237 (2002) (stating
that "[i]n some states, mere economic loss from defendant's negligence will not be
compensated; plaintiff must also prove physical harm to property").
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idated actions10 4 in multidistrict litigation ("MDL"). 05
Plaintiff farmers had filed consolidated class actions on behalf of
a nationwide class of corn farmers alleging common law claims for:
(1) negligence, (2) strict liability, (3) private nuisance, (4) public nui-
sance, and (5) conversion, as well as statutory claims under (6) the
Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1997 and (7) the North Caro-
lina Unfair Trade Practices Act. Plaintiffs sued the seed developer
and seed companies. The seed companies moved to dismiss, and the
court denied the motion, recognizing claims for negligence, strict
product liability, private nuisance, public nuisance, and consumer
fraud. 106 Within months of the denial of the motion to dismiss, the
plaintiffs settled for up to $110 million, with notice given to thousands
of corn growers who lost money due to depressed corn prices. 10 7
Future cases filed by organic or non-GM crop growers may cite
this decision to support claims for nuisance arising from the sale and
production of unapproved-in-E.U. varieties of biotech crops. If com-
mingling occurs through pollen drift, or a "volunteer" emerging from
grain left on the ground in a prior harvest or through post-harvest
commingling, growers suffering economic loss from commingling can
claim the economic loss under resurgence, issuance or trespass arising
from the negligent or unreasonable marketing of a particular biotech
crop, and thousands of growers similarly situated may recover for
their economic loss. As the law evolves to encompass the "physical
injury" of economic loss caused by commingling of an unapproved-in-
E.U. variety of biotech crops, the StarLink decision, combined with
overseas trade barriers, could create another multi-million dollar
precedent.
A majority of states have some form of the "economic loss doc-
trine" that bars purchasers of goods from asserting negligence claims
104. See, e.g., News Release, Iowa Department of Justice & Attorney General Tom
Miller, Miller: Aventis Signs Formal Agreement to Mitigate Losses from StarLink Corn
(Jan. 23, 2001), available at www.state.ia.us/government/ag/StarLink binding-agt
rel.htm (quoting Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller as saying that it was "irresponsi-
ble" for Aventis to market the StarLink seed corn with unrealistic restrictions, such as
660-foot "buffer strips" between StarLink and other planted corn and segregating
StarLink grain from other corn, and saying that his office believes most growers were
not aware of the restrictions).
105. See In re StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 852.
106. See id.
107. See Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Settlement Class for Certification, Pro-
posed Settlement and Fairness Hearing, Starlink Corn Prods. Liability Litigation,




with damages for economic losses. 108 Economic loss in some states is
defined as constituting qualitative defects in the goods themselves
(e.g., where there is no claim of personal injury or property damage
other than a qualitative defect in the goods at issue). The StarLink
court applied Illinois law' 09 to hold that a "physical injury" to property
occurred when StarLink commingled with other corn bound for food
uses or export.
Not every state will be receptive to such claims. For example, nui-
sance law as a tool to recover economic losses in the "stream of com-
merce" was criticized in City of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum Co.110 While
the StarLink decision is a novel extension of nuisance doctrine, this
extension was not entirely unpredictable. Various courts preceding
the StarLink decision struggled to define the boundaries of nuisance
law when products cause environmental harm."
Lawyers representing Aventis l12 and other biotech companies
have called this "public nuisance" claim unprecedented because it
sought compensation for interference with corn markets, including
export markets that refused all United States corn due to the pre-
sumed commingling of StarLink corn (and other "unapproved" vari-
eties of biotech corn).11 3 Legal commentators have analyzed the
108. See, e.g., Thomas P. Redick, Symposium: Stewardship for Biotech Crops: Strategies for
Improving Global Consumer Confidence, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 5 (2003).
109. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 448-49 (Ill.
1982) (finding that the economic loss doctrine applies to the sale of inferior or defec-
tive goods and that cases without accompanying personal injury or property damage
are more appropriately handled by existing warranty laws).
110. 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 876, 883 (1994) (awarding summary judgment to the defend-
ants, stating that manufacturers of asbestos containing building materials did not cre-
ate nuisance on city property and rejecting the idea that "the stream of commerce can
carry pollutants every bit as effectively as a stream of water" and holding the nuisance
law would "become a monster that would devour in one gulp the entire law of tort").
111. See, e.g., Arcade Water Dist. v. U.S., 940 F.2d 1265, 1266 (9th Cir. 1991); Selma
Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Inc., 271 Cal. Rptr. 596 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding a chemical vendor liable for failure to warn of proper disposal);
Shurpin v. Elmhirst, 195 Cal. Rptr. 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Cf Town of Hooksett
Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace Co., 617 F. Supp. 126 (D. N.H. 1984); County of Johnson v.
U.S. Gypsum, 580 F. Supp. 284, 294 (D. Tenn. 1984) (stating that plaintiffs cannot
"convert almost every product liability action into a nuisance claim").
112. Aventis is an E.U.-based pharmaceutical company with a strong presence in the
United States. Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Aventis in the United States: At a Glance, at
http://www.aventis-us.com/newsroom/presskit/index.jsp (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
113. Andrew Harris, Danger Uncertain, But Suits Multiply, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 9, 2002
(stating that Aventis attorney Sheila Birnbaum thinks that "suits are not based on
personal injuries, but instead on 'very novel tort theories"' and quoting her as saying,
"It's our tort system running wild again"); Rachel G. Lattimore & Raquel Whiting,
Genetically Enhanced Seed Suits Not Rooted in Law or Logic, WASH. LEGAL FoUND. LEGAL
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StarLink precedent in some detail, however, and in context it appears
to represent a logical progression from past cases. 114
StarLink established a precedent for agricultural biotechnol-
ogy, 115 but its legal impact may be minimized in future actions. Other
plaintiffs have tried and failed to make a case for damages arising
from other varieties of biotech crops that lack overseas approval. In
Sample v. Monsanto Co., 1 16 farmer plaintiffs tacked public nuisance and
negligence theories onto an antitrust action against Monsanto for GM
corn and soybean seeds that caused a nationwide decline in corn
prices (i.e., economic loss). Plaintiffs claimed that Monsanto failed to
take the appropriate measures to prevent the GM corn from entering
the "chain of grain marketing"1 17 and that, as a result, the plaintiffs
lost significant domestic and foreign commodity corn markets.
The court held that plaintiffs had abandoned or failed to prove
the physical injury allegations that survived a motion to dismiss'1 8
(i.e., actual commingling via pollen drift). The court also held that it
could not apply state law other than Illinois and Iowa (where each of
the two class plaintiffs resided) even though a "potential unnamed
class member might live in a state where nuisance claims are actiona-
BACKGROUNDER, July 27, 2001, available at www.arentfox.com/legal-updates/con-
tent592.htm.
114. See, e.g., Margaret Rosso Grossman, Genetically Modified Crops in the United States:
Federal Regulation and State Tort Liability, 5 ENVrL. L. REV. 86, 93 (2003) (stating that ex
post liability allocates fault to those who cause harm that ex ante regulation fails to
prevent).
115. Amelia P. Nelson, Legal Liability in the Wake of Starlink: Who Pays in the End ?, 7
DRAKE J. AGIic. L. 241 (Spring 2002).
116. 283 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
117. See id. at 1091 (quoting counsel for the plaintiffs as stating, "The claims of this
tort class are based on commingling, our word 'contamination,' in the U.S. marketing
channel, not where the wind blows in Iowa and where and if it blows over the fence of
a particular farmer's property"). The court then explained the plaintiffs' position
and incorrectly stated the European Union had banned U.S. soybeans, as well as corn:
Counsel explained that the term "contamination" did not refer to physical
injury to the person or property of the plaintiffs, but to the "U.S. marketing
channel." Plaintiffs allege that non-GM farmers lost revenue because the
European community rejected Monsanto's genetically modified products
and boycotted all American corn and soy as a result. Id.
118. Plaintiffs alleged that genetically modified seeds caused environmental
problems, such as "toxicity to soil microorganisms and non-target insects such as but-
terflies" and "contamination caused by cross-pollination and commingling." See id.
Plaintiffs also asked the Court "to enter an injunction requiring Monsanto to control
and/or prevent contamination of non-GM crops, soil and farming, storage and trans-
portation equipment; to implement and monitor an effective Insect Resistance Man-
agement Plan; and to adequately test GM seeds for human health and environmental
safety." Id.
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ble even in the absence of physical injury." 119 As a result, the court
granted summary judgment on claims alleging economic loss from
unapproved-in-E.U. crops, finding that "no evidence of physical injury
to the person or property of the named plaintiffs or any proposed
class member was offered by plaintiffs."' 20
Given the Sample decision, it may be difficult for plaintiffs to
prove actual commingling in the chain of grain marketing sufficient
to establish the "physical injury" contemplated by the StarLink deci-
sion. 121 However, while a nuisance is incapable of any exact or precise
definition, 122 nuisance law may be flexible enough to encompass eco-
nomic loss caused by a biotech crop that lacks regulatory approval in a
major overseas market.
B. Warranty Liability and Industry Stewardship
The United States' life sciences industry should contain the Star-
Link precedent to its unique fact pattern by avoiding the creation of
new "bad facts" that might reinforce the StarLink decision allowing
compensatory damages. Unfortunately, the current use of form con-
tracts that shift risk to growers and impose warranty disclaimers could
lead to increased risk under the StarLink precedent, while doing little
to prevent the allocation of liability to a negligent biotech company
that fails to warn of the potentially cataclysmic economic risks of
commingling.
For example, Monsanto asks its growers to sign a Stewardship
Agreement with them that contains requirements and procedures that
growers must agree to follow.1 23 The seed company liability disclaim-
ers appear in various places in the agreement, including: (1) the fine
print of Stewardship Agreements, (2) the separate guide for farmer
practices delivered with the seed, and (3) the logo on the bag. Ac-
119. Sample, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1092 n.1.
120. Id. at 1091.
121. Monsanto used its controversial forum selection clause to get venue in its
home district, the Eastern District of Missouri. Monsanto succeeded in having claims
for negligence and nuisance dismissed because the farmers did not allege facts sup-
porting actual commingling of their grain with Monsanto's unapproved-in-E.U. vari-
ety of corn. Id.
122. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 616-17
(5th ed. 1984) (stating that "[f]ew terms have afforded so excellent an illustration of
the familiar tendency of the courts to seize upon a catchword as a substitute for any
analysis of the problem; the defendant's interference with the plaintiffs interests is
characterized as a 'nuisance,' and there is nothing more to be said").
123. See, e.g., 2005 Monsanto Technology Stewardship Agreement, in David R. Moel-
ler and Michael Sligh, Farmers' Guide to GMOs, available at http://www.nationalag
lawcenter.org/assets/articles/moeller-gmos.pdf.
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cording to the Stewardship Agreement, the grower is bound to as-
sume the risk of liability and agrees not to save seed upon ripping
open the bag. Such a "bag rip" agreement would ostensibly bind
growers in a fashion similar to "click-wrap" website contracts or
"Shrink-Wrap" software licenses, 124 but this novel theory of contract
law remains untested in the context of stewardship agreements.
According to the Stewardship Agreement, growers are bound to
"channel grain produced to appropriate markets as necessary to pre-
vent movement to markets when the grain has not yet received regula-
tory approval for import." Under a separate section entitled "You
Understand," the channeling obligation is clarified by stating that not
all of Monsanto's products have been approved in certain export mar-
kets and, as a result, crops generated with the aid of those products
must be segregated. This document requires growers to confine bi-
otech crops to approved uses and markets. Such efforts should help
appease European fears concerning the co-mingling of approved and
non-approved GM crops and other products.
While Monsanto provides extensive disclosures, if it were to fail to
inform growers of the risk that they run by commingling their unap-
proved variety with a neighbor's crop then the combined effect of this
uniform non-disclosure, paired with a form contract common to all
growers, could create the "commonality" required to certify a nation-
wide class action. And if the "physical injury" of commingling is al-
leged by the neighbor (whose crop is no longer fit for its intended
purposes), then a compensation claim for a decline in grain prices
could be recoverable. While it is not possible to predict Monsanto's
future legal policies and positions with certainty, Monsanto appears to
have plans to market unapproved-overseas soybeans and corn in the
coming era of traceability. 125 Monsanto may need to change the ap-
proach it takes to protect itself from claims by growers for the biotech
soybean, which could be commercially launched in the next few years,
124. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1239, 1241 (1995) (explaining that shrinkwrap licensing agreements are de-
signed to bind the customers who use the product by the terms of the vendor in
exchange for use).
125. Monsanto has also withdrawn Roundup Ready Wheat, which is a variety of bi-
otech crop that lacks E.U. approval and carries commingling risks comparable to self-
pollinating soybeans. Press Release, Monsanto Company, Monsanto to Realign Re-
search Portfolio, Development of Roundup Ready Wheat Deferred (May 10, 2004),
available at http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/layout/media/04/05-10-04.asp.
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and threaten several billion dollars per year in annual soybean exports
to the E.U.
126
C. Grower Insurance for Biotech Crops
Given StarLink's massive liability, which included nearly all eco-
nomic loss without any proven human injury, the insurance industry is
writing this risk of economic loss from biotech crops out of policies. 127
Insurers now demand premiums for specific GMO endorsements, just
as they have done with other novel environmental liabilities. Many
carriers are now writing "GMO exclusions" applicable in farm insur-
ance, grain shipping, and other industry sectors.
In early 2000, a major Swiss insurer issued a report stating that it
would be hesitant to provide insurance for the liability risks arising
from biotech crops.' 28 This re-insurance company, Swiss Re,129 was
widely reported as taking the position that insurers had inadequate
data available on the relevant loss scenarios. 130 Swiss Re and other
insurers expect that biotech crop risks will become more calculable
over time, as data is accumulated, and will eventually become easier to
fit into traditional insurance models. 131 Swiss Re was quoted as stat-
ing: "today we must assume that the one-sided acceptance of incalcu-
lable risks means that any participants in this insurance market run





Thus growers concerned about being left uninsured for the risks
of commingling (which are increasingly being shifted contractually to
the grower) should carefully review their farm liability policies with
their agent and/or legal counsel. If a policy contains an exclusion for
particular liability risks of biotech crops, the grower should determine
126. See MONSANTO COMPANY, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT: SETTING THE STANDARD IN THE
FIELD 7 (2004), available at http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/content/media/
pubs/2004/2004_annualreport.pdf (explaining Monsanto's hopes to launch a new
soybean in 2005).
127. See generally Mayerson, supra note 44.
128. See Tom Lowe, Insuring the GM Industry, THE JACKSON PROGRESSIVE, May 25,
2000, at www.jacksonprogressive.com/issues/foodtech/insuringgm052500.html (last
visited Apr. 27, 2005).
129. Swiss Re is one of the largest insurers in the world. See Need to Know, TIMES
(London), Feb. 15, 2005, at 38.
130. See id.
131. See generally Mayerson, supra note 44.
132. Peter Montague, If You're Not Concerned About GM Foods You Will Be After You
Read This: What the National Academy of Science Says About Genetically Engineered Crops,
TOM PAINE, COMMON SENSE, May 19, 2000, at http://www.tompaine.com/feature2.
cfm/ID/3153 (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
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the range of liability for damages. The covered perils should include
pollen drift from neighboring farms growing an unapproved-in-E.U.
genetic event, commingling at harvest through shared combines, or
commingling through post-harvest mixing in transports, grain eleva-
tors, and so on through the chain of commerce.
Given the retreat of insurers from the risks posed by unapproved-
in-E.U. varieties, biotech companies should fund or support a nation-
wide legal strategy that: (a) manages the class action exposure gener-
ated by these dangerous disclaimers and (b) seeks to prevent "bad
facts" from making bad case law (i.e., prevent large scale commingling
of any unapproved-in-European biotech variety) as they have done
with other foreseeable billion dollar liability risks. Some form ofjoint
self-insurance and risk management could also be considered as an
option for this shared risk.
D. Grower's Response to Traceability Risks
It is obvious that the E.U.'s various tracing-related directives will
change United States grain handling into a more document-intensive
process. Producers may have to provide proof to buyers that they have
maintained records of the varieties of biotech events. Cautious grow-
ers have already begun saving receipts and documenting use of partic-
ular seeds in order to be prepared to show that they did not grow a
variety barred from entry into the E.U.
At a minimum, E.U. traceability will probably increase costs of
U.S. production by forcing a transformation of markets via contrac-
tual requirements that impose a higher level of "process standard"
upon agricultural production. The difficulty of complying with the
E.U. T&L Directives has been the subject of studies commissioned by
the feed industry. 133
The sale in the United States of a biotech crop that cannot be
exported to the E.U. represents an economic threat to crops bound
for export. The economic risks of these crops are largely left to the
states to manage, via various methodologies.13 4 These crops cannot
reach their intended market if the unapproved biotech crop mixes
with it in the field, through pollen drift, a "volunteer" emerging from
133. See, e.g., Tim Herrman, White Paper on Traceability in the U.S. Grain and Plant
Protein Feed Ingredient Industries, July 2, 2002, available at http://www.oznet.ksu.edu/
grsiext/white%20paper%20CVM.pdf (explaining the results of a Kansas State Univer-
sity study commissioned by the American Feed Industry Association).
134. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. TAYLOR ET AL., TENDING THE FIELDS: STATE AND FEDERAL




grain left on the ground in a prior harvest, or through post-harvest
commingling.135
1. Organic Growers
Organic growers may agree to "zero tolerance" for biotech crops
in their harvest in an effort to meet the E.U.'s "zero tolerance" stan-
dard for unapproved varieties in food or feed. Given the problems of
commingling from various steps in production, such growers are likely
to incur problems in delivering the goods promised. 136 Farmers are
increasingly asked to certify that their crop is non-GM or is free from
unapproved-in-E.U. varieties when there are no assurances that seed
sold to them was pure (i.e., free from unwanted genetic events). 1
3 7
However, contracts to deliver grain to demanding grain buyers
who expect growers to meet this strict "zero tolerance" standard may
fail to be enforced in certain courts, due to the commercial "impossi-
bility" or "impracticability" of both a grower and a seed company
achieving "zero tolerance" for unapproved-in-E.U. genetic events in
today's marketplace. 138 If the grower failed to assume a particular risk
(e.g., he stated in his warranty that he could not warrant the purity of
the seed he purchased), then the grain buyer may be assuming the
risk of impure seed containing an unapproved-in-E.U. variety, which
triggers specific economic loss to a customer in Europe.
Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code echoes the com-
mon law impossibility defense, providing a defense to contract en-
forcement where the determination of whether the risk of the given
contingency was so unusual or unforeseen and would have such severe
consequences that performance would give the promisee an advan-
135. See Redick, supra note 108.
136. Erik Stokstad, A Little Pollen Goes a Long Way, 296 Sci. 2314, June 28, 2002,
available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/296/5577/2314a.pdf (predict-
ing difficulty in growing "a truly GM-free crop" in the United States and suggesting
"[z]ero tolerance is not going to work").
137. Farmers should state a "pass-through" warranty (i.e., "the seed company repre-
sented the seed was X variety and did not represent it as genetically modified organ-
ism seed"). If the seed company represented it as non-genetically modified seed, the
growers should repeat that warranty. Growers should use care to avoid contamination
in bins, augers, combines, transports, etc., and save all seed invoices for at least five
years.
138. The Uniform Commercial Code provision governing excuse of performance
has rcplaced the common law requirement of impossibility of performance by a less
stringent standard of commercial impracticability. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-
615, cmt. 3 (West 1966); Nora Springs Coop. Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744, 748
(Iowa 1976).
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tage that he did not bargain for in making the contract. 13 9 If an or-
ganic grower promises "zero tolerance" in an era when seed purity as
to unapproved biotech events is not guaranteed to zero,140 that
grower could be seen as assuming the risk of impure seed. While
some commentators have suggested neighboring biotech growers
could be liable to organic growers,' 4 ' the balance of authority gener-
ally would not favor an organic grower whose agreement to deliver to
a certain standard imposes upon his land a restriction of his own
choosing, an agreement made after years of allowing pollen to freely
flow across his property.142 Commingling with a trace of increasingly
common biotech crops is arguably foreseeable in today's marketplace.
As a result, organic growers are not likely to succeed in asserting
liability claims from GM contamination if they agree to deliver one
hundred percent non-GM crops (assuming their seed does not carry a
one hundred percent guarantee). If certifying organizations and or-
ganic customers insist on organic crops that contain no "genetically
engineered-contamination" then organic growers will have few reme-
dies other than formation of strictly enforced exclusionary grower
districts.
143
139. See, e.g., Mishara Constr. Co., Inc. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 310 N.E.2d
363 (Mass. 1974); Comment, Contractual Excuse Based on a Failure of Presupposed Condi-
tions, 14 DuQ. L. REV. 235, 249 (1976) (stating that the test under UCC § 2-615 is
whether an unforeseen, unrecorded contingency was one that the parties could rea-
sonably have foreseen as a real possibility affecting performance, making it a risk that
the parties were "tacitly assigning to the promisor by their failure to provide for it
explicitly"). Compare Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283,
293 (7th Cir. 1974); Center Garment Co. Inc. v. United Refrigerator Co., 3341 N.E.2d
669, 673 (Mass. 1976); Olson v. Spitzer, 257 N.W.2d 459, 463 (S.D. 1977). For older
cases defining and applying a similar common-law test of impossibility of perform-
ance, see Village of Minnesota v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 31 N.W.2d 920, 926 (Minn.
1948); Canadian Indus. Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 179 N.E. 383, 384 (N.Y.
1932).
140. Biotechnology Industry Organization, Standards Need to Be Developed for Adventi-
tious Presence of Biotech Products, at http://www.bio.org/foodag/background/adventi-
tious.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
141. See A. Bryan Endres, "GMO:" Genetically Modified Organism or Gigantic Monetary
Obligation? The Liability Schemes for GMO Damage in the United States and the European
Union, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 453, 484 (2000).
142. See Drew L. Kershen, Legal Liability Issues in Agricultural Biotechnology, NAT'L
AGRic. L. REs. CTR., Nov. 2002, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/as-
sets/articles/kershen-biotech.pdf, reprinted in 10 ENVTL. LIABILITY 203-16 (Dec. 2002)
(discussing general tort theories related to pollen drift and litigation such as Starlink).
143. Cf Edie Lau and Mike Lee, Biotech Ban May Sprout Others: Mendocino County's
Action Rattles Genetic Engineering Industry, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 5, 2004, available at
http://www.sacbee.com/static/live/news/projects/biotech/archive/030504.html
(stating that "the 14,839 voters who this week banned genetically modified organisms
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2. Corn Growers "Channeling"
Since about twenty percent of the United States corn harvest is
exported, and only a fraction of that would be bound for the E.U., the
National Corn Growers Association ("NCGA") acknowledges the chal-
lenge of segregating crops and informs growers to "Know Before You
Grow" so that they are aware of post-harvest limitations on market-
ing.144 As we noted above, the lost corn trade to the E.U. since 1997
has been estimated by various sources in the United States and Eu-
rope to exceed, in total, as much as $1.5 billion (at a conservative
estimate of $200 million per year for seven years).145
NCGA warns growers in explicit detail regarding the economic
risks posed by unapproved-in-E.U. varieties, stating:
You should select hybrids with the full knowledge of whether it is
conventional, approved for E.U. export or not yet approved for E.U.
export. Growers should read their grower agreements before plant-
ing and be fully aware of the requirements of those agreements. It
is vital that hybrids awaiting E.U. approval are kept out of export
and processing channels. Growers must also "Know Where to Go"
when they sell their harvest: NCGA urges you to funnel hybrids not
approved for E.U. export into one of three markets. Those markets
are: (1) your own livestock rations, (2) domestic livestock feeding
channels or (3) elevators accepting grain not yet approved for E.U.
export. Visit the American Seed Trade Association web site and
look up information about the grain facilities accepting hybrids not
yet approved for export to the E.U.
146
NCGA has been heavily involved in the controversy over Mexico's
perceived threat from biotech corn. 147 A letter sent to EPA Adminis-
trator Michael Levitt1 48 pointed out that all non-indigenous corn car-
ries some potential for replacing local varieties or commingling its
DNA with related corn or teosinte plants. Among the corn seed in-
dustry, Dupont-Pioneer has long led an industry effort to conserve ge-
in Mendocino County have shaken the establishment far beyond their small North
Coast Community").
144. See National Corn Growers Association, Know Before You Grow, at http://www.
ncga.com/biotechnology/knowwhere (last visited Apr. 27, 2005); see also American
Seed Trade Association, Grain Handlers Database, at http://asta.farmprogress.com
(last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
145. See CNN, EU Defends Biotech Crop Rules, Aug. 18, 2003, available at http://www.
cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/O8/18/us.europe.gm.ap (stating that "American
farmers estimate the EU restrictions have cost them nearly $300 million a year (267
million euros) in lost corn exports alone.").
146. See Know Before You Grow, at supra note 144.
147. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
148. Letter to Michael Leavitt, supra note 90.
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netic resources in corn around the world, and particularly in
Mexico. 149 The company recently renewed that commitment with a
pledge of $1 million to the Global Crop Diversity Trust, an interna-
tional fund charged with funding genebanks (storage facilities for
plant germplasm) and crop diversity collections around the world. 150
3. Soybean Growers "Identity Preservation"
In late 1997, the American Soybean Association ("ASA") made a
strategic decision to safeguard United States exports of soybeans to
the E.U. To address the role of commingling export soybeans with
unapproved-in-E.U. soybeans, ASA sent a letter to eleven companies
involved in producing seeds for biotech crops. In this letter, ASA
asked each company to refrain from the unrestricted commercial mar-
keting of unapproved-in-E.U. soybeans.
151
In 1998, ASA asked AgrEvo USA to restrict marketing of seed to
United States farmers of the Liberty Link Soybean seed, which lacked
approval in the E.U., to ensure that growers and grain handlers would
keep it out of United States soybean exports. 152 AgrEvo eventually
agreed that its "Liberty Link Stewardship Program" needed improve-
ment to ensure that the Liberty Link Soybean did not commingle with
soybeans bound for export.15 3 AgrEvo first proposed narrowing the
geographical scope of its launch of Liberty Link soybean and eventu-
ally abandoned the product launch altogether.
154
The second test of ASA's policy requiring complete segregation
of unapproved varieties came in 1999 with the launch of Dupont's
149. See, e.g., Press Release, Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., Pioneer Hi-Bred
International, Inc., Contributes Funds to SIUE National Corn-to-Ethanol Research
Center (Nov. 8, 2004), available at http://www.pioneer.com/pioneer-news/press-
releases/corporate/siue.htm.
150. Press Release, Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., DuPont Announces $1 Mil-
lion Commitment to Global Crop Diversity Trust: Pledge Will Help Sustain Endan-
gered Global Plant Genetic Resources, Biodiversity (Mar. 3, 2004), available at http://
www.pioneer.com/pioneer-news/press-releases/corporate/global.htm ("As part of
DuPont's commitment to conserving and promoting biodiversity, the company re-
cently sent a message to seed industry leaders specifically outlining the importance of
and benefits derived from preserving crop genetic diversity.").
151. See Thomas P. Redick, Biopharming, Biosafety, and Billion Dollar Debacles, 8 DRAKE
J. AGRIc. L. 136-37 (2003).
152. See Press Release, American Soybean Assoc., ASA Applauds AgrEvo Effort to
Protect U.S. Soybean Export Markets (Apr. 14, 1998), available at http://www.
soygrowers.com/newsroom/releases/documents/agrevodl.htm.
153. See id.
154. See Redick, supra note 151.
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high-oleic soybean.155 This commercial launch featured strict adher-
ence to the identity preservation plan proposed by ASA (as adapted in
confidential negotiations). As a result of these negotiations, an indus-
try standard for "identity preservation" began to emerge. 156 The
eleven-point plan adopted by ASA/USB/NOPA for ensuring that bi-
otech companies practice sound stewardship for "unapproved-over-
seas" varieties is a useful tool in managing liability risks. 157 Through
the use of crop-specific isolation, machinery and bin cleanout proce-
dures, and third party oversight of every step, ASA has attempted to
establish a system minimizing the likelihood of commingling. To the
extent that biotech companies follow this standard, they will avoid sig-
nificant threats of class action liability and will also assist growers in
meeting contractual obligations to their buyers.
This raises the question of whether all soybean seed production
should be conducted in accordance with most of the technical re-
quirements of ASA's eleven-point plan, to ensure delivery of seed that
is nearly one hundred percent free from unapproved-overseas vari-
eties of biotech soybeans. At present, the warranty of purity provided
for seed is not within the low levels mandated by the E.U. The Ameri-
can Seed Trade Association has shown a willingness to adapt to cus-
tomer needs but is concerned about the high cost of meeting "zero
tolerance" in seed.' 58 Industry websites explain the difficulties inher-
ent in assuring one hundred percent genetic purity of seed. 15 9
Seed company liability disclaimers that shift the risk of commin-
gling to the grower without an adequate disclosure of the risks of com-
mingling and the methodology for preventing it, may encounter
judges that are unwilling to enforce the disclaimer.' 60 These clauses,
155. See, e.g., J.L. Glancey et al., Development of High Oleic Soybean Oil-Seed Hydrolic
Fluid, FEEDSTOCKS, Mar. 1999, at 1.
156. See, e.g., Presentation by Stephen Censky, ASA President, Improving Communi-
cation from Seed Production Through Retail, available at http://www.soygrowers.
com/newsroom/releases/documents/aba-rtp2.html (predicting a "cataclysm of lost
export trade with the European Union" if identity preservation methods were not
carefully implemented; this prediction was made in 1999, the year it was revealed that
StarLink corn had been used for unapproved purposes).
157. See infra note 185.
158. See News Release, American Seed Trade Association, A Seed Industry Response
to Issues Raised By the Presence of Biotech Seed in Conventional Seed Lots (July 8,
2004), available at http://www.amseed.com/newsDetail.asp?id=95.
159. See, e.g., DuPont, Gene Flow Via Pollination and Crops Derived Through Biotechnol-
ogy, at http://www.dupont.com/biotech/scienceknowledge/geneflow/scientific-
narrative.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
160. See generally J.W. Looney, Warranties in Livestock, Feed, Seed, and Pesticide Transac-
tions, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1123 (1995).
2005]
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
along with forum selection in the seed company's home jurisdiction,
are often challenged as unconscionable contracts of adhesion.1 6 ' De-
spite this, many companies in the industry continue to make use of
these disclaimers, accompanied by detailed stewardship programs.
1 62
4. Rice Growers' Legislative Approach
To date California has protected its commodity export markets
from the sale of biotech varieties that lack overseas approval. The Cal-
ifornia legislature took steps to control the marketing of new varieties
of unapproved rice, in part to protect export markets from the im-
pacts of commingling. California has a long history of legislative man-
agement of agriculture, including the establishment of zones for
certain varieties of cotton, rice, or other commercially important
crops requiring genetic purity to meet market demands. These zones
limit the opportunity for pollen to cause an economic nuisance mov-
ing across boundary lines. Agricultural Districts have various powers
defined by statute,1 63 including the abatement of public nuisances or
other specific threats that come to the attention of the legislature.
1 6 4
The public entity responsible takes all measures necessary to abate a
living threat to agriculture. Once abated, the entity often has a lien
for the costs of doing so on the affected owner.
165
However, the advisory commission on rice, which is made up in
part of California Rice Commission members, recently recommended
growing Ventria's 16 6 field trial of rice with a plant-made pharmaceuti-
cal ("PMP") to the California Secretary for the Department of Food
and Agriculture. 167 The California Department of Food and Agricul-
161. See, e.g., Monsanto v. Homan McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(Clevenger, J. dissenting) (chastising the court's upholding of the Monsanto forum
selection clause by stating, "My colleagues have the honor of making this court the
first to enforce a forum selection clause in a contract of adhesion against a defendant
in derogation of his constitutional rights").
162. See generally id. at note 29. The Monsanto program for grower stewardship in-
cludes instructions on "channeling" requirements, and solicits contact information
from the grower to allow notifications to go to them regarding "regulatory status" and
other issues. See id.
163. See, e.g., CAL. FOOD AND AGRic. CODE §§ 59081-59088 (2004).
164. See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 59081 (2004).
165. CAL. FOOD AND AGRIC. CODE §§ 5401, 5462, 5428, 5430, 7305 (2004).
166. Ventria is a U.S.-based biotech company that focuses its efforts on products in
the biopharmaceutical and nutrition fields. SeeVentria Bioscience, About Us, at http:/
/www.ventria.com/aboutus (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
167. Paul Elias, Biotech Firm Wants to Grow Rice for Medicinal Supplements, USA




ture expressed a need for public hearings. Ventria has reacted, how-
ever, by committing to moving the majority of its operations to
Maryville, Missouri, where it hopes to find a more welcoming environ-
ment than California.1 68 After Riceland Foods and Anheuser Busch
questioned the wisdom of growing this rice near the Southeast
boarder of Missouri, which is close to the Arkansas-Missouri $100-mil-
lion rice market, Ventria agreed to stay at least 120 miles from that
rice-growing region.169
5. Wheat Growers
The Executive Board of the National Association of Wheat Grow-
ers ("NAWG") approved a biotechnology Principles of Commercializa-
tion setting out a roadmap for commercializing biotechnology traits
in wheat. This was prepared by the joint Biotechnology Committee of
NAWG, U.S. Wheat Associates, and the Wheat Export Trade Educa-
tion Committee ("WETEC").
17 °
The Principles of Commercialization state that United States
wheat producers recognize the benefits of biotech wheat chain and
generally support commercialization of transgenic wheat trait, pro-
vided that there is a commercialization plan that "facilitates commer-
cialization with minimal market disruption," and allows customers to
make purchases based on their preferences for specific traits, classes,
qualities, and characteristics.1 71 Wheat growers will vigorously oppose
commercialization of transgenic wheat traits that do not meet all of
the aforementioned principles. While the WETEC board approved
this draft plan in October 2004, the U.S. Wheat Associates Board
("USWAB") rejected the draft plan in October 2004 in a closed execu-
tive session. According to NAWG's report of that decision, no alterna-
tive plan was proposed by USWAB, and no direction was given to the
Biotechnology Committee for amendments. The action leaves the
168. See University Draws California Biotech Firm to Mayville, COLUMBIA DAILY TRm.
(Columbia, MO), Nov. 21, 2004, (stating that Ventria will move to Maryville, home to
Northwest Missouri State University, where a new building will be constructed using
$5 million from anonymous donors for it and other emerging biotech companies to
use), available at http://www.showmenews.com/2004/Nov/20041121News02l.asp.
169. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Ventria Strike Deal on Rice, COLUMBIA DAILY TRm. (Co-
lumbia, Mo.), Apr. 16, 2005, available at http://www.showmenews.com/2005/Apr/
20050416News016.asp.
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wheat industry without a coordinated plan to move forward on this
critical issue of acceptance of biotech crops. 172
E. The Biosafety Body Count
Historically, trade agreements and the WTO have been accused
of promoting environmental degradation, forcing nations to compete
for commercial success at the expense of the environment, and rush-
ing toward a "lowest common denominator" of minimal environmen-
tal protection. 173 With the advent of biotech crops, however, there is
a role reversal underway. The WTO can enhance environmental pro-
tection by reigning in the E.U. and its member states' mistaken mora-
torium on biotech crops, reversing the trend toward worldwide
rejection of biotech crops that provide the best available control tech-
nology for managing significant threats to ecological and human
health.
While the "precautionary approach" mandating increased regula-
tory scrutiny and traceability of biotech crops is based upon fears of
future harm, it appears to be a system that could lead to unintended
consequences including loss of human lives. It could be argued that
the E.U. system of traceability has already led to adverse effects upon
the health of consumers in both the E.U. member nations and nations
who hope to export to the E.U.
In the E.U. food manufacturers are so wary of triggering con-
sumer fears about traces of GMOs that they will suspend the sale of
products that are below the one percent GM label threshold, but nev-
ertheless test positive for traces of GM content. On April 12, 2001,
Italian authorities seized and tested a sample of soy-based biscuits
made by Plada, an Italian subsidiary of H.J. Heinz, the multinational
United States-based food company. While tests showed GM levels
were well under one percent (0.08 percent), Heinz recalled the bis-
cuits, asserting that it used only conventional, non-GM ingredients.
174
This was unfortunate for many consumers, because the Heinz biscuits
172. Press Release, National Association of Wheat Growers, Biotech Action Plan
Falls One Step Short (Jan. 21, 2005), available at http://www.wheatworld.org/html/
news.cfm?ID=667.
173. See, e.g., Donella Meadows, Free Trade Can Work Against the Environment-Or For
It, available at http://www.sustainer.org/dhm-archive/search.php?display-article=
VN506nafta-iied.




were one of the very few baked goods products which sufferers of Ce-
liac disease 175 are allowed to consume.
As noted earlier in this article, President Bush has accused the
E.U. of hindering the fight against famine in Africa.176 During a
drought in 2002, the United States attempted to alleviate some of the
suffering by offering food aid, but their offer was rejected by Zambia
based upon fears that seeds of GMO-containing foods might intermin-
gle with the domestic agricultural systems, rendering their exports in-
eligible for entry into the E.U. 177 The Zambian government initially
accepted GM foods when offered by the United States.178 Zambian
Vice President Enoch Kavindele said, "if Americans can eat GM, Zam-
bians should be able to eat GM." Two months later, however, Presi-
dent Levy Mwanawasa declared the food "poisonous" and ordered
that it be shipped to neighboring Malawi, which possessed no GM re-
strictions.' 79 The Zambians claimed that public concern prompted
the change, but Time magazine learned through a senior government
official that at least two diplomats from European countries "leaned
on the Zambians in private discussions" in order to affect their deci-
sion.180 This issue remains relevant today, as the world press recently
criticized the United States for placing "relentless pressure" on Sudan
and Angola to accept gene-altered food aid.181
If the E.U.'s T&L Directives continue to dominate world trade,
driving its trading partners to reject all biotech crops lacking E.U. ap-
proval, this global rejection will have measurable adverse effects in the
form of health effects from mycotoxins and environmental effects of
soil run-off. These adverse consequences will be measured in floating
fish and loss of habitat for endangered species, leading to nutrition-
ally distressed children, lost species, and lost lives. In an ironic twist,
the E.U.'s effort to avoid having biotech food "forced down its throat"
could lead to the force-feeding of mycotoxins or pesticides in nations
175. Due to their genetics, Europeans have a relatively high rate of Celiac disease.
See id.; see also Celiac Disease Foundation, Celiac Disease, at www.celiac.org/cd-main.
html (last visited Apr. 27, 2005) (explaining that celiac disease is a life long digestive
disorder that interferes with the digestion of nutrients and can also cause damage to
muscle tissue and the small intestine).
176. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
177. Pew Initiative, supra note 36.
178. See Simon Robinson, To Eat or Not to Eat, TIME ONLINE EDITION, Nov. 24, 2002,
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lacking the risk management tools to detect and remove such con-
taminants. Over time, direct loss of life and species that is attributable
to E.U. biotech policy could be tracked using a "biosafety body count"
that links deaths to various adverse effects of this tampering with the
global food supply. As the "biosafety body count" rises, the world will
slowly be forced to come to grips with the benefits that biotech crops
now on the market could have offered earlier, if they had been widely
accepted.
IV. CONCLUSION
The agricultural biotechnology industry in the United States will
only have a thriving future if the entire agbiotech industry implements
adequate measures for "containment" of biotech crops that are not
approved for export. To maintain the flow of commodities to export
markets, biotech companies can work closely with growers associations
armed with crop-specific "standards of care" that the E.U. could
accept.
A heightened level of industry-wide stewardship could be estab-
lished immediately with a standard stewardship clause incorporated
into signed agreements with growers. The contracts could be en-
forced by the threat of contractually stipulated injunctive relief against
those who fail to comply with stewardship standards. This industry-
wide mandatory stewardship program would simultaneously stem a
looming tide of frivolous nuisance cases and also isolate the public
nuisance precedent established in the StarLink case182 by preventing
another set of bad facts from reaching appellate courts and making
bad law for biotech companies.
A coordinated strategy between growers and biotech companies
is needed to prevent both economically cataclysmic impacts to inter-
national trade and devastating legal precedents that could cede some
control over the biotech industry's future to plaintiff's class action at-
torneys. 1 3 StarLink left both of these economic and legal impacts be-
hind, and it also left grounds that would be used to support a credible
threat of "anticipatory nuisance" that can be used to impose strict con-
tainment on biotech crops where necessary.
Public nuisance law could be used by responsible biotech compa-
nies, growers, grain companies, or grocers who want to impose a
higher level of stewardship for a particular biotech crop. If the chain
182. See In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
183. The history of litigation and legislation is worth reviewing as an example of




of commerce in a particular crop is threatened by potential commin-
gling, StarLink's public nuisance precedent could be used to enjoin
that which federal regulators may lack the resources or authority to
oversee properly.
The economic threat posed by biotech crops to the marketplace
is vastly outweighed by the threat to the agricultural biotechnology
industry from such a novel legal development. In other words, the
economic impact upon the United States economy from the loss of
future innovations in agricultural biotechnology is a cataclysm well
worth avoiding, through careful legal planning and cooperation.
APPENDIX A
GROWER CHECKLIST FOR LIABILITY FROM ZERO TOLERANCE STANDARDS
FOR BIOTECH CROPS IN THE AGE OF TRAcEABILITY
1 8 4
The E.U. instituted a new program at the end of April 2004, of
"Traceability and Labeling" that increases the risk of having ship-
ments of grain from the United States turned away from E.U. ports.
This is particularly true for non-GMO shipments of corn and soy-
beans. Shipments will have to disclose the types of biotech crops pre-
sent in a particular shipment, to a tolerance of zero (the limits of
detection) for certain varieties of biotech crops. It is possible that sim-
ilar "zero tolerance" standards could proliferate among E.U. trading
partners that are concerned about losing export trade to the E.U. in
the next few years as parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
implement their own tracing system.
Identity preservation to a zero tolerance has been implemented
successfully by the American Soybean Association for several years
running, as it coped with E.U. "zero tolerance" for various new unap-
proved-in-E.U. varieties of biotech soybeans. ASA's has developed an
eleven-point plan that has succeeded in avoiding liability for growers
and grain shippers, despite E.U. policies imposing zero tolerance for
unapproved-in-E.U. varieties.1 8 5 Growers should keep the following
thoughts in mind:
184. The authors adopted this checklist from information that was originally
provided by the Minnesota Crop Improvement Association.
185. See American Soybean Association, Minimum Requirements for Attempted Identity-
Preserved Production, Harvesting, and Utilization of Biotechnology-Enhanced Varieties/Hybrids
That Are Unapproved for Export to Major Markets, at http://www.soygrowers.com/
publications/minrequire-IP.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
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1. Know What You Are Growing-Including Foreign Material
Seed sales are not certified to a zero tolerance, but can contain
several percentage points of seed that look the same but contain dif-
ferent genetics. If the seed company cannot provide information
about the presence of "unapproved-in-E.U. varieties" in your seed,
seek some assurances from your grower trade association about the
commercial launch of the unapproved-in-E.U. variety.
2. Know What Your Neighbors Plan to Grow
Your neighbors may have decided to plant an unapproved-in-E.U.
variety, or they may have planted seed containing some traces of that
unapproved-in-E.U. variety. While the ideal situation is to have a
neighbor who is as alert as you are, and also communicates with the
seed company and grower association to rule out the possible pres-
ence of an unapproved-in-E.U. variety in his seed, you should take
steps to document your efforts to investigate that neighbor's use of
unapproved-in-E.U. seed. When harvest time comes, it may be too
late to make decisions about sharing combines, transports or elevator
facilities with a grower who is not as careful as you.
3. Read What You Sign, Ask Questions, Take Notes
Your seed salesman may ask you to sign a growers agreement for
unapproved-in-E.U. seeds. Read it carefully, ask questions, and note
the responses. Also, even growers avoiding unapproved-in-E.U. seed
may still be at risk from a neighbor's crops. In that case, the growers
should ask neighbors about the level of stewardship being imple-
mented and suggest ways to avoid commingling of crops before
delivery.
4. Do Not Sign Anything Related to Certain Potential Genetic
Events
You should not sign any affidavit or statement certifying the ab-
sence of a particular genetic event, unless you are certain it is not
being commercially marketed. This is recommended even if you
know your production was in fact from a "non-GMO" seed source.
The current grain distribution system, from your local elevator to the
accumulation of product in a shipping container, may not be ade-
quate to segregate your grain from other unknown sources. Your
grain may in fact have been "non-GMO," however the probability that
it will be commingled during shipment with other grain that may not
be "non-GMO" is high. Commingled shipments will be tested when
[VOL. 1:87
E.U. NON-TARRIFF BARRIERS
they arrive at their final destination. If any GM grain (e.g., Roundup-
Ready soybeans) is present in the shipment, there is a high probability
it will be detected. This could result in the entire shipment being re-
jected. You need to discuss with your legal counsel the degree of lia-
bility you have for this shipment as a result of certifying your portion
of the shipment's "non-GMO" status by signing an affidavit.
5. Check For the Following
Several quick litmus tests have become available to local elevators
that claim to be able to detect the presence of GM grain. Grain pro-
ducers need to realize that the sampling and testing phase of non-
GMO export transactions is extremely critical and it is very important
for you to:
a. Discuss with someone knowledgeable what adequate proce-
dures for sampling of your shipments need to be followed for
the trait testing to be valid.
b. Demand from those receiving your grain written confirmation
that the entire shipment will be scientifically sampled and
tested at each stage of the entire shipping process.
c. Do not depend on quick and easy testing procedures to verify
the presence of GM grain. The laboratory tests required to relia-
bly test for the presence of GM traits are more complicated,
time consuming and expensive than the quick tests. Contact
your grower association to develop an official non-GMO grain
certification program to assure your next year's production can
enter this segment of the grain market with minimum risks to
the grain producer.
APPENDIX B
AMERICAN SOYBEAN ASSOCIATION POLICY
As a part of the Policy Resolution on Biotechnology Approvals,
the American Soybean Association has generated a document entitled
"Minimum Requirements for Attempted Identity-Preserved Produc-
tion, Harvesting, and Utilization of Biotechnology-Enhanced Soybean
Varieties that are Unapproved for Export to Major Markets." 18 6 As the
name implies, the purpose of the document is to provide growers with
a standardized set of procedures that would help to prevent the co-
mingling of authorized and unauthorized varieties of soybean. Some
of the guidelines contained therein are as follows:
186. Document provided by Kim Nill, Technical Issues Director, International Mar-
keting for the American Soybean Association.
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There must be a contract between the seed company and each
farmer, requiring delivery of all production from the biotechnology-
derived seed, allowing on-farm midseason field inspections, requir-
ing minimum isolation distances from other types of the crop, and
other requirements inherent in certified seed production.
All unused seed must be returned to the seed company for proper
disposal.
Designated delivery points must be facilities that do not deliver any
crop into export channels.
The contract growing of biotechnology-enhanced varieties that are
unapproved for export should be confined to restricted "closed-
loop" geographic areas, and the number of the separate geographic
areas kept to as few as possible, in order to minimize the likelihood
for IP system failures.
Varietal verification testing of each load delivered by each farmer
must be performed at each delivery point, with totals by farmer
matched up with the midseason field yield estimates to ensure that
each farmer delivered all of the biotechnology-enhanced crop he
produces in each crop year.
Before handling or harvesting any other varieties of crops, each
farmer must thoroughly clean out all [equipment] utilized in [han-
dling] the biotechnology-enhanced crops.
No "test plots" of unapproved for export, biotechnology-derived va-
rieties shall be allowed, other than the above contracted fields.
An outside third party will check verification of the establishment of
a closed loop system and adherence to these requirements.
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REVISING SEED PURITY LAWS TO ACCOUNT
FOR THE ADVENTITIOUS PRESENCE OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED VARIETIES:
A FIRST STEP TOWARDS COEXISTENCE
A. Bryan Endres*
Adoption of genetically modified (GM) seed varieties in the
United States, Canada, and South America continues to expand, with
GM crops comprising almost 76 million hectares and over 93 percent
of the total biotech cropland worldwide.1 As an increasing number of
farmers plant GM varieties, the potential for adventitious 2 mixture of
genetically modified DNA with products produced via organic and
conventional (non-GM) methods also increases. Many consumers of
organic and identity-preserved products, however, object to the adven-
titious presence of genetically modified DNA at even low levels. Ac-
cordingly, the ability of farmers to choose between conventional,
organic, or GM crop production and achieve required purity levels-
commonly referred to as coexistence 3-is increasingly difficult.
* A. Bryan Endres is an Assistant Professor of Agricultural Law at the University
of Illinois. The author extends his appreciation to Brenda Menard for her excellent
research assistance. This research is supported by the Cooperative State Research,
Education & Extension Service, United States Dept. of Agriculture, Project No. ILLU-
05-309.
1. C. FORD RUNGE & BARRY RYAN, THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF PLANT BIOTECHNOL-
OGY: INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION AND RESEARCH IN 2004, at 5 (2004), available at http://
www.apec.umn.edu/faculty/frunge/globalbiotech04.pdf; see also CLIVE JAMES, PRE-
VIEW: GLOBAL STATUS OF COMMERCIALIZED BIOTECH/GM CROPS: 2004 at 4, available at
http://www.isaaa.org [hereinafter ISAAA PREvIEw]; Press Release, International Ser-
vice for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications (ISAAA), Worldwide Biotech
Crops Experience Near Record Growth, Biotech Crop Area Increases 11 Percent In
the United States, Jan. 12, 2005, available at http://www.isaaa.org/kc/CBTNews/
pressrelease/briefs32/Newsjrelease/English.pdf.
2. Also referred to as technically unavoidable or admixture. GRAHAM BROOKES ET
AL., GENETICALLY MODIFIED MAIZE: POLLEN MOVEMENT AND CROP Co-EXISTENCE 3
(2004), available at http://www.pgeconomics.co.uk/pdf/Maizepollennov2004final.
pdf.
3. See Commission Recommendation 2003/556, pmbl. (3), 2003 O.J. (L 189) 36.
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Potential sources of admixture include pollen drift between
neighboring fields, commingling during harvest or post-harvest activi-
ties (such as transportation or storage), volunteer plants from previ-
ous growing seasons, and seed impurities. 4 Minimizing admixture
requires diligence during each step of the global food chain and,
prior to the biotech revolution, the agricultural community success-
fully adopted coexistence production methods for a variety of prod-
ucts. 5 Despite notable and, ultimately, expensive failures, 6 farmers,
4. See BROOKES ET AL., supra note 2, at 4; ANNE-KATRIN BOCK ET AL., EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, SCENARIOS FOR Co-EXISTENCE OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED, CONVENTIO,4AL
AND ORGANIC CROPS IN EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE 4, Report EUR 20394EN (2002), avail-
able at ftp://ftp.jrc.es/pub/EURdoc/eur20394en.pdf.
5. See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
6. Perhaps the most notable breakdown in the segregation of GM crops was the
admixture of StarLink varieties approved only for use as animal feed with corn des-
tined for human consumption. See generally D.L. Uchtmann, StarLink-A Case Study of
Agricultural Biotechnology Regulation, 7 DRAKEJ. AGRIC. L. 159 (2002) (providing a com-
prehensive review of the legal issues surrounding the StarLink controversy). The Star-
Link commingling spawned several legal claims against the developer, Aventis Crop
Science USA, by the nation's corn farmers who suffered a severe drop in the price of
their corn. In November 2004, Aventis made payments to over 72,000 plaintiffs in the
nationwide class action brought on behalf of corn farmers that did not plant Starlink
varieties. Payments were approximately $2.88/acre. See D.L. Uchtmann & A. Bryan
Endres, Non-StarLink Farmers Litigation: Accounting to "Share" Landlords and Others with
an Interest in the Crop, AGRIC. L. & TAX'N. BRIEFS, Oct. 29, 2004, available at http://www.
farmdoc.uiuc.edu/legal/articles/ALTBs/ALTB_04-13/ALTB_04-13.pdf. Although
the extent to which remnants of Starlink varieties continue to exist in the food distri-
bution system or seed supply are unknown, in November 2004, two and a half years
after the discovery of the product in human food products, the Canadian Food
Inspection Agency dropped its negative Starlink testing requirement for all whole
grain corn imports from the United States. See CANADI FOOD INSPECTION AGENCY,
Industry Advisory: Food, Feed and Seed Products Containing U.S. Corn, Nov. 18, 2004, at
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/fssa/invenq/inform/20041118e.shtml (last vis-
ited Mar. 14, 2005).
A second troubling exception involved the commingling of non-regulated soy-
beans with corn genetically engineered to produce pharmaceuticals. Volunteer corn
plants from the field test were harvested, along with soybeans the following year, and
commingled with 500,000 bushes of other soybeans. ProdiGene, Inc., the company
responsible for the field tests, entered into a consent agreement with the United
States Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration in which it
paid a civil penalty of $250,000 and agreed to reimburse the government for its costs
in securing approximately 500,000 bushes of soybeans in storage. See Press Release,
USDA, USDA Announces Actions Regarding Plant Protection Act Violations Involving
Prodigene, Inc., available at http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/2002/12/0498.htm.
The unfortunate events in the Prodigene case prompted the USDA, in an effort to
prevent future admixture, to tighten its rules for field tests of agricultural products
genetically engineered to produce industrial or pharmaceutical products in an effort
to prevent future admixture. See generally Field Testing of Plants Engineered to Pro-
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grain handlers, and processors have made some progress in imple-
menting on-farm and post-harvest segregation and identity preserva-
tion systems to minimize admixture of genetically modified DNA.7
Seeds are "the irreducible core of crop production on the farm
and the most fundamental agricultural input."8 Therefore, the undis-
puted starting point for a successful identity preservation system is en-
suring seed purity. Existing seed laws at both the federal and state
level, however, do not address directly the adventitious presence of
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in seed labeled as conven-
tional. Recent scientific studies, as well as anecdotal evidence,
strongly suggest that GMOs are present at low levels in seed marketed
to farmers as conventional. 9 Studies also indicate that as the area
under GM production increases, the adventitious presence of GM
seeds grows along with a corresponding increase in the difficulty of
obtaining purity thresholds.10
The adventitious presence of genetically modified DNA in prod-
ucts marketed as conventional or organic could have serious eco-
nomic consequences for farmers and processors.11  Therefore,
duce Pharmaceutical and Industrial Compounds, 68 Fed. Reg. 11,337-340 (Mar. 10,
2003) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340).
7. Too often, however, regulatory action is taken only in response to admixture
events rather than on a proactive basis. One example is the StarLink situation in
which, despite objections, commercial production of the genetically engineered corn
was approved for use as feed, but not as food. See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Consuming
(F)ears of Corn: Public Health and Biopharming, 30 Am. J.L. & MED. 371, 373-76 (2004)
(describing dangers of producing pharmaceuticals within a commodity-type food
crop). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] has since revised its proce-
dures to require approval for use as food and feed before introduction in the com-
modity production system. See Uchtmann, supra note 6, at 205 (describing EPA's
policy change).
8. JACK R. KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT
BIOTECHNOLOGY 4 (1988) ("Nothing is more fundamental to agriculture and our food
supply than seeds. Whether eaten directly or processed through animals, seeds are
the ultimate source of human nutrition. The variety, abundance, and safety of foods
are all dependent on the availability and quality of seeds."); MARGARET MELLON &
JANE RISSLER, GONE TO SEED: TRANSGENIC CONTAMINANTS IN THE TRADITIONAL SEED
SUPPLY 1 (2004), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/food-andenvironment/bio
tecchnology/seedreport fullreport.pdf.
9. See MELLON & RISSLER, supra note 8, at 12.
10. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, HEALTH AND CONSUMER PROTECTION DIRECTORATE-
GENERAL, Opinion of the Scientific Committee on Plants concerning the adventitious
presence of GM seeds in conventional seeds, SCP/GMO-SEED-CONT/002-Final
(2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/scp/out93-gmo-en.pdf
[hereinafter Opinion of Scientific Committee on Plants].
11. Graham Brookes, Co-existence of GM and non GM Crops: economic and market per-
spectives 3-4, available at http://www.pgeconomics.co.uk/pdf/coexistence-paper_01.
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farmers seeking price premiums from identity-preserved harvests for
domestic consumption or the European export market must imple-
ment on-farm and post-harvest measures to ensure their product
meets the required purity standards. If seeds contain significant quan-
tities of genetically modified DNA, however, even the most compre-
hensive post-planting controls for admixture may fail to preserve the
expected premiums for the farmer.
This article examines the critical role played by federal and state
seed purity laws in the achievement of coexistence in the United
States and the preservation of commodity agricultural exports to the
European Union (E.U.). As background, Part I of this article dis-
cusses informal farm-level management practices and developing laws
that impact coexistence. A comparison is made between rules in the
United States, a leader in the adoption of agricultural biotechnology,
and the E.U., which has proceeded along a more cautious (some may
say hostile) route in approving genetically engineered food and feed
products. Because the E.U.'s position with respect to the import of
GM products has engendered significant controversy, Part I also
briefly outlines the traceability and labeling requirements for GM
products imported into the Member States of the E.U. Part II exam-
ines the E.U.'s legal efforts to ensure a level of seed purity sufficient to
achieve its formal coexistence goals. Part III focuses on attaining seed
purity in the United States, including the extent of adventitious GM
presence in the domestic seed stocks12 and how the Federal Seed Act
and corresponding state seed laws address the challenges presented
by GM seed. In Part IV, this article concludes that existing domestic
seed laws should be revised to account for the widespread adoption of
GM varieties. Although the adventitious presence of genetically modi-
fied DNA in seed marketed as conventional or organic probably can-
not be eliminated entirely, it could be minimized and tolerances that
are practically and economically feasible should be established within
the context of existing seed laws. The European approach, which di-
rectly addresses the question of adventitious presence of genetically
pdf ("The economic implications of co-existence for GM and non-GM crops have two
main elements: the costs involved in meeting tolerances for the adventitious presence
of unwanted material . . . and/or; the economic consequences of not meeting
tolerances.").
12. On occasion the author uses the term "contamination" to refer to the presence
of genetically modified DNA in conventional or organic seeds and products. The
term by "contamination" is not intended to have a negative connotation other than
the sense that the object is undesirable in its present location or state of existence.
See, e.g., MELLON & RISSLER, supra note 8, at 7.
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modified DNA in conventional seed stocks, may provide a helpful
benchmark for revising domestic seed laws.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF LAWS AND INFORMAL,
FARM-LEVEL MANAGEMENT PRACTICES THAT FOSTER COEXISTENCE
Farmers have long practiced variations of modern segregation
and identity preservation. For example, for centuries subsistence
farmers have engaged in selective breeding to improve yields with suc-
cessful results perpetuated and traded among neighbors. 3 More re-
cently, commercial agriculture has adopted successful coexistence
strategies in a variety of production situations: waxy and non-waxy
corn; white, blue, and other specialty corns; and high- and zero-erucic
acid oilseed rape. 14 In the United States, informal methods have
evolved in the absence of a formal legal regime supporting coexis-
tence. In contrast, the E.U. has taken initial steps to delineate respon-
sibilities for obtaining coexistence. 15 The following two sections
examine the evolution of coexistence measures in the United States
and E.U.
A. Coexistence in the United States
1. The Costs of Segregation: Private Solutions
Formal legal rules to determine whether conventional or GM
producers must bear the cost of in-field segregation and setback mea-
sures to achieve coexistence do not exist in the United States. Fur-
ther, no reported case has assessed liability for the farm-to-farm
admixture of genetically modified DNA via pollen drift, shared farm
machinery, or other sources. 16 In the absence of legal rules seed and
13. KLOPPENBURG, supra note 8, at 1-2.
14. See BOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 5; INTERNATIONAL SEED FEDERATION, POSITION
PAPER: COEXISTENCE OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED, CONVENTIONAL AND ORGANIC CROP
PRODUCTION (2003), available at http://www.worldseed.org/pdf/PosPaperCoexis-
tence.pdf [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL SEED FEDERATION]; Peter W.B. Phillips, Tracea-
bility and Trade of Genetically Modified Food, in BIOTECHNOLOGY: SCIENCE AND SOCIETY AT
A CROSSROAD 141, 150 (National Agricultural Biotechnology Council 2003), available
at http://www.habc.cals.cornell.edu/pubs/nabc-15/chapters/Phillips.pdf.
15. For a comprehensive case study of how informal societal norms in agricultural
communities may supplant formal legal rules, see generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, OR-
DER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (examining open and
closed range regimes in California and how traditional farm practices incorporate
informal social norms and discount legal rules).
16. Farmers in Canada, however, have filed a number of high profile court actions
against seed developers to recover costs related to coexistence efforts. The most fa-
mous case, Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, included allegations
2005]
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
specialty crop producers (including organic producers) have histori-
cally borne all of the costs necessary to achieve desired purity stan-
dards.17 Specific costs may include setback and crop rotation
requirements, as well as segregation measures. For example, the Na-
tional Organic Program (NOP) requires organic farms to have "dis-
that GM pollen from neighboring fields blew onto defendant Schmeiser's field or that
GM seeds spilled from a truck traveling down a road adjacent to Schmeiser's field and
contaminated the defendant's canola crop. The courts did not directly address coex-
istence responsibilities but instead looked at whether the defendant violated Mon-
santo's patent rights by saving and planting seed containing the patented DNA. See id.
at 92-97; see also Carlos Scott Lopez, Intellectual Property Reform for Genetically Modified
Crops: A Legal Imperative, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 367, 408-411 (2004) (dis-
cussing Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser). The defendant's wife later filed a separate
court action against Monsanto for the alleged contamination of Mrs. Schmeiser's or-
ganic vegetable garden with genetically modified DNA and her attendant clean up
costs. See A.B. Hansen, Mrs. Schmeiser Sues Monsanto for $140, COMMON GROUND, Dec.
2004, available at http://www.commonground.ca/iss/0412161/cgl6lMrsSchmeiser.
shtml. In addition, a class action suit (class not yet certified by the trial court) by
certified organic farmers in Saskatchewan against Monsanto and Bayer Crop Sciences
alleges that farmers are no longer able to grow certified organic canola in Saskatche-
wan and that GM canola from neighboring fields increasingly appears as weeds or
volunteers in certified organic fields with the costs of removing the GM plants unnec-
essarily borne by the organic farmer. See Press Release, Organic Consumers Associa-
tion, Organic Class Action Against Monsanto Moves Forward in Canada (Nov. 8,
2004), available at http://www.organicconsumers.com/OFGU/canadalIl204.cfm; see
also ORGANIC AGRICULTURE PROTECTION FUND, The Class Action, available at http://
www.saskorganic.com/oapf/legal.html (providing a copy of the Amended Statement
of Claim).
17. See, e.g., Association of Official Seed Certifying Agencies, About AOSCA, at
http://www.aosca.orga/about.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2005) (explaining that a ma-
jor purpose of AOSCA is "[t]o establish minimum standards for genetic purity and
identity and recommend minimum standards for seed quality for the classes of certi-
fied seed"); Organic Production and Handling Requirements, 7 C.F.R. § 205.202
(2004) (detailing setback requirements); 7 C.F.R. § 205.201 (a) (5) (2004) (providing
requirement to describe management practices and physical barriers to prevent com-
mingling with non-organic products and contact with prohibited substances, which
includes GMOs organisms); 7 C.F.R. § 205.204 (2004) (providing organic seed re-
quirement where commercially available). Because of the site-specific nature of or-
ganic production, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) did not
include specific setback and segregation requirements in the national regulations but
delegated the responsibility to individual certifying agents to review and evaluate each
farm's segregation plan. 7 C.F.R. § 205.200 (2004). In addition, certification organi-
zations may impose standards beyond those required by the NOP in order to satisfy
third-country import requirements. See Letter from A.J. Yates, Administrator, USDA
Agricultural Marketing Service, to Jose Sousa Uva, European Commission (Sept. 6,
2002), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/nop/NOP/TradeIssues/EuropeanCom-
mission.pdf (noting that NOP expressly permits U.S. certifiers to certify to standards
for exports).
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tinct, defined boundaries and buffer zones ... to prevent... contact
with a prohibited substance applied to adjoining land that is not
under organic management."1 8 Similarly, the Association of Official
Seed Certifying Agencies (AOSCA), an umbrella organization for
agencies responsible for seed certification, has promulgated mini-
mum production requirements designed to maintain genetic purity
and varietal identity.1 9 Under AOSCA rules, seed corn may not be
grown on land that grew corn of another color or endosperm type
during the preceding season, and there must be a minimum distance
from other corn and/or border rows to trap potential pollen drift.20
In an effort to minimize segregation requirements, and thereby
costs at the individual farm level, some large-scale seed producers
have adopted a strategy of contracting with contiguous blocks of farm-
ers in a particular region.21 As a result, only operators on the edge
(i.e., fields that do not share a common border with fellow contractors
on all sides) must sacrifice a portion of their fields as a setback. Inte-
rior farms can extend plantings to their respective fence lines without
fear of contamination from neighbors. A variation of this concept is
the establishment of GM-free zones where conventional and organic
farmers do not have to plant border rows to "catch" drifting GM pol-
len. California appears to be the leader in this movement, with sev-
eral counties recently passing referendums prohibiting the cultivation
of crops with genetically modified DNA. 22 Conversely, a locality with a
18. See 7 C.F.R. § 205.202 (2004) (setting forth land requirements).
19. See AOSCA, Seed Certification, at www.aosca.org/seed%20certification.htm (last
visited Apr. 2, 2005).
20. See id.
21. Conversation with Donald N. Duvick, Affiliate Professor, Iowa State University,
in Ames, IA (Nov. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Conversation with Duvick]. In the alterna-
tive, a corn breeder could arrange to only contract with farmers whose adjacent
neighbors' intend to plant soybeans (or provide an incentive to those neighbors to
forego corn in favor of soybeans). A related concept is the development of "fence-in
laws" for livestock (only those farmers with livestock need to bear the cost of fencing).
Individuals engaging in production practices with the potential to harm their neigh-
bors' crops traditionally have had the responsibility to confine their animals within
the boundaries of their own property. In some localities, however, particularly where
livestock producers outnumbered row crop farmers, the farmer, as opposed to the
rancher, had the responsibility to fence out the potentially harmful animals. These
"fence-in" or "fence-out" districts, allow the predominant agricultural practice in the
locality to shift individual production costs to the minority producer.
22. See Greg Lucas, Genetically Altered Crops: 2 Counties Rejecting Ban, Not Mann, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 3, 2004, at B10 (noting passage of voter referendum in Main County,
California that prohibits the cultivation of GM crops, and similar ordinances in
Mendocino and Trinity counties); Thomas P. Redick & MichaelJ. Adrian, Do European
Non-Tariff Barriers Create Economic Nuisances in the US?, 1J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 87 (2004).
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particularly high concentration of producers planting GM crops theo-
retically could create a "GM-only" or "GM-preferred" agricultural zone
and thereby minimize possible liability exposure from pollen drifting
into neighbors' fields.
23
In addition to direct costs of establishing and maintaining coexis-
tence, non-GM farmers face the risk that their systems for coexistence
will fail.24 For example, despite a producer's efforts to comply with
organic certification standards, organically produced grains tainted
with genetically modified DNA from an unknown origin may be re-
jected at the point of initial sale. In that case, the producer is forced
to forgo the expected organic price premium and sell the product as
commodity grade grain. 25 Although no reported case exists where an
Minimizing on-farm coexistence costs may not be the only purpose of these laws, as
general opposition to genetic engineering probably is driving adoption of these rules.
Id.
23. See also Redick & Adrian, supra note 22, at 103-04 (discussing grower districts in
Idaho and Washington formed to isolate industrial rapeseed from edible rapeseed
(canola oil) because pollen from the plant my travel as far as three kilometers).
24. Not all risk of failure is borne by the organic or specialty crop producer. For
example, the risk of damage from pesticide drift from applications on neighboring
farms is borne by the applicator. See A. Bryan Endres, GMO: Genetically Modified Or-
ganism or Gigantic Monetary Obligation? The Liability Schemes for GMO Damage in the
United States and European Union, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 453, 490-91
(2000) (discussing damages resulting from pesticide drift). At least one commentator
has suggested that if the economic/market consequences are high, which would likely
happen if there is a large price premium for non-GM supplies, then farmers are likely
to minimize this risk via insurance (assuming it is available). See Brookes, supra note
11, at 8.
25. Rejections and thus economic losses may arise later in the food supply chain.
For example, Terra Prima, a producer of organic tortilla chips, recalled and destroyed
85,000-95,000 bags of certified organic chips from Europe because of the presence of
GM corn. See ERICA WALZ, ORGANIC FARMING RESEARCH FOUNDATION, FINAL RESULTS
OF THE FOURTH NATIONAL ORGANIC FARMERS' SURVEY- SUSTAINING ORGANIC FARMS IN A
CHANGING ORGANIC MARKETPLACE 22, 73, 87, available at http://www.ofrf.org/publica-
tions/survey/Final.Results.Fourth.NOF.Survey.FastView.pdf (noting that two percent
of survey respondents indicated they lost sales due to perceived or actual contamina-
tion of their organic crop by GMOs, twenty-seven percent of respondents indicated
that some outside entity has requested testing of some portion of the farm's seeds,
inputs or products for the presence of GMOs, and nine respondents indicated they
were unable to grow organic corn in their region because of pollen drift); Andrew
Pollack, Can Biotech Crops be Good Neighbors?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2004, at A12
(describing concerns of organic producers of contamination from genetically modi-
fied DNA). If the harvested seed was contaminated with genetically modified DNA
during pollination, the GM seed may be multiplied over several years and contami-
nate future harvests. See CATHERINE L. MOYFS & PHILIPJ. DALE, ORGANIC FARMING AND
GENE TRANSFER FROM GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS § 4.5 (1999), available at http://
www.gmissues.org/organic%20report.htm.
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organic farmer has pursued relief from the courts by way of a direct
action against another farmer or seed manufacturer for this economic
injury, the potential for such lawsuits exists.
26
2. Efforts by Seed Companies to Facilitate Coexistence
Current seed stewardship guidelines from the seed breeder and
regulating agencies require non-GM reserves only for the purpose of
preventing and/or slowing resistance. 27 Unfortunately, measures de-
signed to slow resistance may not prevent admixture. Guidelines for
planting corn genetically engineered to produce the toxin Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt) provide an excellent illustration. Because Bt is an
important insecticide for organic producers, the developer of Bt tech-
nology in corn plants, as well as regulating agencies, have expressed
concern regarding development of resistance to the toxin. Accord-
ingly, Monsanto requires growers to certify that they have read and
understand the Technology Use Guide that accompanies the sale of
their YieldGuard Rootworm corn. To slow resistance, growers are in-
structed to plant twenty percent of their field with a non-Bt variety.
The hope is that insects with a mutation allowing them to survive ex-
posure to Bt will mate with insects in the refuge and produce off-
spring without a tolerance for Bt. From a coexistence perspective, the
refuge probably should border the genetically engineered corn to
minimize pollen drift.28 The location of this reserve, however, is left
26. See Endres, supra note 24, at 482-94 (discussing potential tort causes of action
available to an organic farmer to recover damages resulting from pollen drift); Han-
sen, supra note 16 (noting Mrs. Schmeiser's suit against Monsanto in Canada).
27. In addition to on-field stewardship guidelines, Monsanto requires farmers to
complete a "Market Choices" form when planting GM varieties that are not approved
for export. See MONSANTO COMPANY, 2004 GRAIN MARKETING COMMUNICATION PLAN,
available at http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/us-ag/content/stewardship/
marketchoices/mc-market~plan2004.pdf. The purpose of the form is to ensure that
farmers growing such products do not direct the harvested commodities into the ex-
port market. In completing the form, the farmer must specify where the grain was
used or marketed, e.g., on-farm feeding, domestic feed lots, elevators agreeing to ac-
cept non-export grain, or other approved domestic market uses. See DAVID R. MOEL-
LER & MICHAEL SLIGH, FARMERS' GUIDE TO GMOs 13-14, available at http://www.
nationalaglawcenter.org/assetts/articles/moeller-gmos.pdf.
28. Border rows of non-GM corn may serve as a "fence" by catching drifting pollen
from the GM varieties. The corn planted in the refuge will then produce a grain
containing genetically modified DNA and should be harvested and treated as a GM
product. GRAHAM BROOKES & PETER BARFOOT, Co-EXISTENCE IN NORTH AMERICAN AG-
RICULTURE: CAN GM CROPS BE GROWN WITH CONVENTIONAL AND ORGANIC CROPS 11,
available at http://www.pgeconomics.co.uk/pdf/coexistencereportNAxnericafinal
june2004.pdf. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that farmers will occasionally
harvest, and attempt to market, corn planted in the refuge as conventional. Id.
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to the sole discretion of the farmer. The refuge may be planted on
one side of the field, in a neighboring (even if not adjacent) field, or
as alternate rows within the same field,29 thereby squandering its value
as a coexistence tool.
3. State Delegation of Responsibility for Coexistence
In the absence of legal rules fashioning coexistence standards,
some state legislators continue to propose, without success, statutes
mandating notification of surrounding farmers of an intention to
plant GM crops.30 Such bills are shortsighted, however, because a no-
tification requirement may inadvertently impose the burden of in-
field segregation on the non-GM farmer. That is, by providing notice
of intent to plant GM crops, the GM farmer may be deemed to have
satisfied all duties owed to neighbors to restrain pollen or otherwise
prevent admixture of the GM product. So warned, a conventional or
organic farmer could then be held responsible for implementing set-
backs and border rows to catch drifting genetically modified DNA. 31
In an effort to build consensus for a more comprehensive coexis-
tence scheme, North Dakota State University formed the Coexistence
Working Group with grant assistance from the Northern Plains Sus-
tainable Agriculture Society.32 Group membership included repre-
sentatives from the biotechnology, conventional, identity-preserved
and organic farming sectors, organic certification groups, the North
Dakota Agriculture Department, and various organizations within the
29. See MONSANTO, 2005 TECHNOLOGY USE GUIDE 6, at http://www.monsanto.com/
Monsanto/us-ag/content/stewardship/tug/tug2005.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
The Technology Use Guide illustrates additional refuge options with little coexistence
value. Id.
30. See, e.g., A.B. 115, 228th Leg. Sess., 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. § 31-0303(1) (N.Y.
2005) (requiring anyone who "uses, grows or produces GMO seed... [to] inform any
landowner located within two miles... or such distance as the pollen of such GMO
seed species is determined by the Commissioner to travel, whichever is greater"); H.B.
150, 2001 Sess. (Minn. 2001) (requiring seed manufacturer to mail a notification to
neighboring farmers that identifies the person intending to grow GM seed); H.B.
1024, 23rd Leg. (Haw. 2005) (requiring public disclosure of locations of each crop
field and testing site containing GMO crops); cf Genetically Modified Organism Lia-
bility Act § 142-C, H.B. 1022, 23rd Leg. (Haw. 2005) (imposing tort liability for drift
of GMO pollen to neighboring organic farms).
31. See ORGANIC TRADE ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN ORGANIC STANDARDS 29, n. 38
(2003), available at http://www.ota.com/pics/documents/AOS032003.pdf (stating
that the burden for avoiding contamination for GMOs should not be placed entirely
on the organic producer) [hereinafter ORGANIC TRADE ASSOCIATION].
32. See COEXISTENCE WORKING GROUP, SUGGESTED BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
FOR THE COEXISTENCE OF ORGANIC, BIOTECH AND CONVENTIONAL CROP PRODUCTION
SYSTEMS 1 (2004), available at www.ag.ndsu.nodak.edu/coexistence/a1275.pdf.
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University.3 3 The Group reached consensus (and near unanimity) on
a variety of "best management practices" to foster coexistence,3 4 in-
cluding: (1) product stewardship education is the responsibility of the
party marketing the GM seed; (2) growers and handlers should be
aware of the requirements and risks of contracts they enter into and
the impact of those requirements on their operating procedures; (3)
stakeholders should review insurance coverage with respect to dam-
ages from the adventitious presence of GMOs; (4) producers should
take steps to maximize crop purity and segregation; (5) transportation
devices should be carefully cleaned and inspected; (6) tolerance levels
should be set by the market and not the government; (7) the process
for public input for seed certification standards should be publicized;
(8) if GM admixture is suspected in the seed, the purchaser should
pre-plant test the seed; (9) seed stock breeders should test for adventi-
tious presence in breeder and foundation seeds; (10) growers should
communicate production intentions to neighbors; and (11) consum-
ers should have unbiased information on the various food production
systems to enable an educated choice. 3
5
Unfortunately, after initial voting on the proposed best manage-
ment practices, five members of the group withdrew their support and
discontinued participation in the project.36 One of their primary ob-
jecti6ns was the passage by a nine-to-eight vote of the "recommenda-
tion" that states not set seed certification standards for the
adventitious presence of genetically modified DNA in otherwise non-
GM seed.37 The objectors noted that "[s]eed standards are a recog-
nized system of identity preservation and segregation. Without stan-
dards, there is not segregation. Without a strict segregation system in
place, there will be no coexistence. ' 38 Although the process broke
down before the Group could obtain a consensus on a comprehensive
set of best management practices, the process served as a valuable
starting point for future debate and elevated the issue of coexistence
to state level consideration.
33. See id.
34. The working group specifically noted that the best management practices de-
veloped during the process were "not intended to advocate the development or im-
plementation of legislative or regulatory policies." Id. at 2.
35. See generally id. (listing approved BMPs and vote totals).
36. Letter of Resignation Addressed to the Coexistence Working Group, February
7, 2004 (on file with the author) [hereinafter Letter of Resignation]. One other best
management practice passed on a controversial votes of 9 in favor to 8 against: com-
pliance with regulatory minimum standards in an important factor in determining
liability. See COEXISTENCE WORKING GROUP, supra note 32, at 2.
37. See Letter of Resignation, supra note 36.
38. See id.
20051
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
Because the United States has adopted a policy of voluntary label-
ing for GM food and feed, coexistence is of immediate importance to
those producers attempting to access the identity-preserved, organic,
export, or other specialty markets. 3 9 As discussed in Section B, pro-
ducers seeking admittance to European, and to a lesser extent
Asian,40 export markets must meet stringent non-GM purity standards.
So long as European consumers and, therefore, food processors and
distributors, continue to reject products containing or produced from
GMOs, 4I conventional crop producers in the United States must im-
plement coexistence measures to ensure their harvest does not exceed
the E,U.'s threshold for labeling the product as "genetically
modified."4
2
Organic farmers face similar market-based coexistence con-
cerns. 43 Although federal organic rules acknowledge and allow for
the adventitious presence of GMOs in organic products, the govern-
ment has not established a specific, numeric federal tolerance level. 44
The National Organic Program (NOP) established certification stan-
39. See Nicholas Kalaitzandonakes, Regulating Biotechnology: GM Food Labels, in Bio-
TECHNOLOGY: SCIENCE AND SOCIETY AT A CROSSROAD 125-27 (National Agricultural
Biotechnology Council 2003); BRoOKEs & BARFOOT, supra note 28, at 14.
40. See BROOKES ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 (noting less onerous labeling thresholds
for the adventitious presence of GMOs for export to Japan and Korea (five percent
and three percent, respectively) compared to the European Union (0.9 percent)).
41. GEORGE GASKELL ET AL., EUROPEANS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY IN 2002 at 36-40
(Eurobarometer 58.0, 2d ed. 2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/public-
opinion/archives/ebs/eb9177 en.pdf (finding continued resistance to GM food in
contrast to acceptance of biotechnology for medical purposes).
42. See BROOKES ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 (discussing labeling threshold of 0.9
percent in the European Union).
43. See Catherine Greene & Carolyn Dimitri, Organic Agriculture: Gaining Ground,
AMBER WAVES, Feb. 2003, available at http://ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/Feb03/Find-
ings/OrganicAgriculture.htm. Although relatively small in relation to conventional
and GM production methods, the organic market is one of the fastest growing sectors
in domestic agriculture, with a sustained twenty percent increase in sales since the
1990s. Id.
44. National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548 (Dec. 21, 2000) (to be codified
at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205) (clarification of "genetic drift" issues). USDA noted that organic
standards are "process based" and certification is granted according to the ability of
organic operators to follow a set of production standards and processes. Id.
The presence of a detectable residue of a product of excluded methods
[e.g., genetically modified organisms] alone does not necessarily constitute a
violation of this regulation. As long as an organic operation has not used
excluded methods and takes reasonable steps to avoid contact with the prod-
ucts of excluded methods.., the unintentional presence of the products of
excluded methods should not affect the status of the an organic producer or
operation. Id. at 80,556.
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dards based on a "process" or "production method" rather than an
end-product guarantee.45 Some advocate that the lack of clear inter-
national standards for the adventitious presence of genetically modi-
fied DNA has "disrupted the flow of trade in seed, agricultural
commodities and food."46 Accordingly, the government should adopt
a "science-based policy on adventitious presence . . .and persuade
other countries to adopt similar measures" to prevent arbitrary restric-
tions on exports.47 On the other hand, IFOAM and the Organic
Trade Association oppose establishing a de minimis tolerance because
"Reasonable steps to avoid contact" with GMOs could include tracing back at least
one step in the biological chain all processing aids and other inputs into the organic
production system to verify that the product was not derived from genetic engineer-
ing and prohibiting use of GMOs on farms with split production systems (i.e., the
farm produces both organic and non-organic products). See INTERNATIONAL FEDERA-
TION OF ORGANIC AGRICULTURE MOVEMENTS (IFOAM), IFOAM BASIC STANDARDS FOR
ORGANIC PRODUCTION AND PROCESSING 11-12 (2002), available at http://www.ifoam.
org/standard/norms/ibs.pdf. Although specifically noting that the burden for avoid-
ing contamination from GMOs should not be placed entirely on the organic pro-
ducer, the Organic Trade Association requires additional measures for certified
producers including: "establishment of physical barriers, diversion of runoff, notifica-
tion of neighbors, posting of borders, buffer zones of no less than 25 feet, or other
means as approved by the certification agent to prevent the application or drift of a
prohibited substance to land on which organically produced crops are grown." OR-
GANIC TRADE ASSOCIATION, supra note 31, at 28-29.
45. 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548 (Dec. 21, 2000) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205) (refer-
ring to clarification of "genetic drift" issues). See also IFOAM, Position on Genetic Engi-
neering and Genetically Modified Organisms, available at http://www.ifoam.org/pospap/
ge-position.html [hereinafter IFOAM GMO Position].
The potential of GMO contamination does not alter the traditional ap-
proach of certifying organic as a "production method" rather than an end-
product guarantee. Organic producers are not defined or certified as being
"free" of unwanted pollution. Just as organic farmers cannot guarantee zero
contamination from pesticides they do not use themselves, there is no way
for them to guarantee that organic products will not be polluted by traces of
GMOs. Id.
IFOAM, however, does require organic producers and operators to "take all reasona-
ble measures to minimize and manage the risk of contamination." Id.
46. Biotechnology Industry Organization, Issues in Brief: Standards Need to be Devel-
opedfor Adventitious Presence of Biotech Products, available at http://www.bio.org/foodag/
background/adventitious.asp.
47. Id.; see also The Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, Biotech and Organic:
Reaching Detente (paraphrasing Leon Corzine of the Biotechnology Working Group of
the National Corn Growers Association as advocating tolerances for organic foods in
order to ensure organic and biotech farming methods remain viable options), availa-
ble at http://pewagbiotech.org/buzz/print.php3?StoryID=62; National Corn Growers
Association, NGGA Position: Biotechnology 1-2 (supporting "development of internation-
ally accepted, science-based tolerance standards" for the adventitious presence of GM
material and development of "merchandising and process verification standards for
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it might require testing for all producers who otherwise follow organic
principles and experience contamination from circumstances beyond
their control. 48 As the tolerance debate continues, organic certifying
organizations, in response to consumer demand, have imposed their
own tolerance standards; as a result, grain elevators and processors
routinely refuse to accept otherwise organically certified shipments
that contain adventitious amounts of genetically modified DNA.49
B. The European Union's Approach to Coexistence
1. Specific Measures Aimed at Coexistence
While conventional and organic farmers in the United States
must rely on ad hoc informal norms, the E.U. has proposed formal
principles of coexistence5" and is in the process of developing formal
rules and accompanying best management practices.51 In July 2003,
goods that do not contain biotech corn"), available at http://www.ncga.com/biotech-
nology/pdfs/BIOTECHNOLOGYPOSITIONPAPERS.pdf.
48. See IFOAM GMO Position, supra note 45, at 4; see also COEXISTENCE WORKING
GROUP, supra note 32, at 6 ("The marketplace, represented by the purchasing entity,
will determine the acceptable level (tolerances) of unintended presence."); INTERNA-
TIONAL SEED FEDERATION, supra note 14, at 2 (opposing adoption of specific thresh-
olds for the adventitious presence of GM material in organic products and, if such
thresholds are adopted, arguing that "responsibility to reach and guarantee them
must rest with organic producers and the burden of their decision should not be
transferred to the farming community at large"); Organic Trade Association, Summary
of OTA Positions on GMOs (2003), available at http://www.ota.com/pp/otaposition/
geos.html.
[The E.U.] has a tolerance level of 1 [percent], but OTA does not support
setting a tolerance level.. .OTA stresses that organic production is a process
guarantee, and notes that just as there are trace amounts of persistent syn-
thetic pesticides in much of our food, so there may be background levels of
GMOs in North American food, due to the high percentage of GM crops
grown here. Id.
49. See The Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, Organic Farmers Sing Biotech
Blues (noting that even the "slightest bit of biotech contamination can cut the value of
the crop by a third or more" and "food companies and livestock producers are in-
creasingly forcing farmers and grain elevators to test organic commodities to detect
any traces of biotech material"), available at http://pewagbiotech.org/newsroom/
summaries/display.php3?NewsID=458. Some farmers, however, purchase non-GMO
seed due to personal preference, cost concerns or simply because the traits genetically
engineered into the plant offer no benefit. For example, a farmer is unlikely to
purchase corn genetically modified to resist the corn borer or rootworm if the farmer
does not experience yield pressure from those plant pests. Id.
50. See generally Commission Recommendation 2003/556, 2003 O.J. (L 189) 36.
51. Commission Recommendation 2003/556, art. 2.1.2, 2003 O.J. (L 189) at 41.
Best management practices (BMPs) should reflect "the best available scientific evi-
dence," and "should take into account the differences between crop species, crop
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the European Commission issued guidelines to its Member States for
the development of national coexistence strategies and best manage-
ment practices for coexistence. 52 Under the new guidelines, Member
States must strive to ensure that farmers have the ability to "make a
practical choice between conventional, organic and GM crop produc-
tion, in compliance with the legal obligations for labeling and/or pu-
rity standards."5 3 Among the key implementation principles is the
requirement that farmers introducing a new production type in a re-
gion (presumably GM crop production) must bear the responsibility
for implementing the farm management measures necessary to limit
admixture. 54 In addition, Member States should establish mecha-
nisms to favor coordination and voluntary arrangements among
neighbors and, in crafting rules, rely on the best available scientific
evidence regarding the probability and sources of admixture.55
These proposed rules present a stark contrast to the adoption of
GM production methods by farmers in the United States, where the
absence of regulatory rules supporting coexistence subsidize the adop-
tion of GM production as producers are free to disregard production
practices on neighboring farms and pass segregation costs onto the
non-GM farmer. In contrast, European producers will likely see the
cost of switching to GM production rise in response to implementa-
tion of the European rule. As a result, the adoption of GM technol-
ogy in the E.U. may be further slowed.56 In addition to on-farm
management costs, European GM producers may face liability for ad-
mixture because the Commission recommended that Member States
"examine their civil liability laws to find out whether existing national
varieties and product type (e.g., crop or seed production) ... [d]ifferences in re-
gional aspects (e.g., climatic conditions, topography, cropping patterns, and crop ro-
tation systems, farm structures, crop-specific GMO share in a region) that may
influence the degree of admixture." Commission Recommendation 2003/556, art.
2.1.6, 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 41.
52. Commission Recommendation 2003/556, art. 2.1.6, 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 41.
53. Commission Recommendation 2003/556, art. 1.1, 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 39.
54. Commission Recommendation 2003/556, art. 2.1.2, 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 41.
55. Commission Recommendation 2003/556, art. 2.1.2, 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 41.
An additional interesting recommendation is the requirement for farmers planting
GM seeds to notify neighboring farms. Commission Recommendation 2003/556, art.
2.1.7, 2003 OJ. (L 189) at 41.
56. In addition to on-farm management costs, some Member States have imposed
further costs on the farmer adopting GM production methods such as payment into
an indemnity fund for damage resulting from GMOs. See Benoit & Wassener, infra
note 57 (discussing indemnity funds & damage from GMOs).
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laws offer sufficient and equal possibilities" in the event of economic
damage resulting from admixture.
57
The Commission's guidelines place emphasis on farm specific
management measures (e.g., setbacks, segregation protocols, coordi-
nation among neighboring farms) over region wide coexistence mea-
sures such as GM-free growing zones.58  Measures of regional
dimension "should only be considered if sufficient levels of purity can-
not be achieved by other means .. .and will need to be justified for
each crop and product type (e.g., seed versus crop production) sepa-
rately. '5 9 Despite this stated priority, several Member States have im-
posed region wide bans on GM crop production or "opt-out" clauses
in national legislation that empower regional governments to declare
themselves "biotech-free.
60
2. Approval and Marketing of GM Products in the E.U.
In addition to specific measures directed to obtaining coexis-
tence, the E.U. has adopted a robust approval and post-market regula-
tory system for genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and products
produced from GMOs. 61 Included in this scheme are comprehensive
57. See Commission Recommendation 2003/556, art. 2.1.9, 2003 oJ. (L 189) 36.
In November 2004 the lower house of the German Parliament passed a revised civil
liability measure addressing economic damage from admixture. The law places the
risk of liability on the producer adopting production methods that employ genetically
modified DNA. See Bertrand Benoit & Bettina Wassener, German Bill Lays Down Strict
Rules for "Genetic" Crops, FINANcCIAL TIMES, Nov. 26, 2004, at 8.
58. See Commission Recommendation 2003/556, art. 2.1.5, 2003 OJ. (L 189) 36.
59. See Commission Recommendation 2003/556, art. 2.1.5, 2003 OJ. (L 189) 36.
60. Europe Reflects Italian Battle over Biotech Coexistence, ANSA ENGLISH MEDIA SER-
VICE, Oct. 13, 2004 (available on Lexis) [hereinafter ANSA]. Region wide bans on
GM production have also garnered increasing attention in the United States, espe-
cially in California. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. As an alternative to an
outright ban on GM cultivation (a violation of E.U. rules), Denmark established "ex-
tremely tough penalties for biotech farmers who contaminate conventional crops...
and face a special 'GMO tax,' amounting to 13.50 euros per hectare" to finance a
compensation fund for farmers damaged by admixture with GMOs. ANSA, supra note
60; see alsoJeremy Smith, Reuters, Lawmaking on Genetic(GMO) Food is MinefieldforEU,
Feb. 28, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2005-02-
28-biotech-eu x.htm.
61. See Council Directive 90/219, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 1 (outiining the approval pro-
cess for research and other use of genetically engineered DNA within containment
systems); Parliament and Council Directive 2001/18, 2001 OJ. (L 106) 1 (explaining
approval process for field testing and marketing of GMOs); see also Margaret Rosso
Grossman, Traceability and Labeling of GM Crops, Food, and Feed in the European Union, 1
J. FooD L. & POL'y 43, 53-65 (parts II. A-C) (2005); Margaret Rosso Grossman & A.
Bryan Endres, Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms in the European Union, 44 AM.
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rules for traceability and labeling of GMOs, some of which impact co-
existence. Regulation 1829/2003 established procedures for the ap-
proval and labeling of GM food and feed.62 Regulation 1830/2003,
adopted concurrently with Regulation 1829/2003, created an opera-
tional framework for the traceability of products consisting of or con-
taining GMOs, as well as food and feed produced from GMOs. 63 The
purpose of the two regulations is to facilitate accurate labeling of
products, monitoring of environmental and health effects, and imple-
menting necessary risk management measures, including the possible
withdrawal of products from the market.
The operator, when first placing products "consisting of' or "con-
taining GMOs," on the market, and at all subsequent stages of market-
ing, must notify the receiving operator in writing that the products
contain or consist of GMOs, as well as the unique identifier(s) as-
signed to each GMO present in the shipment.64 Products containing
or consisting of mixtures of GMOs intended to be used directly as food
or feed or for further processing may be accompanied by a declara-
tion from the operator that lists all GMOs used to constitute the mix-
ture as well as the unique identifiers. 65 Operators must retain this
transaction information for a period of five years.66 At the consumer
level, labels on prepackaged products (or on the display for non-
prepackaged products) must state "[t] his product contains genetically
modified organisms" or " [t]his product contains genetically modified
[name of organism] ,,67 Similarly, labels on animal feed composed of
a feed that contains or consists of GMOs must state "genetically modi-
BEHAV. Sci. 378 (2000) (describing the European Union's regulatory approval process
for GMOs).
62. Parliament and Council Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 Oj. (L 268) 1.
63. Parliament and Council Regulation 1830/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 24.
64. Regulation 1830/2003, art. 4(A), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 26. Similar rules apply
to products "produced from" GMOs. See Regulation 1829/2003, art. 13, 25(2) (b),
2003 O.J. (L 268) at 11-12, 17; Regulation 1830/2003, art. 5, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 27.
The traceability and labeling rules, however, do not apply to food or feed "produced
with" GMOs. An example of a product produced "with" GMOs would be an animal
fed GM grain or treated with a GM medicinal product. See Regulation 1829/2003,
pmbl. (16), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 2-3.
65. Regulation 1830/2003, art. 4(A), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 26.
66. Regulation 1830/2003, art. 4(A), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 26.
67. Regulation 1830/2003, art. 4(B), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 26. In addition, Article
13 of Regulation 1829/2003 requires that food products intended for the final con-
sumer that contain or consist of GMOs must indicate on the ingredients list "geneti-
cally modified [name of organism]" or, where there is no list of ingredients, indicate
the same somewhere clearly on the label.
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fled [name of organism]" in parentheses immediately following the
name of the feed or in a footnote to the list of feed.68
The traceability and labeling rules, however, do not apply to food
or feed that meet a preset tolerance level. Food or feed containing
material which contains, consists of, or is produced from GMOs in a
proportion no higher than 0.9 percent of the food ingredients consid-
ered individually (or food consisting of one ingredient) may be mar-
keted in the E.U. without a label indicating the presence of GMOs,
provided that the presence is adventitious or technically unavoida-
ble.69 To qualify for the exemption, operators must be able to
demonstrate that appropriate steps were taken to avoid the presence
of GMOs in the product.70 The adventitious presence rules, however,
only apply to GMOs approved for use in the European Union. There
is no tolerance level for GMOs rejected or otherwise not yet approved
for release.
7 1
Like the United States, organic certification rules in the E.U. ac-
knowledge that GMOs may be present in organically produced prod-
ucts. The E.U. has not yet established a de minimis threshold for
unavoidable contamination, but has signaled that it will in the fi-
ture.72 Absent specific rules, the general traceability and labeling
standards (0.9 percent for approved GMOs) probably apply to organic
products.73 Organic certification bodies, as well as processors, may
impose a more stringent threshold of 0.1 percent.
II. EUROPEAN UNION SEED LAws: A WORK IN PROGRESS
As a starting point in the achievement of its agricultural purity
standards, the E.U. enacted a series of statutory measures regulating
the production, labeling and sale of agricultural seeds to "minimize
genetic contamination and maximize varietal purity. ' 74 Directive
68. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 25(2)(a), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 17.
69. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 12, 24, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 11, 16-17; Regulation
1830/2003, art. 4(c) & 5, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 26-27.
70. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 12, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 11.
71. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 47(1), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 22. In addition to the
zero tolerance level for unapproved GMOs, Regulation 1829/2003 carves out a lim-
ited exception for GMOs with a favorable risk evaluation completed before November
7, 2003, but not yet approved for use. The adventitious presence for this limited
category of GMOs is limited to 0.5 percent. See also Commission Regulation 641/
2004, 2004 o.J. (L 102) 14.
72. Council Regulation 1804/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 222) 1. In contrast, the United
States process based organic standards have a "reasonable efforts" requirement to
avoid contamination from GMOs. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
73. See Commission Recommendation 2003/556, 2003 o.J. (L 189) 36.
74. BOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 15.
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2002/53/EC75 codified earlier legislation that established a common
catalog of each variety of agricultural plant species accepted for certifi-
cation and marketing in the Member States of the E.U. 76 Once listed
in the common catalog, seed varieties are freely marketable within the
Member States. 77 Separate Directives establish specific certification
standards for marketing each type of seed and plant propagating
material.
78
Genetically modified varieties may be included in the common
catalog only after approval in accordance with Regulation 1829/
2003, 79 the regulation authorizing the placing on the market of prod-
ucts consisting of, containing, or produced from GMOs.80 Moreover,
the catalog listing must clearly indicate that the variety is genetically
modified, 81 and individual labels must accompany each seed lot.
8 2
Current seed certification and marketing directives, however, do not
establish a tolerance level for the adventitious presence of GM seeds
75. Council Directive 2002/53, 2002 O.J. (L 193) 1 (regarding the common cata-
log of varieties of agricultural plant species).
76. See Council Directive 70/458, 1970 O.J. SPEC. ED. 674 (regulating the market-
ing of vegetable seed).
77. Council Directive 2002/53, pmbl. (11), 2002 O.J. (L 193) 1.
78. See Directive 66/401, 1965-1966 O.J. SPEC. ED. 132 (regarding fodder plant
seed); Council Directive 66/402, 1965-1966 O.J. SPEC. ED. 143 (regarding cereal seed,
including maize); Council Directive 68/193, 1967-1968 O.J. SPEC. ED. 93 (regarding
wine and table grapes); Council Directive 92/33, 1992 O.J. (L 157) 1 (regarding plant
propagating material other than seed); Council Directive 92/34, 1992 O.J. (L 157) 10
(regarding fruit plants); Council Directive 2002/54, 2002 O.J. (L 193) 12 (regarding
beet seed); Council Directive 2002/55, 2002 O.J. (L 193) 33 (regarding vegetable
seed); Council Directive 2002/56, 2002 O.J. (L 193) 60 (regarding seed potatoes);
Council Directive 2002/57, 2002 O.J. (L 193) 74 (regarding oil and fiber plant seeds,
including soybeans).
79. See Regulation 1829/2003, pmbl. 34, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 4. For example, on
September 8, 2004, the European Commission approved the inscription of seventeen
varieties of GM corn into the common catalog. All of the varieties were derived from
Monsanto's MON810 maize sold under the trade name YieldGuard. Press Release,
European Commission, Inscription of MON 810 GM maize varieties in the Common
EU Catalogue of Varieties (IP/04/1083, Sept. 8, 2004).
80. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 4(2), 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 7. Approval under Regu-
lation 1829/2003 assumes prior approval for the release under Directive 2001/18.
81. Council Directive 2002/53, art. 9.5, 2002 O.J. (L 193) at 5.
82. See, e.g., Council Directive 98/95, 1999 O.J. (L 25) 1 (amending, in respect to
the consolidation of the internal market, GM plant varieties and plant genetic re-
sources, Council Directives 66/400, 66/401, 66/402, 66/403, 69/208, 70/457 and
70/458 on the marketing of beet seed, fodder plant seed, cereal seed, seed potatoes,
seed of oil and fibre plants and vegetable seed, and on the common catalogue of
varieties of agricultural plant species, and amending, inter alia, labeling requirements
required under art. 1la of Directive 66/402).
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that are otherwise approved for marketing in the E.U. Accordingly,
agricultural seeds are subject to the generic 0.9 percent labeling and
traceability threshold applicable to all GMOs.8 8 However, a farmer
planting conventional seed with an adventitious GM presence of 0.9
percent is unlikely to harvest a final crop with only 0.9 percent geneti-
cally modified DNA due to a variety of potential admixture events,
including: cross-pollination, volunteer plants, harvesting, transporta-
tion, and storage.8 4 Accordingly, the European Commission is consid-
ering legislation that would establish labeling thresholds for the
adventitious presence of GM seed at a level low enough to ensure the
harvested crop could satisfy the 0.9 percent threshold for traceability
and labeling.
85
The Scientific Committee on Plants of the European Commission
acknowledged that a zero level of adventitious GM seed is unobtain-
able in practice given the nature of field experiments and the fact that
unapproved GM varieties may have received some level of regulatory
approval in third countries.86 Instead, the Committee recommended
thresholds of 0.3 percent for cross-pollinating crops and 0.5 percent
for self-pollinating vegetatively propagated crops.87 An October 13,
2003 Commission Staff Working Paper recommended thresholds of
0.3 percent for rape (canola), 0.5 percent for maize and 0.7 percent
for soybeans. The required thresholds were calculated to produce an
end-product with a GM presence of approximately 0.8 percent, leav-
ing a margin vis a vis the 0.9 percent labeling threshold for final
products.
88
83. See Commission Recommendation 2003/556, art. 2.1.4, 2003 O.J. (L 189) 36.
84. One study has estimated post-planting admixture from these sources to be 0.81
percent for oilseed rape and 0.57 percent for maize. Opinion of Scientific Committee
on Plants, supra note 10, at 8.
85. See Commission Recommendation 2003/556, art. 2.1.4, 2003 O.J. (L 189) 36.
Factors to consider in setting seed purity thresholds include whether the species is self
or open pollinated and the difficulty of controlling volunteers. Opinion of Scientific
Committee on Plants, supra note 10, at 7. Of course, this assumes the farmer would
practice adequate farm level and post-harvest segregation measures. See supra notes 4
and 80 and accompanying text (describing possible factors influencing admixture)
and infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text (noting possible prevention measures).
86. Opinion of Scientific Committee on Plants, supra note 10, at 16. Analytical
sensitivity is currently at 0.1 percent. Moreover, an international database of DNA
sequences and analytical procedures is necessary to be able to detect unauthorized
GM material. Id. at 7; INTERNATIONAL SEED FOUNDATION, ACCESS TO RELEVANT TECH-
NOLOGY TO TEST THE ADVENTITIOUS PRESENCE OF GM MATERIAL IN NON-GM SEED, avail-
able at http://www.worldseed.org/Positionpapers/Acc-rel tech.htm.
87. Opinion of Scientific Committee on Plants, supra note 10, at 7.
88. COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER, SEC (2003) 1131 (on file with author). A
2004 Draft Commission Decision would establish tolerances of 0.3 percent for canola
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Of course, any Europe-wide labeling requirement would not a pri-
ori guarantee acceptance of the harvested crop as non-GM. Farmers
would have to practice adequate farm level and post-harvest segrega-
tion measures to preserve genetic purity. The ability to purchase
properly labeled non-GM seeds with an adventitious presence signifi-
cantly below the 0.9 percent threshold, however, does provide a rea-
sonable starting point toward obtaining coexistence.
III. GM TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHERS: How DOMESTIC SEED
LAWS FAIL TO CURTAIL THE ADVENTITIOUS PRESENCE OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED DNA IN THE SEED SUPPLY
As the undisputed leader in the development and adoption of
agricultural biotechnology,8 9 the United States' agricultural produc-
tion system has served as the "guinea pig" for coexistence. Accord-
ingly, an evaluation of the efficacy of its interlocking system of agency
oversight9" provides a baseline for development of regulatory models
abroad. Unfortunately, the initial rollout of biotechnology advances
in agriculture did not anticipate resistance by trading partners91 (such
as the E.U.) and the potential consequences of the adventitious pres-
ence of genetically modified DNA in the domestic seed production
system.92 This section discusses the extent of the adventitious pres-
ence of genetically modified DNA in the nation's seed supply and how
federal and state seed purity laws currently address GM seeds.
and maize and 0.5 percent for sugar and fodder beet, potato and cotton. In addition
to seed purity standards, achievement of the labeling thresholds would require good
farm level and post-harvest management practices. Factors influencing local levels of
contamination other than seed purity include the relative proportion of the species in
the agricultural landscape, the relative size of the fields (pollen emitter and recep-
tor), the field pattern and the process of collecting, drying, transporting and storing
the harvested product. BOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 65. An increase in isolation
distances (buffer zones) and coordination of pollination times for GM and non-GM
varieties are additional, complementary farm level measures to reduce adventitious
admixture. Id. A recent review of the scientific literature of cross-pollination of maize
crops concluded that four buffer rows of non-GM maize or, in the alternative, a sepa-
ration distance of six meters, is likely to prove effective for coexistence purposes.
BROOKES ET AL., supra note 2, at 18.
89. See ISAA PREVIEW, supra note 1.
90. See, e.g., U.S. Regulatory Agencies Unified Biotechnology Website, Welcome, at
http://usbiotechreg.nbii.gov (last visited June 8, 2005) (describing the coordinated
framework for the regulation of biotechnology by USDA, FDA and EPA).
91. Andrew Pollack, We Can Engineer Nature, But Should We?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
2000, at 16 (noting that "[s]ome executives at bio-engineered seed companies say
their mistake was to regard the farmer and not the consumer as the customer. With
no apparent benefit, it is easy to shun even a miniscule risk, just to be safe").
92. MELLON & RiSSLER, supra note 8, at 9.
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A. The Infiltration of Genetically Modified DNA in the
Domestic Seed Supply
The scientific community and the American public have become
increasingly concerned about the potential environmental dangers
presented by cultivation of GM crops.9 3 Typical concerns include the
elimination of the ability to grow non-GM varieties, the contamination
of wild relatives and landraces,9 4 and the development of "super"
weeds and bugs resistant to existing pesticides.95 Assuming released
GM crops are safe (i.e., have been approved or deregulated by the
appropriate agency), coexistence is concerned with the economic via-
bility of sustaining different farming practices, as opposed to the envi-
ronmental or health consequences of GM production methods.
96
Unlike environmental concerns, the economic consequences of un-
wanted genetically modified DNA are not theoretical dangers to farm-
ers but are here and potentially catastrophic to the sustained viability
of the conventional and organic farming community.
The adventitious presence of genetically modified DNA in the do-
mestic seed supply greatly hampers coexistence efforts. Each poten-
tially contaminated seed produces multiple offspring and, once in
foundation seed stocks, will reintroduce the genetic sequences during
each use.97 Unfortunately, there are increasing reports of genetically
modified DNA within seed marketed as conventional or organic.
North Dakota State University's Foundation Seedstocks Program re-
ported the adventitious presence of GM soybeans in its natto variety
93. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 25; Andrew Pollack, Genes From Engineered Grass
Spread for Miles, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2004, at Al; Alex Pulaski, A Growing
Controversy, THE SUNDAY OREGONIAN, Sept. 12, 2004, at DI; Gregory M. Lamb, Seeds of
Concern: Genetically Altered Material Turning Up, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 22, 2004,
available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2001885053-
genfood22.html; Susanne Quick & Kimm Groshong, Modified Crops Could Erase Wild
Counterparts, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, July 25, 2003, available at http://www.
jsonline.com/alive/news/jul03/157588.asp.
94. COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION OF NORTH AMERICA, MAIZE AND
BIODIvERSITY: THE EFFECT OF TRANSGENIC MAIZE IN MEXICO 10-13 (2004), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF//Maize-and-Biodiversity-en.pdf.
95. Pulaski, A Growing Controversy, supra note 93, at D1; PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD
AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, ISSUES IN THE REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PLANTS
AND ANIMALS 39-40 (2004), available at http://pewagbiotech.org/research/regula-
tion/Regulation.pdf.
96. BROOKES & BARFOOT, supra note 28, at 6; INTERNATIONAL SEED FEDERATION,
supra note 14, at 1.
97. See IFOAM GMO POSITION, supra note 45, at 4; MELLON & RISSLER, supra note
8, at 10.
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bean for the 2001 and 2002 seed supplies.9 8 Foundation seed pro-
grams in Virginia, Missouri, and Michigan have also acknowledged the
adventitious presence of GMOs in foundation soybean seeds. 99 In a
pilot study to assess the extent of adventitious presence of genetically
modified DNA in conventional seed supplies, the Union of Con-
cerned Scientists found conventional varieties of corn, soybeans, and
canola "pervasively contaminated with low levels of genetic sequences
originating in transgenic varieties."100 Although the pilot study was
too limited to support quantitative estimates of overall levels of GM
presence in conventional crop varieties, expected contamination
levels were estimated to be between 0.05 percent and 1.0 percent of
conventionally labeled seed.101
The scarcity of non-GM seeds already poses a major challenge to
organic producers and is likely to only increase as GM use continues
to expand.10 2 Based upon a two-year field test of wind transport of
GM corn pollen, Professors John Jemison and Michael Vayda con-
98. Mikkel Pates, Agriculture: Seed Raises Control Issues, AGWEEK, Nov. 12, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.grandforks.com/mld/grandforksherald/4498432.htm.
99. MELLON & RiSSLER, supra note 8, at 10 (citing THE NoN-GMO SOURCE, Vol. 3,
No. 6, pp. 1-2 June 2003).
100. Id. at 12. See also Lyle F. Friesen et al., Evidence of Contamination of Pedigreed
Canola (Brassica Napus) Seedlots in Western Canada with Genetically Engineered Herbicide
Resistance Traits, 95 AGRONOMYJ. 1342, 1345 (2003) (reporting finding of a high level
of genetically modified DNA in foundation, registered and certified canola seed with
thirty-two of thirty-three seedlots recording the presence of genetically modified DNA
and fourteen of those seedlots with contamination levels above purity guidelines for
certified seed).
101. MELLON & RiSSLER, supra note 8, at 26-27. Six varieties of each species (corn,
soybean and canola) were tested at two independent laboratories. Laboratory 1
(GeneScan USA, Inc.) found genetically modified DNA in fifty percent of the corn
and soybean samples and 100 percent of the canola samples. Laboratory 2 (Bioge-
netic Services, Inc.) found genetically modified DNA in eighty-three percent of the
corn, soybean and canola samples. Id.
102. See id. at 11 ("Organic growers ... are finding it increasingly difficult to obtain
non-engineered seed"); In 2000, the USDA acknowledged the problem of ensuring
genetic identity of seeds used for organic production, but declined to take affirmative
steps to address the problem. See National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548,
80,556 (Dec. 21, 2000) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205). As a general rule, organic
producers "must use organically grown seeds, annual seedlings, and planting stock."
7 C.F.R. § 205.204(a) (2004). In recognition of the problem of acquiring organically
produced seeds, producers are exempted from the requirement if an organically pro-
duced variety is not commercially available. Id. at § 205.204(a)(1)-(2). The difficulty
in obtaining organic seed is a major concern to organic trade groups, and IFOAM
recently sponsored an international conference on this issue. See generally, IFOAM,
FIRST WORLD CONFERENCE ON ORGANIC SEED: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
THE ORGANIC AGRICULTURE AND THE SEED INDUSTRY (2004) (on file with the author).
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cluded that it is increasingly important for organic producers to care-
fully consider what seed to purchase and perhaps to independently
test seed stocks before planting.10 3 Other recommended alternatives
include growing open-pollinated corn varieties or purchasing certified
seed. IFOAM, the leading international non-governmental organiza-
tion for organic producers, echoes these concerns 0 4 and recom-
mends that organic producers make "special efforts ... to ensure that
the seeds they use are not contaminated. " 10 5 The organization fur-
ther directed organic certification bodies to ensure that producers im-
plement precautionary measures regarding seed contamination and
requested that organic trade associations assist producers in their ef-
forts to obtain uncontaminated seed.10 6 Not surprisingly, in a recent
survey of organic farmers, forty-eight percent of the respondents indi-
cated that they believe contaminated seed stocks presents the greatest
risk of GMO contamination to their farms, followed by pollen drift at
forty-two percent.
1 0 7
As discussed below, however, neither the federal nor state govern-
ments have openly considered the consequences of low levels of ge-
netically modified DNA in the context of their seed purity laws.
Moreover, the International Seed Federation, in response to the
problems of adventitious presence in seed supplies, drafted for its
members a "Model for Conditions of Sale Applicable to Seed Lots"
foreswearing liability arising from the adventitious presence of GM
material.108 As a result of inadequate labeling laws and non-negotia-
103. John M. Jemison, Jr. & Michael E. Vayda, Cross Pollination From Genetically Engi-
neered Corn: Wind Transport and Seed Source, 4(2) AGBIoFoRuM 87, 91 (2001), available
at http://www.agbioforum.org/v4n2/v4n2a02jemison.pdf; see also COEXISTENCE
WORKING GROUP, supra note 32, at 6 (noting one of the recommended best manage-
ment practices from the Coexistence Working Group is to conduct a pre-planting test
of suspect seed) (on file with author).
104. IFOAM GMO POSITION, supra note 45, at 4 (noting that minimization of the
adventitious presence of genetically modified DNA "is especially important for seed,




107. ERIcA WALz, FINAL RESULTS OF THE FOURTH NATIONAL ORGANIC FARMERS' SUR-
VEY: SUSTAINING ORGANIC FARMS IN A CHANGING ORGANIC MARKETPLACE, available at
http://www.ofrf.org/ publications/survey/Final.Results.Fourth.NOF.Survey.FastView.
pdf.
108. See International Seed Federation, Model Conditions of Sale Disclaimer, available at
http://www.worldseed.org/Position-papers/cond-sale.htm. The recommended dis-
claimer states:
Seeds supplied to you are from a variety bred from parent components that
have not been genetically modified. The methods used in the development
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ble contract provisions in seed sales that foreclose compensation,
farmers attempting to produce conventional or organic products face
substantial economic risk before the first seed is planted.
B. Federal and State Seed Laws Have Failed to Protect the Conventional
and Domestic Seed Market from Contamination from
Genetically Modified DNA
Although genetically modified DNA may be present at low levels
throughout the conventional seed supply, the contamination can be
reduced substantially, even if complete reversal is not possible.109 Ini-
tial steps should include a full-scale investigation by the USDA to de-
termine the extent, cause, and impact of the contamination with a
view toward recommending the most efficient methods of reestablish-
ing genetic purity.110 Moreover, some commentators recommend cre-
ation of a reservoir of non-GM seeds at the lowest achievable amount
of contamination to enable the agricultural community to shift from
GM production methods, if required, as the long-term impacts of the
technology are realized."a ' In the interim, private seed companies
should test their seed stocks for the presence of undesired genetically
modified DNA and publicize the results to enable farmers to make
informed choices."
12
and maintenance of that variety are aimed at avoiding the presence of off-
types, including genetically modified material, as defined by the applicable
laws or regulations.
Seed production has been carried out in accordance with production rules
including stipulated isolation distances. However, in open fields there is
free circulation of pollen. As it cannot be excluded that in seed multiplica-
tion areas the growing of approved GM plants takes place, it is not possible
to totally prevent the adventitious presence of GM material and to guarantee
that the seed lots comprising this delivery are free from any traces derived
from GM plants.
(Company name) has undertaken due diligence to avoid adventitious pres-
ence of GM material in this seed lot. However, (company name) gives no
guarantee that the seed is GM free and can accept no liability arising from
the adventitious presence of GM material. Id.
109. MELLON & RISSLER, supra note 8, at 3.
110. Id. at 52.
111. Id. at 54.
112. Id. at 56.
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1. The Federal Seed Act
Enacted to ensure "truth-in-labeling,"1' 3 federal and state seed
laws currently do not require disclosure of low levels of adventitious
presence of GM seeds. Under federal law, product labels must accom-
pany all seeds transported or delivered for transportation in interstate
commerce. 114 Labels must include, inter alia, the name of the kind 1 5
or variety1 16 of seed present in excess of five percent of the whole,
17
the percentage of each kind or variety,' 18 and for each variety in-
cluded on the label, the percentage of germination, the percentage of
hard seed, and the date the test was completed to determine the re-
spective percentages.'1 9 Accordingly, labels need not include infor-
mation regarding adventitious presence of GM seeds so long as they
are present below the five percent threshold.
20
Although the Federal Seed Act does not explicitly address GM
seeds, in practice it is implied that seed is not of a GM variety unless
113. See Enforcement of the Varietal Labeling Provisions of the Federal Seed Act, 67
Fed. Reg. 59,769 (Sept. 24, 2002) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 201). A secondary
purpose of most seed laws is to prevent the entry of noxious weeds into the respective
geographical region. Accordingly, the Federal Seed Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1551-1611
(2005), prohibits the presence of certain weeds. See 7 U.S.C. § 1561(9) (A)-(B). In
addition, each state seed act or implementing regulation generally includes provi-
sions banning additional weeds. See, e.g., 8 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 230.20, 230.30 (1987)
(listing prohibited and restricted weed seeds in Illinois). The USDA maintains a list
of all noxious weed seed by state. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF AGRIC., STATE Noxious-
WEED SEED REQUIREMENTS RECOGNIZED IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FEDERAL SEED
ACT, available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/lsg/seed/2004noxiousweed.pdf.
114. 7 U.S.C. § 1571(a).
115. The Federal Seed Act defines the term "kind" as "one or more related species
or subspecies which singly or collectively is known by one common name, for exam-
ple, soybean, flax, carrot, radish, cabbage, cauliflower, and so forth." 7 U.S.C.
§ 1561(11).
116. The term "variety" is a "subdivision of a kind which is characterized by growth,
plant, fruit, seed, or other characteristics by which it can be differentiated from other
sorts of the same kind, for example, Marquis wheat, Flat Dutch cabbage, Manchu
soybeans, Oxheart carrot, and so forth." 7 U.S.C. § 1561(12).
117. 7 U.S.C. § 1571(a)(1).
118. 7 U.S.C. § 1571(b)(3)(A).
119. 7U.S.C.§1571(b)(3)(C).
120. Seed companies, however, have the option of including on the label the per-
centage by weight of other agricultural seeds that comprise less than five percent of
the whole. 7 U.S.C. § 1571 (a) (8). If the seed company chooses to indicate the pres-
ence of such seeds, the label must also include the percentage of germination and
hard seed, as well as the date of the test to determine the respective percentages. 7
U.S.C. § 1571 (a) (8).
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labeled accordingly.12' GM seed is considered the "variety" of its
broader "kind" of seed. On the label, the kind and variety designation
will be the conventional kind and variety name (e.g., field corn 4513),
with Bt or similar designation added to the end of the variety name to
indicate that it is genetically modified (e.g., field corn 4513Bt).122
Failure to include the Bt (or other appropriate designation) implies
that the seed is conventional and probably would constitute a "misla-
beling" violation.' 23 With respect to adventitious presence in seeds
marketed as conventional, GM seeds would fall into the "other crop"
or "other variety" category. Therefore, if the GM variety is present in
less than five percent of the whole, designation on the label is not
required.124 On the other hand, if GM seed constitutes more than
five percent of the whole, it must be designated on the label.1 25
Enforcement of the Federal Seed Act's requirements is through
cooperative agreements with state governments.1 26 States are respon-
sible for collecting and testing seed samples for compliance with the
Federal Seed Act, as well as applicable state laws. 127 Subject to broad
federal guidelines, state seed agencies have the discretion to test how-
ever they see fit.128 For example, states may choose to test a certain
amount of each type of seed, or they may choose to test particular
companies that have mislabeled seed in the past. Violations are re-
ported to the Federal Seed Regulatory & Testing Branch of the
USDA.129 Depending upon the circumstances of each violation, the
USDA may issue a cease and desist order, impose a monetary fine,
commence a civil suit, or file criminal charges.130 However, no private
right of action exists under the Act.' 3 '
Enforcement is tempered further by a statutory-based "safe-har-
bor" provision. No violation of the Federal Seed Act's labeling re-
quirements occurs if kinds or varieties of seeds present above the five
121. Telephone interview by Brenda Menard with Richard Payne, Chief, USDA
Seed Regulatory and Testing Branch, Livestock and Seed Program, Beltsville, Md.
(June 8, 2004) [hereinafter Payne interview].
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 7 U.S.C. § 1571 (a) (1).
125. 7 U.S.C. § 1571 (a) (1).
126. See 67 Fed. Reg. at 59,769.
127. See generally 67 Fed. Reg. at 59, 769.
128. See 7 C.F.R. § 201.37 (2005).
129. See 67 Fed. Reg. at 59,769.
130. See 67 Fed. Reg. at 59,769-770 (Sept. 24, 2002) (outlining range of USDA en-
forcement options and policy of use).
131. See Ren-Dan Farms, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 952 F. Supp. 370, 374 (W.D. La.
1997).
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percent threshold 3 2 are not identified and, therefore, not included
on the label "because of their indistinguishability in appearance from
the seeds intended to be transported or delivered for transportation
in interstate commerce. 1 33 In order to qualify for the safe-harbor,
the entity charged with labeling the seeds must prove that it has taken
"reasonable precautions to insure the identity of the seeds to be that
stated" on the label.
134
At this time, the scope of the "indistinguishable in appearance"
exception is unclear as it relates to the adventitious presence of GM
seed. Detecting the presence of genetically modified DNA from cur-
rent commercially marketed varieties requires sophisticated labora-
tory analysis, such as polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing.13 5 PCR
testing, however, requires "primers" that locate and replicate the
targeted DNA within the sample. In other words, PCR testing will find
and measure known contaminants but will not identify genetically
modified DNA for which a primer is not available.' 36 Accordingly,
GM material that has not received regulatory approval "is unlikely to
be detected because the DNA sequence data is probably not available"
for comparison with the sample.' 37 If DNA sequence data is unavaila-
132. 7 U.S.C. § 1571(a)(1) (2005).
133. 7 U.S.C. § 1573(d).
134. 7 U.S.C. § 1573(d).
135. MELLON & RISSLER, supra note 8, at 18-19. Another common testing method is
the Immunoassay (ELISA) "dipstick" test. See Steven Sonka et al., Transportation, Han-
dling, and Logistical Implications of Bioengineered Grains and Oilseeds: A Prospective Analysis
22, 23 (USDA, Nov. 2000), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/tmd/lats/latsbi-
otech.pdf. The ELISA "dipstick" methods works similarly to a home pregnancy test-
ing kit. "[a] sample of grain is ground and added to a tube filled with liquid. The
dipstick is then inserted in the tube and, within 5 minutes, a positive or negative result
is indicated by a change of color." Id. at 23.
136. MELLON & RISSLER, supra note 8, at 18-21 (describing process of PCR testing).
For example, a test that is designed to detect the presence of genetically modified
DNA from Liberty Link corn (Liberty brand herbicide tolerant) would not detect the
presence of Roundup Ready corn (glyphosate tolerant corn). A separate test is re-
quired to detect each genetic modification. See Sonka et al., supra note 135, at 23.
137. Opinion of Scientific Committee on Plants, supra note 10, at 16. Because de-
tection of undesired genetically modified DNA in a sample requires the investigator
to have an analytical method in place that is capable of "routine use, with appropriate
sampling procedures and confidence limits," the Committee recommends the estab-
lishment of "an international database of DNA sequences and analytical procedures
to be able to detect unauthorized GM material." Id. This position is echoed by the
International Seed Federation. See International Seed Federation, Access to Relevant
Technology to Test the Adventitious Presence of GM Material in Non-GM Seed (2002), availa-
ble at http://www.worldseed.org/Position-papers/Acc rel-tech.htm (stating "it is es-
sential that seed companies have at their disposal for internal use the necessary
technology to test the seed they are producing").
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ble for a particular transgene, a variety containing that DNA probably
falls within the Act's safe-harbor provision. The outward appearances
of most genetically modified seeds are indistinguishable from their
conventional counterparts. The question, therefore, is whether the
agency would require PCR or other sophisticated DNA testing of seeds
to distinguish their "internal appearance" and eliminate the safe-har-
bor for companies marketing seeds with an adventitious presence of
genetically modified DNA above the five percent threshold.
2. State Seed Laws
Most state seed laws closely track the federal version and, unfortu-
nately, do not offer conventional and organic farmers any additional
protection from the adventitious presence of genetically modified
DNA in seeds. For example, the only significant difference between
the Federal Seed Act and the Illinois Seed Law1 38 is the listing of addi-
tional noxious weed seeds.13 9 As the enforcing agency for both the
federal and state seed acts in Illinois, the Illinois Department of Agri-
culture (IDOA) promulgates specific rules governing the labeling,
sampling, inspecting, analyzing, testing, and examining of seeds, and
establishes state requirements for, inter alia, seed purity and
germination.
1 40
In addition, IDOA tests official samples of seeds offered for sale
in Illinois, including GM seeds, to ensure the seeds possess the adver-
tised traits.14' IDOA occasionally tests official samples of convention-
ally labeled seed for the unintended presence of GM traits as well. In
such tests, GM traits usually account for less than one percent of the
total weight.' 42 IDOA will also test nonofficial seed samples for the
presence of GM traits on a fee basis. 143 Anecdotal evidence suggests
that seed companies generally do not request testing for the presence
138. 505 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1 et seq. (Thomson/West 2004).
139. Compare 7 C.F.R. § 201.16 (2005) with 8 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 230.20 and 230.30
(2005).
140. See 505 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/3 (2004).
141. If mislabeling with respect to a GM trait is discovered in testing (i.e., greater
than the five percent threshold), IDOA will generally send a letter to the offending
company. Historically, there has been very little problem in Illinois because few com-
panies label incorrectly. Telephone interview by Brenda Menard with Mike Simpson,
State Seed Analyst, IDOA, Certified Seed Analyst/Association of Official Seed Analysts
(June 29, 2004 and July 16, 2004).
142. Telephone interview by Brenda Menard with Mike Simpson, State Seed Ana-
lyst, IDOA, Certified Seed Analyst/Association of Official Seed Analysts (July 23,
2004) [hereinafter Interview with Mike Simpson].
143. See 8 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 230.80 (2005).
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of GM seeds in conventional seeds.1 44 Farmers, however, have re-
quested such tests with results varying from 0.5 percent up to 5 per-
cent of the total weight.145
A few states have modified their respective seed laws to account
for the advent of GMOs. Vermont House Bill 777, effective October
1, 2004, amended Vermont's seed laws to require "identification of
seeds that have been genetically engineered."1 46 Labels accompany-
ing seeds containing GM material must specify the identity and rele-
vant traits of the seed, requirements for safe handling, transport and
use, and the contact point for further information. 147 It is unclear as
of this writing whether the state will set a tolerance level for the adven-
titious presence of GM seed. In its current form, a literal reading of
the statute appears to impose a zero tolerance (or at least the detecta-
ble limit of 0.1 percent) for labeling. If the standard holds, the Ver-
mont law will be the first of its kind in the United States to require
labeling for adventitious presence below the 5 percent threshold.
148
State seed purity enforcement agencies in two other states, Ken-
tucky and Mississippi, have taken first steps in dealing with GM seed.
In Kentucky, the Division of Regulatory Services is testing old samples
of conventional seed to determine the level of adventitious presence
of GM seed as time and money permits. 149 Initial reports indicate
"not a significant amount" of adventitious GM presence in the old
samples.' 50 In 2000, Mississippi amended its Pure Seed Law to in-
clude "transgenic seeds" in its definition of "agricultural seeds.''
1 1
Transgenic seeds are also mentioned specifically in the seed law as
something that the Commissioner of Agriculture and Commerce
144. Perhaps this is because many large seed companies conduct testing in-house
and other companies may not want to alert regulatory authorities to potential
problems.
145. See Telephone Interview with Mike Simpson, supra note 142.
146. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 611(c) (supp. 2004).
147. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 644(a) (4) (supp. 2004).
148. Maine also modified its seed labeling laws to require seed dealers selling GM
seed to include instructions on how to reduce the chances of contaminating non-GM
crops. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1052 (1964). The statute, however, does not
mandate that the farmer follow the instructions or require implementation of meth-
ods to reduce the chance of adventitious presence. Moreover, there is no labeling
requirement for adventitious presence below the five percent threshold.
149. Telephone interview by Brenda Menard with David Buckingham, Coordinator,
Seed Regulatory Program, Kentucky Division of Regulatory Services (July 12, 2004).
150. Id. Interestingly, Kentucky informally considers Roundup Ready soybeans a
"trait" of a variety and not an independent variety that would trigger labeling require-
ments. Id.
151. Miss. CODE ANN. § 69-3-1 (1972).
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should sample, test, and analyze.1 52 Within the Mississippi Depart-
ment of Agriculture and Commerce, the Bureau of Plant Industry is
responsible for seed purity and conducts tests for the presence of
Roundup Ready seeds (soybean and cotton) on request and, occasion-
ally, on official samples.' 53 As of mid-September 2004, there were no
violations of the seed purity laws in Mississippi as a result of adventi-
tious presence of GM seed.154 Violations, however, are only instances
in which adventitious presence exceeds five percent-well above the
thresholds required for export to the E.U.
In sum, a few states have taken small steps regarding adventitious
presence and seed labeling. Other states have proposed legislation
designed to reduce admixture but not necessarily seed labeling.
1 55 It
remains to be seen whether the Vermont approach will have a signifi-
cant effect on seed labeling practices in other states.
IV. RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO DOMESTIC SEED LAWS TO
ENSURE COEXISTENCE
Absent a consensus on labeling and tolerance levels (0.9 percent
in the European Union versus 5 percent in the United States), the
domestic agricultural community will face continued uncertainty and
will have to navigate a patchwork of questionably effective regulations.
Producers wishing to market products to traditional trading partners
such as the European Union will have to comply with the higher end-
product standards while using inputs (i.e., seeds) with less stringent
tolerance levels. 156 For the most part, federal decision makers have
152. MISS. CODE ANN. § 69-3-19 (1972).
153. Telephone interview by Brenda Menard with Lee Daughtry, Director of Seed
Division, Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce (Sept. 10, 2004).
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1052 (discussing Maine's labeling require-
ments); S. & Assem. B. 2761, 226th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003) (requiring seed dealer
to provide written instructions to farmer on how to prevent cross-pollination of GM
seed and imposing strict liability on the farmer for failing to follow the instructions);
S. & Assem. 10094, 227th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003) (requiring anyone who "uses,
grows or produces GMO seed... [to] inform any landowner located within two miles
... or such distance as the pollen of such GMO seed species is determined by the
commissioner to travel, whichever is greater"); H.R.B. 150, 82d Leg. Sess. (Minn.
2001) (requiring seller of GM seed to provide purchaser with written instructions to
prevent cross-pollination with conventional seeds and requiring seed manufacturer to
mail a notification to neighboring farmers of the purchaser's intent to grow GM
seed); H.B. 1415, 92d Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2004) (requiring manufacturer
or seed dealer to provide instructions on how to avoid "cross contamination").
156. See Peter W.B. Phillips, Traceability and Trade of Genetically Modified Foods, in
NAT'L AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, BIOTECHNOLOGY: SCIENCE & SOCIErY
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done little to address this problem; instead these agencies have been
focusing their efforts on opposing, without success, trading partners'
labeling rules.157 A federal bill introduced in 2003 garnered little at-
tention but represented an important first step in addressing adventi-
tious presence of genetically modified DNA.'5 8 The bill would
require sellers of seeds to provide instructions on measures to avoid
"cross-contamination" for crops considered "outcrossed pol-
linators."' 59 More importantly, the law would prevent the labeling of
seed as non-GM if samples of seed contained genetically modified
DNA. 160 Although Vermont's new seed purity law incorporated this
concept, it remains to be seen whether other state legislatures will fol-
low Vermont's proactive approach and enact similar seed labeling
laws. In the interim, the National Corn Growers Association re-
quested that "seed companies make available the percent of trans-
genic purity of seed labeled, promoted, and sold as non-genetically
modified."161
In conjunction with voluntary labeling by seed sellers, a more
complete study of the extent of adventitious presence should be un-
dertaken to assess the nature and scope of the problem. Assuming a
full study confirms the preliminary results of the Union of Concerned
Scientists' investigation 62 and the domestic seed supply is contami-
nated with low levels of genetically modified DNA, federal and state
lawmakers and seed regulatory agencies should take affirmative steps
to restore the integrity of the seed production system and revise ex-
isting labeling laws to provide conventional and organic farmers accu-
rate information.
Although adventitious presence thresholds below one percent
may be difficult to achieve without an increase in costs to the seed
breeders163 (and, therefore, the end user), it is essential to have clear
labeling standards to allow farmers to purchase seed with the poten-
tial to yield a harvested crop that will meet the import standards of
AT A CROSSROAD 141, 146 (2003), available at http://nabc.cals.cornell.edu/pubs/
nabc15/chapters/Phillips.pdf.
157. See generally, Redick & Adrian, supra note 22 (discussing whether European
traceability and labeling restrictions are unlawful trade barriers and the United States'
WTO challenge to the European Union's rules).
158. See H.R. 2918, 108th Congress (2003).
159. See H.R. 2918.
160. See H.R. 2918.
161. National Corn Growers Association, supra note 47, at 2; see also MELLON &
RISSLER, supra note 8, at 56.
162. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
163. See International Seed Federation, Motion on Adventitious Presence of GM Material
in non-GM Seeds (2001).
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major trading partners and the purity demanded by consumers of
identity-preserved and organic products. Seed purity standards
should be set according to sound science and at a level that considers
the degree of potential post-planting admixture. Proposed standards
developed by the E.U.'s Scientific Committee on Plants of 0.3 percent
for corn and 0.5 percent for soybeans provides a starting point for
discussion and further evaluation.
164
In order to meet the requirements of any new labeling rules, how-
ever, seed companies and testing agencies must have the necessary
technology (e.g., primers for PCR analysis) to test for the adventitious
presence of genetically modified DNA.165 An international database
of genetically modified DNA and testing procedures (including test-
ing material for genetic engineering events that have not yet received
final regulatory approval)166 should be compiled, and maintained in a
manner that preserves the intellectual property and trade secrets of
the seed developers.
167
Another helpful revision at the federal level would be elimination
of the safe-harbor provision with respect to GM varieties. Elimination
of the safe-harbor, however, would not a priori ensure coexistence but
could provide at least a limited incentive for seed companies to test
for the adventitious presence of genetically modified DNA in their
seed inventory.
Finally, the agricultural production system has faced similar chal-
lenges in the past and crafted workable solutions. Coexistence is pos-
sible to obtain and will require similar creativity on the part of the
world's farmers and policymakers. A new look at seed laws is a logical,
and necessary, first step.
164. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text (discussing recommended seed
purity thresholds).
165. See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text (describing difficulties of con-
ducting testing for DNA originating from genetic engineering).
166. See Opinion of Scientific Committee on Plants, supra note 10, at 16.
167. See International Seed Federation, supra note 137.
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EUROPEAN UNION FOOD LAW UPDATE
By Nicole Coutrelis*
The purpose of this update is to present the main events that
have taken place each six months in the food law sector in the Euro-
pean Union (E.U.). This presentation will cover June through De-
cember 2004, but is not exhaustive. This update will not include
detailed discussions of regulations, such as authorizations of new addi-
tives for animal feed or registrations of new geographic names. In-
stead it will concentrate on fundamental topics and focus on food,
which excludes from our scope questions regarding the management
of agricultural products (Common Agricultural Policy, or CAP). How-
ever, some questions which legally pertain to the CAP (such as specifi-
cation or presentation of some agricultural products when they are
delivered to the final consumer) will be addressed when it appears
they are relevant for those who are involved in food law.
Within each issue, the presentation of this update will follow the
same pattern. The update will be divided into four main sections:
published regulations, pending draft regulations, cases, and other rel-
evant news.
I. PUBLISHED REGULATIONS
1. General Food Law and the European Food Safety Authority
On August 25, 2004, the Commission published a decision creat-
ing an advisory group concerned with food and feed safety, food and
feed labeling and presentation, human nutrition, animal health and
welfare, and various matters related to crops and seeds.1 This advisory
group will be composed of representatives from European bodies with
* Nicole Coutrelis is an attorney for Coutrelis & Associes in Brussels, Belgium
and Paris, France. Her practice focuses on litigation and lobbying efforts in the area
of food law. She serves as Secretary General of the European Food Law Association
and the International Wine Law Association, and she is a member of the Paris Bar
Association, the International Bar Assocation, the Food and Drug Law Institute and
the Defense Research Institute. She has taught several courses and published many
articles on the subject of food law in the European Union.
1. Commission Decision 2004/613, 2004 OJ. (L 275) 17.
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the objective of protecting the interests of the various fields covered
by food legislation, such as industry, retailers, and consumers. 2 It re-
places the former Advisory Committee on Foodstuffs.3 Applications
for membership were initiated in September,4 but the composition of
the group had not been announced as of the submission of this article
for publication.
On December 24, 2004, the Commission published a regulation
"laying down detailed rules for the implementation of the European
Parliament and Council Regulation 178/2002 with regard to the net-
work of organisations operating in the fields within the European
Food Safety Authority's [EFSA] mission."5 This regulation lays down
the basic rules governing the Member States's authorities, which form
part of the network related to EFSA (i.e., national Food Safety Agen-
cies) and the functioning of such network. The objective of this net-
work is to assist EFSA in scientific tasks which can be distributed
among those entities according to their competence. 6 The regulation




Since GMOs have been removed from the scope of the "novel
food" regulation s by the enforcement of Regulation 1829/2003, 9 this
section only deals with non-GM novel foods.
On December 11, 2004, the Commission published a decision au-
thorizing the marketing of milk-based beverages with added phytoster-
ols as novel foods.10 Phytosterols, which are well-known for their
cholesterol lowering effects, were not on the E.U. market before May
1997, which was the effective date for the "novel food" regulation.
Therefore, products containing phytosterols have been subject to the
2. Decision 2004/613, 2004 OJ. (L 275) at 18 (limiting the group to forty-five
members).
3. Decision 2004/613, 2004 OJ. (L 275) at 17.
4. Decision 2004/613, 2004 OJ. (L 275) at 18.
5. Commission Regulation 2230/2004, 2004 OJ. (L 379) 64.
6. Regulation 2230/2004, 2004 o.J. (L 379) at 65.
7. Regulation 2230/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 379) at 65-66.
8. Parliament and Council Regulation 258/97, 1997 OJ. (L 43) 2 (defining a
novel food as a food or food ingredient that was not used for "human consumption to
a significant degree" within the E.U. before May 1997).
9. Council Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 OJ. (L 268) 1, 2 (stating that, for the
most part, "foods covered by an authorisation granted under this Regulation will be
exempted from the requirements... concerning novel foods and novel food ingredi-
ents" and referencing some specific exceptions).
10. Commission Decision 2004/845, 2004 oJ. (L 366) 14.
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novel food procedure and must obtain pre-market approval based on
a scientific dossier.11 The first authorization was delivered in July
2000 for margarine. 12 Considering the development of such prod-
ucts, the Commission also adopted a general regulation regarding the
labeling of food and food ingredients with added phytosterols in or-
der to avoid excessive intake.13 With the present decision, the Com-
mission has granted an approval for the marketing of milk drinks
where the milk fat has been partially or fully replaced by vegetable fat,
provided certain conditions are met regarding their composition.14
3. Genetically Modified Organisms
On September 18, 2004, the Commission published a decision
"concerning the placing on the market.., of a maize product (Zea
mays L. line NK603) genetically modified for glyphosate tolerance."'15
This decision authorized the importation of a new variety of GM
maize, and is the first authorization since Directive 2001/18 "on the
deliberate release of genetically modified organisms into the environ-
ment" became effective. 16 For political reasons, this Decision was ex-
tremely difficult to reach because there was not a sufficient majority of
Member States in support of the authorization, which had been re-
quested by Spain and proposed by the Commission. The decision had
to be sent to the Council, but since a majority was not reached at the
Council, the latter did not make decision there either. According to
the "Comitology" procedure, the Commission then took the decision
itself despite the lack of majority in support of its decision.
It is important to note that the scope of this decision and its prac-
tical effect are extremely limited. The authorization is only for impor-
tation of the products and for use in animal feed only; the product
was not authorized for cultivation or for use in food for human con-
sumption. Furthermore, the entry into force of the decision was
delayed until the product was also authorized for human food. On
11. See Regulation 258/97, 1997 O.J. (L 43) at 4.
12. Commission Decision 2000/500, 2000 O.J. (L 200) 59.
13. Commission Regulation 608/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 97) 44.
14. The Commission issued four decisions on March 31, 2004 that authorized
products enriched with phytosterols/phytostanols. See Commission Decision 2004/
333, 2004 O.J. (L 105) 40; Commission Decision 2004/334, 2004 O.J. (L 105) 43;
Commission Decision 2004/335, 2004 O.J. (L 105) 45; Commission Decision 2004/
336, 2004 O.J. (L 105) 49.
15. Commission Decision 2004/643, 2004 O.J. (L 295) 35.
16. Council Directive 2001/18, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1. This Directive replaced Coun-
cil Directive 90/220, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15.
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October 26, 2004, the Commission announced that the authorization
for food use had also been granted. 17
On November 24, 2004, the Commission published a Recommen-
dation, dated October 4, 2004 "on technical guidance for sampling
and detection of genetically modified organisms and material pro-
duced from genetically modified organisms as or in products in the
context of Regulation 1830/2003."1s Regulation 1830/2003 on trace-
ability and labeling of GMOs provides for controls and inspections to
be undertaken by the Member States on all GM products-whether
they are produced within the Community or imported, whether for
domestic consumption or for exportation. 19 The Regulation also
states that the Commission should provide guidance on sampling and
testing to help the Member States undertake this task. Although the
guidance issued in November is not legally binding, as it is a "recom-
mendation" and not a decision or a Regulation, it certainly provides a
basis on which the Member States should rely and which should pro-
vide some legal certainty to operators. This document provides pre-
cise indications as to the sampling and makes reference to certain
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards.
However, it is also acknowledged that there may be several methods
for the detection and quantification of GMOs, and that there may well
be situations where no validated method exists. Therefore, despite
this Recommendation, it is not certain that all litigation regarding the
presence of GMOs (or of a particular GMO event) in a lot will be
avoided.
4. Food Contact Material
On November 13, 2004, the European Parliament and Council
published Regulation 1935/2004 of October 27, 2004 "on materials
and articles intended to come into contact with food."20 This regula-
tion entered into force on December 3, 2004, has replaced Directive
80/590 (which introduced a symbol that may accompany materials
and articles in contact with food) and Directive 89/109 (which dis-
cussed the laws of the Member States related to materials that come
into contact with foodstuffs). This new Regulation lays down funda-
mental rules governing food contact material (including packaging)
and states that certain specific materials are subject to other directives
17. See Press Release, European Commission, Genetically Modified NK603 Maize
Authorised for both Food and Feed (IP/04/1305, Oct. 26, 2004).
18. Commission Recommendation 2004/787, 2004 OJ. (L 348) 18.
19. Parliament and Council Regulation 1830/2003, 2003 OJ. (L 268) 24.
20. Parliament and Council Regulation 1935/2004, 2004 OJ. (L 338) 4.
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(for example Directive 2002/72 "related to plastic material and arti-
cles intended to come into contact with foodstuffs"). Thus previous
directives will remain in application, even though they may need to be
amended according to new principles laid down in Regulation 1935/
2004.
One of the most important modifications introduced by Regula-
tion 1935/2004 is the reference to new categories of packaging mate-
rial known as "active and intelligent materials and articles." "Active
materials and articles" are defined as "articles and materials that are
intended to extend the shelf-life or to maintain or improve the condi-
tions of packaged food. They are designed to deliberately incorporate
components that would release or absorb substances into or from the
packaged food or the environment surrounding the food."21 "Intelli-
gent materials and articles" are defined as "materials and articles
which monitor the condition of packaging food or the environment
surrounding the food."22 The specificity of such material is that they
may release substances into the food, which is contrary to the tradi-
tional principle that food packages must be inert, and must not
change the composition of the food or cause a deterioration in the
food's organoleptic properties. 23
"Active and intelligent materials" may now bring changes to the
composition or the organoleptic properties of food, provided that
they are not used to mislead the consumer. For example, they may
not be used to mask a defect or a spoilage. More specific rules may be
adopted in the future. In the meantime, the substances released into
food are considered ingredients, and must therefore comply with gen-
eral rules regarding additives and ingredients.
5. Contaminants
On October 22, 2004, the Commission published a Recommen-
dation "on the monitoring of background levels of dioxins and dioxin-
like PCBs in foodstuffs."24 This text has to be read within the general
context regarding dioxins, furans, and PCB-type dioxins in food-di-
oxins and furans are currently subject to maximum levels, 25 but PCB-
type dioxins are not yet subject to maximum levels because there was
21. See Regulation 1935/2004, 2004 o.J. (L 338) at 7.
22. See Regulation 1935/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 338) at 7.
23. Regulation 1935/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 338) at 4-6.
24. Commission Recommendation 2004/705, 2004 O.J. (L 321) 45. The term
PCBs refers to polychlorinated biphenyls, a type of synthetic organic materials sus-
pected to have harmful effects.
25. See Recommendation 2004/705, 2004 O.J. (L 321) at 45.
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no sufficient information available. The Recommendation, which in-
cludes the possibility of fixing maximum levels for PCB-type dioxins, is
to be reviewed by December 31, 2006. In the meantime, Member
States are asked to monitor the situation by taking samples and analy-
sis in their own territories. The Recommendation addresses each cat-
egory of foodstuffs in each Member State, and gives an indication of
the minimum samples to be analyzed each year. It also provides a
format to register the results and communicate them to the Commis-
sion. The Member States are also encouraged to analyze other types
of PCB residues. The ten new E.U. Member States thatjoined on May
1, 2004 are not yet included in the list of minimum samples to be
performed by each country, but they are encouraged to participate in
the program as soon as possible.
On December 22, 2004, the Commission published Directive
2004/115 "amending Directive 90/642 regarding the maximum levels
for certain pesticide residues fixed therein."26 New maximum resi-
dues have been fixed and will enter into application on June 23, 2005.
The relevant substances are: methomyl, thiodicarb, myclobutanil,
maneb group, fenpropimorph, metalaxyl, metalaxyl-m, penconazole,
iprovalicarb, azoxystrobin and fenhexamid. The regulated foods in-
clude fruit, nuts, vegetables, pulses, oil seed, and potatoes.
6. Organic Farming
On December 29, 2004, the Commission published Regulation
2254/2004 "amending Regulation 2092/2001 on organic production
of agricultural products and indication referring thereto on agricul-
tural products and foodstuffs." 27 This Regulation allows the introduc-
tion of non-organic pullets for organic egg production under certain
conditions. Such derogation had already been granted as a transi-
tional measure in 2003, and the Commission accepted that there was a
need for the renewal of such derogation.
7. Specific Products: Wine and Eggs
Commission Regulations 1427/2004 and 1428/2004 of August 9,
2004, both amended Regulation 1622/2000 "laying down certain de-
tailed rules for implementing Regulation 1493/1999 on the common
organisation of the market in wine and establishing a Community
Code of oenological practices and processes."28 The Regulation also
26. Commission Directive 2004/115, 2004 OJ. (L 374) 64.
27. Commission Regulation 2254/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 385) 20.
28. Commission Regulation 1427/2004, 2004 OJ. (L 263) 3; Commission Regula-
tion 1428/2004, 2004 OJ. (L 263) 7.
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allowed for new categories of practices and new varieties of wines (for
instance, taking into account the manufacturing practices for Tokaj in
Hungary). At the same time, E.U. regulations were amended to intro-
duce new categories of wines in some other Member States, and to
take into account the specificities of "icewines" from Canada.
Commission Regulation 1429/2004 of August 9, 2004 was also
adopted, "amending Regulation 753/2002 laying down certain rules
for applying Council Regulation 1493/1999 as regards the descrip-
tion, designation, presentation and protection of certain wine sector
products."29 This Regulation amended the list of Community wines
bearing a geographical indication and particularly, but not exclu-
sively, addressed wines from the ten new Member States.
Another regulation regarding wine was published on November
20, 2004.30 The purpose was to apply the general rule requiring com-
pulsory labeling of allergens in foodstuffs to the wine sector. Wines
must now indicate the presence of allergens, even though they are not
generally required to list all of the ingredients on the label. The list
includes sulphur dioxide and sulphites at certain concentrations. In
such cases, wine labels should bear the term "contains" followed by
"sulphites" or "sulphur dioxide."
The Commission published Regulation 1515/2004 on August 26,
2004 "amending Reg. 2295/2003 introducing detailed rules for imple-
menting Council Regulation 1907/90 on certain marking standards
for eggs. '31 Some conditions of transportation, control, and marking
of eggs have been modified in order to improve traceability and avoid
frauds related to the destination of eggs (eggs destined to the industry
are subject to less marking obligation than those destined to the final
consumer). Surveillance measures were implemented for eggs im-
ported from third countries.
8. International Trade
On December 23, 2004, the Council published its Decision of
February 24, 2004 "concerning the conclusion, on behalf of the Euro-
pean Community, of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Re-
sources for Food and Agriculture.
'3 2 According to this Decision the
Council of the European Community deposited instruments of ap-
proval to the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO), who is the Depositary of the Treaty. The Member States
29. Commission Regulation 1429/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 263) 11.
30. Commission Regulation 1991/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 344) 9.
31. Commission Regulation 1515/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 278) 7.
32. Council Decision 2004/869, 2004 O.J. (L 378) 1.
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of the Community were also invited to deposit their own instruments
of ratification by March 31, 2004. Nine Member States had ratified as
of January 2005 (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).
On July 13, 2004, the Council published its Decision of June 21,
2004 "on the signing of the European Convention for the protection
of animals during international transport.133 This Decision authorizes
the President of the Council to designate the person empowered to
sign said Convention on behalf of the European Community. The
Convention is a revised version of the Convention of 1968. Parties to
the new Convention are members of the Council of Europe. The
Council of the European Union simultaneously adopted a new regula-
tion 34 on the protection of animals during transport which takes into
account this revised Convention. Comments on that new regulation,
published on January 5, 2005, will be provided in the next issue of the
Journal of Food Law & Policy.
On December 23, 2004, the Commission published a Decision of
November 19, 2004 "terminating the examination procedure concern-
ing obstacles to trade consisting of trade practices maintained by Ca-
nada in relation to certain geographical indications for wines. ''35 This
decision puts an end to a procedure that was initiated in December
2001, following a complaint lodged with the Commission by the Bor-
deaux wine producers regarding the Canadian Trademarks Act.
Under the Canadian Act, the words "Bordeaux," "Mdoc," and "Me-
doc" were considered generic, which the French producers and the
Commission considered an infringement to the standstill clause con-
tained in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) Agreement. Following a bilateral agreement between Ca-
nada and the European Community, which was initiated in April 2003
and entered into force on June 1, 2004, these three words have been
removed from the Canadian list of generic names. The Commission
has thus closed its "examination procedure.
'3 6
On December 23, 2004 the Commission published a regulation
"establishing the allocation of export licences for cheese to be ex-
ported to the United States in 2005 under certain [General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade] GATT quotas."37 Quotas for the import
33. Council Decision 2004/544, 2004 O.J. (L 241) 21.
34. Parliament and Council Regulation 1/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 3) 1.
35. Commission Decision 2004/891, 2004 O.J. (L 375) 28.
36. The publication of Decision 2004/891 annuls and replaces a previous publica-
tion of the same decision which had been issued on November 30, 2004. Decision
2004/891, 2004 O.J. (L 375) at 30.
37. Commission Regulation 2221/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 375) 9.
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of E.U. cheeses into the United States have been established under
the Uruguay Round and the Tokyo Round, and these quotas are allo-
cated each year to E.U. exporters following a call for applications. 38
Since the demand for export licenses has been much higher than the
quantities available in most categories, high reduction coefficients
have been adopted (from 0.12 to 0.83 depending on the categories of
cheese) and preference has been given to those operators who had
previously exported to the United States.
On July 28, 2004, the Commission published a Decision "amend-
ing Decision 92/452 as regards embryo collection teams in the United
States of America." 9 Two new United States entities (Lutz Brookview
Farm in Fairfield, Kentucky and Cashton Veterinary Clinic in Cashton,
Wisconsin) were added to the list of places from which bovine em-
bryos can be imported into the E.U. Import of such material from
third countries is subject to official approval from the veterinary ser-
vices for obvious sanitary reasons.
On August 19, 2004 the Commission published a regulation
"amending Annex XI to Regulation 999/2001 as regards the import
of cervid products from Canada and the United States."' 40 Following
reported cases of chronic wasting disease involving farm-raised and
wild deer and elk in Canada and the United States, the importation of
meat and meat preparations from cervid products are subject to a spe-
cific declaration issued by official authorities stating that the products
have tested negative for that disease. This regulation is only applica-
ble to meat and meat products since the importation of live animals,
semen, ova, and embryos is already prohibited. The Regulation be-
came effective on January 1, 2005.
II. PENDING DRAFT REGULATIONS
1. Labeling: Health Claims
A proposal laid down by the Commission in July, 2003 for the
"regulation on nutrition and health claims made on foods," has been
intensively debated.41 The current law provides only two basic rules
for health claims: claims should not mislead the consumer, and
should not make disease-related claims. These rules are subject only
to a posteriori controls in most Member States.
38. Commission Regulation 1847/2004, 2004 OJ. (L 322) 19 (opening the alloca-
tion procedure for export licenses).
39. Commission Decision 2004/568, 2004 OJ. (L 252) 5.
40. Commission Regulation 1471/2004, 2004 OJ. (L 271) 24.
41. Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Nutrition and
Health Claims Made on Foods, COM(2003)424 final at 2.
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In contrast, the proposal provides for a much more comprehen-
sive and stringent set of rules. The main idea is that claims will only
be authorized if they are provided for in the regulation (such as nutri-
tion claims), or upon individual approval following a scientific dossier
for the strongest claims (such as risk reduction claims). Claims ad-
dressed to children would be banned, as would claims related to prod-
ucts which do not meet a "nutritional profile" based on the sugar, salt
and fat content of the product. The Commission also agreed that
claims that are "too vague" (such as those regarding well-being in gen-
eral) should be banned, as well as claims related to slimming proper-
ties (except for express authorizations). The proposed regulation has
to be approved by the Council and the Parliament following a com-
plex and long procedure.
In the past few months the Parliament and the Council have
asked for many improvements to the proposed regulation regarding
health claims. The discussions were initially delayed because of the
changes in the E.U. Parliament (elections) and in the Commission
(renewal of the Commission in December 2004). On November 4,
2004, however, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy of
the European Parliament issued a draft opinion that was extremely
critical of the Commission view. The opinion rejects the very idea of
prior approval for claims, the banning of "vague" and behavioral
claims, and the concept of nutritional profiles which were perceived
as contrary to the idea of a balanced diet. This opinion also empha-
sizes that there is no legal vacuum for the proposed regulation to fill
since there are laws prohibiting false and misleading advertising.
However, such an opinion is not decisive because it does not come
from the Parliament Committee that was first in charge of this pro-
ject-the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food
Safety. This latter Committee was less critical of the basic principles of
the Commission proposal, although it did suggest many
amendments. 42
42. European Parliament Committee on the Environment, Public Health and
Food Safety, Draft Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council on Nutrition and Health Claims Made on Foods, COM
(2003)0424 - C5-0329/2003 - 2003/0165 (COD), available at http://www.europarl.eu.
int/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/PR/553/553203/553203en.pdf.
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2. Additives
On October 11, 2004, the Commission issued a proposal for
amending previous Council Directives on additives and sweeteners. 43
The purpose of the proposal was to revise existing authorizations for
specific additives, authorize new additives, and extend the use of other
additives.
If the proposal is adopted, the level of nitrates and nitrites used
in meat processing will be lowered and based on the incorporated
dose rather than the residual dose. Two additives will also be sup-
pressed (E 216 and E 217), and there will be a ban on the use of a
number of jelling agents used in mini-cups due to the risk of suffoca-
tion (E 400, E 401, E 402, E 403, E 404, E 406, E 407, E 410, E 412, E
413, E 414, E 415, E 417 and E 418). This last proposal follows a
decision taken by the Commission in February 2002 to withdraw jelly
mini-cups containing Konjac, and all jelly mini-cups in April 2004.
4 4
The Commission also proposes to authorize several new additives:
Erythritol (a new polyol, which will also be authorized as a sweetener),
4-hexylrdsorcinol (for preventing black stains on shell-fish), and Soy-
bean Hemicellulose and Ethylcellulose (already authorized for
medicines, and which would be authorized for encapsulating food
supplements and flavours). Additionally, an extension of use would
be granted to some additives which are already authorized (E 500ii for
some cheeses, E 200-203 and E 210-213 for all shell-fish, and E 551 for





In two judgments dated December 14, 2004,4 5 the Court ruled
that a deposit and return system for the recovery of waste packaging
(such as packaging used for drinks and mineral water) was justified by
the need to protect the environment. However, it also decided that
Germany had violated the rules governing the free movement of
43. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive
95/2/EC on Food Additives Other Than Colours and Sweeteners and Directive 94/
35/EC on Sweeteners for Use in Foodstuffs, COM(04)650 final.
44. Commission Decision 2002/247, 2002 O.J. (L 84) 69; Commission Decision
2004/374, 2004 O.J. (L 118) 70.
45. Case C-463/01, Commission v. Germany, Case C-309/02, Radlberger Ge-
trankegesellschaft mbH & Co., S Spitz KG v. Land Baden Wurttemberg.
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goods within the E.U. by installing such a system without a sufficient
transitional period, thus causing disproportionate obstacles to the op-
erators. This is a new illustration of a well-known principle in E.U.
law, which states that any measure which restricts intra-community
trade should be balanced with the principle of proportionality and
must not cause more obstacles to trade than strictly necessary.
B. Geographical Names
By an Order delivered on July 6, 2004,46 the Court of the First
Instance (CFI) put an end to a long dispute related to the protection
of the name "Feta," which has been restricted to Greek cheeses.
Feta-or cheese marketed under this name-has been manufactured
and sold in several Member States, but Greece has always claimed that
it was a traditional name and the use should be restricted to Greek
cheese. After a long dispute and a first Judgment of the Court on
March 16, 199947 which annulled the registration of the name as an
Appellation of Origin restricted to Greece, 48 the Commission adopted
a new regulation on October 14, 2002 that once again restricted the
name to Greek cheeses. 49 The 2002 regulation was challenged before
the court once again. As a part of this challenge, several German
companies claimed the regulation unlawful. However, without con-
sidering the merits of the case, the Court declared the applicants inad-
missible. This ruling fully complies with the consistent case law of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ), which has held that individuals-as
opposed to Member States-are not permitted to directly challenge
regulations.
C. Trademarks
On November 10, 2004,50 the CFI confirmed a Decision of the
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OAIM), which re-
fused the registration of two three-dimensional trademarks composed
of the shape of a sweet and that of a sweet wrapper for the candies
known as "Werther's Original." These shapes were considered not
distinctive enough for candies, and the Court considered, inter alia,
whether the market share of manufacturer, August Storck, is based
46. Case T-370/02, Alpenhain-Camembert-Werk v. Commission.
47. The Court issued three decisions related to this issue. See Case C-289/96, Case
C-293/96, Case C-299/96, Denmark v. Commission.
48. Commission Regulation 1107/96, 1996 O.J. (L 148) 1.
49. Commission Regulation 1829/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 277) 10.
50. Case T-402/02, August Storck KG v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal
Market.
[VOL. 1:21 9
EUROPEAN UNION FOOD LAW UPDATE
more upon the name, Werther's Original, which is well-known, than
upon the shape of the candies.
By a judgment of November 16, 2004,51 the ECJ ruled on a num-
ber of interesting points regarding the interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement within the Community as it relates to a conflict between a
beer producer from outside the Community and a distributor in Fin-
land. The Court first considered whether the TRIPS Agreement was
applicable to a trademark dispute that arose before the entry into
force of the TRIPS Agreement and continued after the enforcement
date. The Court also stated that a trade name may be a "sign" within
the meaning of the TRIPS Agreement, thus it may be compared with
the trademark and prohibited if its use may prejudice the essential
function of the trademark. However, the Court also stated that a
trade name, even one that is not registered or established by use in a
Member State, may be regarded as a prior-existing trade name, assum-
ing the proprietor of that trade name had a right to this claim under
the TRIPS Agreement prior to the trademark it is alleged to infringe.
This is a question of fact to be examined by the national judge in a
trademark case.
D. Food Supplements
In ajudgment rendered on October 28, 2004, the ECJ ruled that
Austria had infringed European Community law (specifically art. 28 of
the Treaty on Free Movement of Goods) by prohibiting the sale of
food supplements by mail order.
E. Specific Products: Milk Products
By a judgment of October 28, 2004,52 the ECJ provided explana-
tions as to the definition of "milk products" referred to in Directive
92/46, for the purpose of veterinary controls on the occasion of im-
portation within the E.U. The Court ruled that "milk for the manu-
facture of milk-based products" does not include milk constituents of
a product which also contains non-milk constituents in those situa-
tions where those constituents cannot be separated. The Court also
ruled that "milk-based products" included semi-finished products to
be delivered to the industry. In order to assess whether semi-finished
products are "milk-based products," a court must consider the propor-
tion of milk, the use of the product, and its taste. The products at
51. Case C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Budejovicky Budvar, narodni podnik.
52. Case C-124/03, Artrada NV v. Rijksdienst voor de kuering van Vee en Viees.
2005]
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
stake were a mixture of sugar, cocoa and skimmed-milk powder im-
ported from Aruba.
F. Advertising of Alcoholic Drinks and Tobacco
By a judgment of July 13, 2004,5 3 the ECJ ruled that France was
allowed to prohibit "indirect advertising" of alcohol when the adver-
tisements appeared on the television screen during the retransmission
of bi-national sporting events taking place in other Member States.
Such a national rule has been declared infringing neither the specific
directive on television broadcasting 54 nor article 49 of the Treaty on
the Freedom to Provide Services. 55
Also, in two judgments rendered on December 14, 2004,56 the
ECJ confirmed that the prohibition on tobacco products for oral use,
introduced by Council Directive 92/41 of May 15, 1992, 5 7 was valid
and not disproportionate to the purpose of protecting public health.
G. International Trade
By a judgment of December 14, 2004,58 the ECJ confirmed a
Commission decision not to take action against the retaliatory mea-
sures taken by the United States in relation to "prepared mustard"
imported from France. This case takes place within the broad context
of the "hormone" dispute which began in 1999 when the United
States was authorized by the Dispute Settlement Body of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) to suspend tariff concessions, and to im-
pose one hundred percent duties, on some products, including pre-
pared mustard. The United States imposed these duties, but decided
not to suspend tariff concessions with the United Kingdom. The
French mustard producers believed the selective nature of those retal-
iatory measures to be contrary to the Trade Barriers Regulation
(TBR). The Commission had opened an examination procedure for
mustard, foie gras, Roquefort, and shallots, all of which were subject
to the retaliatory measures. However, the Commission later termi-
nated the procedure because it determined that the Unites States's
53. Case C-429/02, Bacardi France SAS v. Television francaise 1 SA.
54. Council Directive 89/552, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23.
55. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C 325) 54 (2002).
56. Case C-210/03, Swedish Match AB v. Secretary of State for Health; Case C-434/
02, Arnold Andre GmbH & Co. KG v. Landrat des Kreises Herford.
57. Council Directive 92/41, 1992 O.J. (L 158) 30.
58. Case T-317/02, Fdration des Industries condimentaires de France v.
Commission.
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measures did not cause adverse trade effects within the meaning of
the TBR. The CFI backed this decision, finding that the French mus-
tard producers did not demonstrate that, in the absence of the dero-
gation in favor of the United Kingdom, they would have significantly
increased their exports to the United States. The CFI also recalled
that in such cases the Commission has a duty to balance the interests
of the parties involved against those of the Community in general.
2. Conclusions of Advocate General
On December 16, 2004, Advocate General Jacobs delivered his
opinion in a case involving the prohibition on the use of the word
"Tocai" to designate certain Italian wines. The case involved an agree-
ment between the E.C. and Hungary that was aimed at protecting the
Hungarian geographic name "Tokaj" and will become effective as of
March 2007.59 The Advocate General found that the prohibition on
Italian producers is not contrary to the TRIPS Agreement because the
word "Tocai" refers to a grape variety, rather than a geographic name
when it is used in Italy. Jacobs also rejected the Italian argument
under which the Italian producers considered themselves deprived of
a "possession" within the meaning of the European Convention on
Human Rights. While conceding that the notion of "possession" may
include the name of a wine variety traditionally used to sell a product,
Jacobs concludes that in the present case the interests of the owners in
this case had been sufficiently taken into account by allowing the own-
ers a thirteen-year transitional period.
3. Pending Cases
A. Geographic Names for Wine
On October 15, 2004, Italian producers of "Tocai" brought a
challenge before the CFI related to Commission Regulation 1429/
2004, and its prohibition of the use of the word "Tocai" to designate
Italian wines.60 Advocate General Jacobs examined a similar 
claim,6 1
but this case involved different legal argument. The plaintiffs in this
case argued that, after the accession of Hungary to the E.U. provisions
contained in previous treaties should lapse if they have not been in-
59. Case C-347/03, Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Regione Autonoma
Fruili-Venenzia Giulia v. Ministero per le Politiche Agricole e Forestali.
60. Case T-417/04, Regione Autonoma Friuli Venezia Giulia v. Commission; Case
T-418/04, Confcooperative, Unione regionale della Cooperazione Fvg Federagricole
and Others v. Commission.
61. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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cluded in the Accession Treaty under the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. Therefore, the Treaty between the E.C. and Hungary
does not provide a legal basis for the prohibition of the use of the
name "Tocai" in Italy. The plaintiffs also argue that the Commission
has no power to prohibit the use of a variety in a Member State.
B. Sale Modalities for Confectionary
A reference for a preliminary ruling was sent to the ECJ on Au-
gust 23, 2004 seeking interpretation of Articles 28 to 30.62 The dis-
pute involved a question about the free movement of goods within the
E.U. The subject of the dispute is an Austrian rule that prohibits the
sale of unwrapped sugar confectionary products in vending machines.
The Austrian rule also applies to products that use sugar substitutes.
63
IV. OTHER RELEVANT NEws
1. Regulations Entered Into Application
A. A Regulation 178/2002 of January 28, 2002 "laying down the
general principles and requirements of food law,
establishing the European Food Safety Authority and
laying down procedures in matters of food
safety."
64
The provisions of this regulation enter into application on Janu-
ary 1, 2005. On December 20, 2004, the Commission published "Gui-
dance on the Implementation of Articles 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20"
of said regulation. The guidance document was designed to help
"food business operators" understand and implement the Regulation,
and was published with the cooperation with the Standing Committee
on the Food Chain and Animal Health which is composed of repre-
sentatives of the Member States. This document deals with responsi-
bilities, traceability, withdrawal, recalls and notifications, and imports
and exports. 65 The document emphasized that the traceability re-
quirement does not have any extra-territorial effect because the im-
62. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
Dec. 24, 2002, OJ. (C 325) 33 (2002).
63. Case C-366/04, Georg Schwarz v. Burgermeister des Landeshauptstadt
Slazburg.
64. Parliament and Council Regulation 178/2002, 2002 OJ. (L 31) 1.
65. See Guidance on the Implementation of Articles 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of
EC Regulation 178/2002 on General Food Law (Dec. 20, 2004), available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/food/food/foodlaw/guidance/guidance-rev 7 en.pdf.
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porter is only required to be able to identify "from whom the product
was exported in the third country.
B. Reg. 1829/2003 of September 22, 2003 "on genetically modified
food and feed."66
This Regulation provides for the labeling of food and feed prod-
ucts containing GMOs or GM material, and for a pre-market approval
of such products. Those provisions were applicable on April 18, 2004.
Existing products which were already on the market before that date
may remain on the market, provided the Commission was notified
before October 18, 2004. The list of notifications that were sent to the
Commission is available on the Commission's website.
67
2. Unofficial Documents and Announcements
A. Food and Health
The Commission held a roundtable discussion on obesity on July
20, 2004 in Brussels. 68 This roundtable was the first step of a global
action, and was followed by a "Platform Document" that was issued on
December 14, 2004 as part of the preparations for a second round-
table held on January 21, 2005. This document contains proposals for
actions from the Commission.
On November 29, 2004 experts met in Brussels, under the aegis
of the Commission, in order to examine the influence of nutrition on
Alzheimer disease, osteoporosis, and other diseases related to age.
B. Genetically Modified Organisms
On September 8, 2004, the Commission announced the approval
of the registration of a maize variety, MON 180, which had been au-
thorized since 1998 under the European Union GM Legislation in the
Common European Union Seed Catalogue. 69 This was the first time
that a GM variety was listed in the E.U. Common Catalogue. MON
180 has been cultivated in Spain for years, and several derivatives of
66. Parliament and Council Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 OJ. (L 268) 1.
67. See Notification of Existing Products Received by the Commission Pursuant to
Article 8 and 20 of Regulation (EC) 1829/2003 on GM Food and Feed, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/food/biotechnologY/gmfood/notificationsex-
isting-products.pdf.
68. SANCO C4/MR/WK D (2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
health/ph determinants/lifestyle/nutrition/documents/ev-20040
72 0-mi-en.pdf.
69. See Press Release, European Commission, Inscription of MON 180 GM maize
varieties in the Common EU Catalogue of Varieties (IP/04/1083, Sept. 8, 2004).
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this variety have been listed in national seed catalogues. For example,
six varieties are listed in France and eleven are listed in Spain.
C. Contaminants
On October 13, 2004, the Commission announced that the
Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health has ap-
proved a Commission proposal to establish minimum levels of
ochratoxin A in coffee, wine, and grape juice. 70 Maximum levels al-
ready existed for cereals. This regulation was published in the Official
Journal of the European Union on January 26, 2005 and will enter
into application on April 1, 2005. More information will be available
in the next issue of the Journal of Food Law & Policy.
Also on October 13, 2004, the Commission announced that maxi-
mum levels for Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAH), in particu-
lar benzopyrene, have been set.7 ' This will apply to certain foods
containing fats, as well as oils and foods where smoking or drying
processes might cause high levels of contamination.
D. E.U. and United States Cooperate on Food Safety
On September 16-17, 2004, a technical seminar was held at the
Food and Veterinary Office in Ireland to discuss practical implemen-
tations of HACCP principles. 72 It was the first technical exchange of
views between E.U. and United States experts on how HACCP is im-
plemented and the first step towards the possibility of cooperation be-
tween governmental offices when differences exist in applicable
regulations.
E. Hormone Dispute
In December 2004, the E.U. lodged a complaint with the WTO
regarding continued sanctions United States and Canada against E.U.
exports, whereas the E.U. has adopted new rules based on indepen-
dent scientific evidence. The E.U. has asked for a formal consultation
with the United States and Canada.
70. European Commission, Summary Report of the Standing Committee on the
Food Chain and Animal Health, Section on Toxicological Safety, Meeting of 12 Octo-
ber 2004, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/committees/regulatory/scf-
cah/toxic/summaryl 5_en.pdf.
71. See id.
72. See Press Release, European Commission, Midday Express of 2004-09-09
(MEX/04/0909, Sept. 9, 2004).
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3. The E. U. Institutions
A. The Parliament
The Committee on Environment, Public Health, and Food Safety,
which is primarily in charge of food law, has been renewed after the
elections to the E.U. Parliament. It is composed of sixty-three mem-
bers and is chaired by Mr. Karl-Heinz Florenz (Christian Democrat).
B. The Commission
The new Commissioner in charge of DG SANCO is Mr. Markos
Kyprianou from Cyprus. Speaking to the European Parliament at his
confirmation hearing, Mr. Kyprianou explained that "he wants to
fight obesity, crack down on smoking, protect young people from al-
cohol abuse and empower consumers to shop with confidence in the
E.U.'s internal market.'
'73
C. The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)
On November 9-10, 2004, an EFSA stakeholder Colloquium took
place in Berlin. Delegates represented consumer groups, industry,
university and research centers, retailers, distributors, farmers, food
trade workers, and animal welfare and environment non-governmen-
tal organizations (NGOs). During the Colloquium, views were ex-
changed among the participants. Three sessions were organized: one
devoted to the analysis of public perception and food safety, another
to the involvement of stakeholders in risk analysis, and a third interac-
tive session where participants were encouraged to identify strategies
for EFSA's future policy on stakeholder relations.
On December 13-14, 2004, a scientific Colloquium took place in
Brussels on the topic of the Qualified Presumption of Safety (QPS)
and its possible application in harmonizing safety assessment ap-
proaches concerning micro-organisms used in food and feed
production.
In December 2004, EFSA published a Guidance Document on
the "Risk Assessment of GM plants" 74 to help operators prepare and
73. See DG SANCO "Health and Consumer Voice" (Dec. 2004) at http://europa.
eu.int/comm/dgs/health-consumer/newsletter/
2 OO41 2 /index-en.htm (last visited
May 14, 2005). This is the new name for DG SANCO newsletter, which was previously
named "Consumer Voice."
74. See Guidance Document of the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Orga-
nisms for the Risk Assessment of Genetically Modified Plants Dervied from Food and
Feed (European Food Safety Authority), available at http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/
gmolgmoguidance/660/guidance_docfinall.pdf.
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present applications in accordance with the GM food and feed
regulation.
75
A discussion paper on Botanicals and Botanical Preparations
used as food supplements was also issued by EFSA,76 EFSA Scientific
Committee highlighted a number of health concerns associated with
these products, such as chemical and microbial contamination, mis-
identification of plants, and mislabeling. The Committee advocated
implementing a coherent risk assessment plan and communicating
better information to the consumer of botanical supplements.
As to flavorings, the EFSA panel on Food Additives, Flavourings,
Processing Aids and Material issued two opinions in November, 2004
that assessed seventy-seven substances. 77 This work is part of the gen-
eral review of flavorings which is currently required under Regulation
2232/96 "laying down a Community procedure for flavoring sub-
stances used or intended for use in or on foodstuffs."
78
Regarding Food Allergens, EFSA has examined applications from
the industry regarding possible exemptions from the mandatory label-
ing rules for allergen derivatives. 79 Out of nine evaluations, EFSA
concluded there can still be adverse reactions for eight substances.
75. Parliament and Council Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1.
76. European Food Safety Authority, Discussion Paper on Botanicals and Botanical
Preparations Widely Used As Food Supplements and Related Products: Coherent and Compre-
hensive Risk Assessment and Consumer Information Approaches, available at http://www.efsa
.eu.int/science/sccommitee/sc-documents/616/scdocadvice03_botanicalsen1.
pdf.
77. European Food Safety Authority, Opinion of the Scientific Panel on Food Additives,
Flavourings, Processing Aids and Materials in Contact with Food (AFC) on a Request from the
Commission Related to Flavouring Group Evaluation 3 (EGE 03), 107 E.F.S.A. J. 1-59
(2004), available at http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/afc/afc-opinions/catindex en.
html.
78. Parliament and Council Regulation 2232/96, 1996 OJ. (L 299) 1.
79. Parliament and Council Directive 2003/89, 2003 OJ. (L 308) 15.
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UNITED STATES FOOD LAW UPDATE
By Michael T. Roberts & Margie Alsbrook*
I. INTRODUCTION
The one constancy about food law in the United States is change,
especially in a rapidly-developing food industry.' Innovations in food
technology, shifts in popular culture and tastes, concerns of safety and
nutrition, pressures from international markets, all contribute to the
changing landscape of food law. These changes are reflected in new
federal statutes, regulations, administrative decisions, and judicial
decisions.
The purpose of this update is to summarize significant changes
and developments in food law over the last half of 2004. An update of
developments in United States food law will be published in each issue
of the Journal of Food Law & Policy. As the Journal will be published bi-
annually, the update will appear twice a year and will cover the last six
months of the calendar year immediately preceding its publication.
These updates provide a starting point for scholars, practitioners,
scientists, and policy-makers determined to understand the shaping of
food law in modern society. 2 Tracing the development of food law
through these updates will also serve a useful historical purpose. As
stated by the acclaimed food historian, Felipe Ferndndez-Armesto,
food "has a good claim to be considered the world's most important
subject. It is what matters most to most people for most of the time.
* Michael T. Roberts is a Research Associate Professor of Law and Director of
the National Agricultural Law Center at the University of Arkansas School of Law in
Fayetteville, Arkansas. Professor Roberts is also a faculty advisor to the Journal of Food
Law & Policy and teaches a course on food law. Margie Alsbrook is the founding
Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Food Law & Policy and a 2005 graduate of the
University of Arkansas School of Law, where she was also a member of the Arkansas
Law Review.
1. See Peter Barton Hutt, Food Law & Policy: An Essay, 1 J. FOOD L. & POL. 1, 11-15
(2005).
2. See, e.g., REAY TANNAHILL, FOOD IN HISTORY 371 (rev. ed. 1998) (underscoring
the importance of this starting point by noting "[c]omplacency is something that
neither governments nor scientists can afford, because whatever the shape of the fu-
ture, the role of food in it will be every bit as decisive as it has in the past").
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Yet food history remains relatively underappreciated. Most academic
institutions still neglect it." These updates represent a modest effort
to building historical context for the development of food law.
It should be noted that this scholarly framework has limits. Not
every change in national food law will be included in the update; in-
stead, these updates will be limited to significant changes in national
food law. Also, new developments in state law, while certainly impor-
tant and deserving of attention, are beyond the scope of this update.
4
II. RECENT FEDERAL STATUTES
A. The Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthoization Act of 2004
On June 30, 2004, President George W. Bush signed into law the
Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act.5 Congress had passed
the Act earlier in the same month. 6 The new Act took effect immedi-
ately on July 1, 2004, and has been heralded as "an important step
toward improving the health and well-being of our nation's
children.
7
1. Reauthorization of Federal Legislation
The Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act reauthorizes for
five years both the National School Lunch Act8 and the Child Nutri-
tion Act of 1996.9 The Act also amends the existing child nutrition
programs and the Special Supplemental Nutrition program for Wo-
3. FELIPE FERNANDEz-ARMESTO, NEAR A THOUSAND TABLES: A HISTORY OF FOOD, at
ix (2002).
4. See NAT'L Assoc. OF STATE DEPTS. OF AGRIC. & NAT'L CENTER FOR AGRIC. LAW
RESEARCH & INFORMATION, FOOD SAFETY STATE AND FEDERAL STANDARDS AND REGULA-
TIONS, available at http://www.nasda.org/nasda/nasda/Foundation/foodsafety/in-
dex.html.
5. Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-265,
118 Stat. 729 (2004) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
6. See Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act (stating the Act was passed in
the U.S. Senate on June 23, 2004 and in U.S. House of Representatives on June 24,
2004).
7. U.S. Newswire, American Dietetic Association Commends U.S. Government for New
Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act (July 1, 2004), available at 2004 WL
78580731.
8. Richard B. Russell National School Lunch Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1754-1769 (2004)
(originally enacted as the National School Lunch Act, June 4, 1946, c. 281, 60 Stat.
230).
9. Child Nutrition Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1771-1791 (originally enacted as the Child
Nutrition Act of 1966, Oct. 11, 1966, 80 Stat. 885); Child Nutrition and WIC
Reauthorization Act (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1761 to extend the effectiveness date of
the statutes to Sept. 30, 2004).
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men, Infants, and Children (WIC).10 These programs are adminis-
tered by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)."1
(a) National School Lunch Act
The National School Lunch Act was passed in 1946 to "safeguard
the health and well-being of the Nation's children" and to "encourage
the domestic consumption of nutritious agricultural commodities and
other food."12 The National School Lunch Program today helps feed
over 26 million school children in almost 100,000 public and private
schools around the nation.
13
(b) Child Nutrition Act and WIC
The Child Nutrition Act was passed in 1966 to reach more effec-
tively children in economically poor areas. 14 The Child Nutrition Act
was designed to complement the National School Lunch Act, and in
fact shares the same two-fold purpose.' 5 Several ambitious programs
were instituted by the Child Nutrition Act, including a Special Milk
Program and an experimental School Breakfast Program. 16 The
10. See Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-265, § 116,
118 Stat. 729 (2004) (amending, in scattered sections, 42 U.S.C. § 1786 (2005)).
11. See Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act (granting, in various scat-
tered passages, the Secretary of Agriculture the power to administer the programs
authorized in the Act).
12. See Clint G. Salisbury, Make an Investment in Our School Children: Increase the Nu-
tritional Value of School Lunch Programs, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 331, 333 (2004); 42
U.S.C. § 1941 (2005); see also National School Lunch Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1769
(2005) (originally enacted as the National School Lunch Act, June 4, 1946, c. 281, 60
Stat. 230).
13. U.S. Dep't. of Agric. Food and Nutrition Serv., Nutrition Program Facts: National
School Lunch Program, available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/WIC-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
14. See Child Nutrition Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-642, 80 Stat. 885-890 (1966)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1771-1790 (2005)); amended by Child Nutrition
and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-265, § 116, 118 Stat. 729
(2004) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
15. See Child Nutrition Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1771 (2005) (explaining the Child Nutri-
tion Act was passed in recognition of the success of the National School Lunch Act,
and in the anticipation that the new act would strengthen and expand the govern-
ment's ability to meet its twin goals of increasing the health of the nation's children
and encouraging the domestic consumption of agriculture).
16. See Child Nutrition Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1771-1785 (2004); see also Special Milk
Program for Children, 7 C.F.R. §§ 215.1-215.17 (2005) (giving the rules and regula-
tions for administering the Special Milk Program); School Breakfast Program, 7
C.F.R. §§ 220.4-220.21 (2005) (giving the rules and regulations for administering the
School Breakfast Program).
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Child Nutrition Act also established WIC,'17 which today serves over
7.4 million low income and nutritionally at-risk people each month by
providing nutrition counseling, healthcare referrals, and checks or
vouchers designed to help purchase specific foods.18
2. Addresses Child Nutrition Needs
Consistent with previous child nutrition legislation, the Child Nu-
trition and WIC Reauthorization Act was intended to help resolve a
particular problem-in this case, the problem of child obesity. 19 The
Act strives to decrease obesity by increasing the availability of nutri-
tious foods. For example, school administrators are encouraged to
make milk available in schools whenever possible, which is expected
to combine with recent flavored-milk offerings to increase childhood
milk consumption. 20 It also expands a pilot program that offers free
apples, bananas, raisins, and other forms of produce to children in
17. See Special Supplemental Program for Women, Infants and Children, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1786 (2005).
18. See U.S. Dep't. of Agric. Food and Nutrition Serv., Nutrition Program Facts: Na-
tional School Lunch Program, available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/WIC-Fact-Sheet.
pdf.
19. See Encouraging Healthy Choices for Healthy Children: Hearing on H.R. 2227 Before
the House Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce Subcomm. on Educ. Reform, 108th Cong.
(2004) (opening statement of Rep. Michael N. Castle, Chairman, House Comm. on
Educ. and the Workforce Subcommittee on Educ. Reform).
As we all know, childhood obesity has become a major health problem in the
United States, and studies suggest that overweight children are significantly
more likely to become overweight or obese adults. This is a matter of great
concern to us as a Committee, and to society in general.
According to a report by the National Institute for Health Care Manage-
ment, the number of overweight and obese young Americans doubled be-
tween 1990 and 2000. As a result, children are increasingly suffering from
conditions traditionally associated with adulthood, including Type 2 diabe-
tes, insulin resistance, high cholesterol, high blood pressure, sleep apnea,
orthopedic complications, and are troubled by other effects such as low self-
esteem. See id.
20. See National School Lunch Program: Requirement for Variety of Fluid Milk in
Reimbursable Meals, 69 Fed. Reg. 70,871 (Dec. 8, 2004) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt.
210) (giving schools more flexibility in the types of milk they are allowed to offer
students); see also Raquel Rutledge, Milk is Fresh: Beverage Gets Flashy Makeover For Fast
Food Restaurants, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 21, 2004, at 1 (explaining that school
districts often increase their financial resources by signing exclusive contracts with
soft drink companies, but those contracts often prevent schools from offering milk in
school vending machines; proponents hope the Act will nullify those clauses in the
contracts, since schools who make flavored milks available or who install milk vending
machines often see significant increases in milk sales).
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impoverished school districts.21 Another expanded pilot program al-
lows school districts to buy increased amounts of fresh and locally
grown foods.22 The Act also requires and provides limited funding for
schools to incorporate a nutrition and physical education component
into their curriculums by 2006.23
The Act also strives to improve the efficiency of the school lunch
program. A new direct certification process through the Food Stamp
Program permits all the children in a household to apply at one time
for certification eligibility (certification is valid for an entire school
year).24 Runaway, homeless, and migrant children automatically are
eligible for meals. 25 Also, active duty military housing allowances will
no longer be counted in the determination of eligibility.
26
An interesting feature of the Act is its new requirements concern-
ing irradiated food products.27 Irradiated food products can be sent
only to states and school districts that request it.28 The program will
not increase reimbursements to schools that request irradiated food
products, which may discourage schools from ordering such products
as irradiated meat.29 Also, companies that send schools irradiated
food products must keep them completely separate from other food
products, and schools that serve them are encouraged to offer stu-
21. See Michelle R. Davis, Bush Signs School Lunch Reauthorization, EDUG. WK., July
14, 2004, at 29 (noting the Act allows for funds for healthier snacks, as well as meals,
in some school districts).
22. See id.
23. See id. (explaining additional Act provisions, which expand the school lunch
program to the summer months in some areas and provide various provisions that
attempt to reduce the paperwork burden on schools and administrators). See also
Proclamation No. 7831, 69 Fed. Reg. 61,141 (Oct. 14, 2004) (proclaiming the week of
Oct. 10-16, 2004 to be "National School Lunch Week").
24. See Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-265,
§ 104, 118 Stat. 729 (2004) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
25. See Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act § 104.
26. See Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act § 107.
27. See Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act § 118.
28. See Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act § 118 (requiring that policies
and procedures created by the Secretary of Agriculture ensure that "irradiated food
products are made available only at the requests of States and school authorities").
29. See Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-265,
§ 118, 118 Stat. 729 (2004) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also
Emily Gersema & Chris Clayton, States Reject Irradiated Beef Over Cost, Nebraska and Min-
nesota Cancel Orders for Schools and Day Care Centers, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 8,
2004, at 1B (Iowa ed.) (stating that irradiated beef can cost schools up to seventy-five
cents more per pound than non-irradiated beef).
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dents other alternatives. 30 While schools are not required to disclose
on menus or signage that the food products are irradiated, schools
must prominently display the fact of irradiation on the container.
31
Finally, schools are required to implement a food safety program that
complies with the hazard analysis and critical control point (HACCP)
system used by USDA.
32
These new rules for irradiated food products are designed to ad-
dress consumer concerns about the safety of such products especially
irradiated meat, despite science's general attestation of the safety of
irradiated meat products.33 They follow on the heels of the USDA
announcement in 2003 that the agency was beginning to educate
school administrators about the availability of irradiated beef.3 4 Time
will tell what effect these new rules will have on the usage of irradiated
meat products in schools.
35
B. Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act
On August 3, 2004, the Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer
Protection Act ("Food Allergen Act") was signed into law.36 The Food
Allergen Act will take effect January 1, 2006 and will be administered
by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"). 37 The Food Allergen
Act is widely celebrated by consumer groups and parents, who hope
30. See Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act § 118 (stating that "irradi-
ated food products must not be commingled with food products that are not irradi-
ated" and including the language encouraging alternatives to irradiated foods).
31. See Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act § 118 (requiring irradiated
food products distributed through the national school lunch program be clearly la-
beled with a symbol or other printed notice that "indicates the product was irradiated
and is prominently displayed in a clear and understandable format on the
container").
32. See Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act § 111.
33. See Carole Sugarman, Irradiation, HACCP Included in Child Nutrition Act, FOOD
CHEM. NEWS, July 5, 2004, at 24 (discussing the various provisions of the Act); see also
Gersema & Clayton, supra note 29 (discussing the concerns of parents and consumer
groups who worry that there have been no long-term studies looking into the poten-
tial effects of eating irradiated beef).
34. Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Agric., USDA Releases Specifications for the
Purchase of Irradiated Ground Beef in the National School Lunch Program (May 29,
2003), available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/cga/PressReleases/2003/PR-0172.htm.
35. See Gersema & Clayton, supra note 29 (noting that since the passage of the Act,
Texas has chosen not to order irradiated beef for its school lunch programs).
36. Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-282, 118 Stat. 891 (2004) (to be codified as 21 U.S.C. § 343).
37. See Food Allergen and Consumer Protection Act § 203.
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the new law will make it easier to identify potentially harmful or
deadly substances.38
1. Background and Development of the Food Allergen Act
Approximately two percent of adults and five percent of infants
and young children in the United States suffer from food allergies.3 9
Each year, nearly 30,000 individuals require emergency room treat-
ment and 150 individuals die because of allergic reactions to food.40
A recent study showed that prior to the passing of the Food Allergen
Act, many parents of children with a food allergy were unable to cor-
rectly identify in each of several food labels the ingredients derived
from major food allergens. 41
Previous regulations did not prevent some manufacturers from
using a wide variety of terms to describe the same type of ingredient.42
For example, milk might be listed as whey, casein, or a variety of other
words that may be equally unclear to consumers. 43 As a result, con-
sumer and patient advocacy groups worked collaboratively with the
food industry, medical community, and members of Congress in or-
der to provide clear, consistent, and reliable ingredient label informa-
tion concerning allergens. 44
2. Food Allergen Act Requirements
The Food Allergen Act requires that food labels display promi-
nently in layman's terms the eight most commonly allergenic sub-
stances: milk, eggs, fish, shellfish, tree nuts, wheat, peanuts, and
soybeans. 45 The food label is to include the word "contains," followed
by any of these eight allergens. 46 Food ingredient labels are to appear
38. See, e.g., President Bush Signs Bill That Will Benefit Millions With Food Allergies,
OBESITY, FITNESS & WELLNESS WK., Sept. 4, 2004, at 39.
39. See Food Allergen and Consumer Protection Act § 201.
40. See Food Allergen and Consumer Protection Act § 201.
41. See Food Allergen and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-282,
§ 201, 118 Stat. 891 (2004) (to be codified as 21 U.S.C. § 343).
42. See, e.g., President Bush Signs Bill, supra note 38.
43. See, e.g., id. (reporting that one medical study showed that less than seven per-
cent of parents with children who have milk allergies were able to correctly identify
products that contain milk).
44. See, e.g., Press Release, Food Allergy and Anaphylaxis Network, President Bush
Signs Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act, Historic Day for the
Eleven Million Americans With Food Allergies (Aug. 3, 2004), available at http://www.
foodallergy.org/press-releases/falcpasign.html.
45. Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act §§ 202-03.
46. See Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-282, § 202-03, 118 Stat. 891 (2004) (to be codified as 21 U.S.C. § 343).
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in a print size, type, and format that is easier to read than that re-
quired by previous regulations. 47 Food ingredient statements must
identify food allergens used in spices, natural or artificial flavorings,
additives, and colorings.
48
The Food Allergen Act also requires various entities to perform
certain activities. Food manufacturers are required to increase protec-
tions against cross-contamination in the food manufacturing pro-
cess.49 United States Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) is required to conduct an extended study on allergens.50
FDA, an agency within the DHHS,5 1 is to maintain its authority to reg-
ulate the safety of certain products bioengineered to contain proteins
that cause allergic reactions. 52 Centers for Disease Control, also an
agency within DHHS,53 is required to track food-allergy-related
deaths.
54
Finally, the Food Allergen Act also orders DHHS to develop regu-
lations allowing for foods to be labeled "gluten free" within two
years. 55 This is to address concerns of people with celiac disease, who
can be harmed by exposure to gluten.56 The new regulations will
need to coincide with previously existing rules that require labels to
identify whether gluten is corn or wheat based.
57
47. See Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act §§ 202-03.
48. See Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act § 203(d) (stating
companies have until January 1, 2006 to implement the changes). Highly refined oils
derived from these eight ingredients are exempt from the labeling requirements. See
Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act § 201 (qq) (2) (A).
49. See Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act § 205.
50. See Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act § 208.
51. See U.S. Dep't. of Health and Human Serv., HHS: What We Do, at http://www.
hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
52. See Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-282, § 203, 118 Stat. 891 (2004) (to be codified as 21 U.S.C. § 343).
53. See U.S. Dep't. of Health and Human Serv., HHS: What We Do, at http://www.
hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
54. See Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act § 207.
55. See Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act § 206.
56. See, e.g., Frederick H. Degnan, The Food Label and the Right to Know, 52 FooD &
DRUG LJ. 49, 53 n.31 (1997).
57. See id. (citing Corn Gluten, 24 C.F.R. § 184.1321 (2004) and Wheat Gluten, 24
C.F.R. § 184.1322 (2004)).
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III. RECENT FEDERAL REGULATIONS
A. USDA Issues New Rule Related to Country of Origin Labeling
In October 2004, USDA issued its interim final rule58 regarding
country of origin labeling (COOL) requirements for fish and shell-
fish.59 Under the rule, fish and shellfish sold in retail venues must
have labels that identify both the country of origin of the fish and
shellfish and the method in which they were raised (the rule gives the
example of identifying wild verses farm-raised salmon). 60 Fish and
shellfish that are included as ingredients in processed food products,
however, are excluded from the COOL requirements. Processed food
products include those that have been combined with other ingredi-
ents, pre-cooked or "undergone a change." 61 Food service establish-
ments, such as restaurants, lunchrooms, cafeterias, food stands, bars,
lounges, and similar enterprises are exempt from mandatory COOL.
62
The COOL requirements for fish and shellfish are currently not
scheduled to take effect until April 4, 2005.63 Notwithstanding the
issuance of the interim final rule, the future of COOL for fish and
shellfish, as with all commodities covered by the labeling program, is
uncertain.
64
COOL was introduced in the Farm Security and Rural Investment
Act of 2002 (2002 Farm Bill), which amended the 1946 Agricultural
58. The term interim final rule refers to a rule that is issued by an agency without
going through the traditional pre-issue comment period. With an interim final rule,
the agency in question will take comments and suggestions from the public during
the first few months that the rule is in place. Later the agency may (or may not)
choose to adopt these suggestions when the final version of the rule is adopted. See,
e.g., Michael Asimow, Interim Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 703
(1999).
59. See Country of Origin Labeling for Fish and Shellfish, 7 C.F.R. §§ 60.101-.400
(2004) (Dep't of Agric. Oct. 5, 2004).
60. See 7 C.F.R. § 60.119.
61. See 7 C.F.R. § 60.119.
62. See Country of Origin Labeling: Definitions, 7 U.S.C. § 1638 (2005) (exempt-
ing food service establishments from the country of origin labeling requirements and
defining a food service establishment as "a restaurant, cafeteria, lunch room, food
stand, saloon, tavern, bar, lounge, or other similar facility operated as an enterprise
engaged in the business of selling food to the public").
63. See 7 C.F.R. § 60.119.
64. SeeJacquelyn Trussell, Note, The Birth Place of Food Products: Do You Know Where
Your Food Comes From?, 16 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 285, 285-88 (2004) (detailing recent
COOL legislation and subsequent congressional postponements of the legislation's
effective date).
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Marketing Act (AMA).65 COOL was to become mandatory in Septem-
ber 2004.66 On October 30, 2003, USDA's Agriculture Marketing Ser-
vice (AMS) published a proposed rule to implement the mandatory
COOL program.67 The regulation requires "a retailer of a covered
commodity" to inform consumers "at the final point of sale of the
covered commodity to consumer, of the country of origin of the cov-
ered commodity."68 Covered commodities include beef, lamb, pork,
fish, and perishable agricultural commodities such as peanuts. 69
COOL has since been beset by congressional postponement. On
January 23, 2004, Congress passed an omnibus appropriations bill,
which included a provision amending the AMA. 70 This provision, Sec-
tion 749 of Division A, Title VII, of the AMA, delayed the mandatory
application of COOL until September 2006 for all products covered
under that law, except for "'farm-raised fish' and 'wild fish.'-
71
COOL is also under threat of repeal. In June 2004, efforts were
made to pass a separate law that would completely repeal any COOL
requirements present in the 1946 AMA and replace them with a vol-
untary country-of-origin program, dubbed as the VCOOL program. 72
Given this tumultuous history in the short life of COOL, the future for
COOL is anything but certain.
B. Agencies Issue Proposals for Preventing the Spread of BSE
In July 2004, USDA and DHHS jointly issued three important an-
nouncements related to efforts to prevent the spread of bovine spon-
65. See id.; see also Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
66. See Notice of Country of Origin, 7 U.S.C. § 1638a (2004).
67. See Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Lamb, Pork, Fish, Perisha-
ble Agricultural Commodities, and Peanuts; Proposed Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,944 (Oct.
30, 2004) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 60).
68. See 7 U.S.C. § 1638a.
69. See 7 U.S.C. § 1638a.
70. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3
(2004) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1638d).
71. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004.
72. See H.R. Res. 4576, 108th Cong. (2004); see also Country of Origin Labeling Must
Go, DAILY TRIBUNE-HERALD (Grand Prairie, Alberta), Nov. 18, 2004, at 12 (stating that
VCOOL is preferred by large segments of the food industry); Country-of-Origin Labeling
Amendment Left Out of Omnibus, NAT'LJ.'S CONG. DAILY, Nov. 19, 2004 (explaining how
Congressional leaders removed the COOL repeal provision from a November 2004
spending bill vote when public concern about food safety spiked due to an unrelated
incident).
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giform encephalopathy (BSE), 73 also known as "Mad Cow Disease," 74
in the United States.75 The Food Safety and Inspection Service
(FSIS), under USDA, is responsible for the safety of meat and poul-
try.7 6 FDA, under DHHS, is responsible for regulating animal feed.77
The first announcement was the issuance of an interim final
rule78 prohibiting the use of specific cattle parts in human food, cos-
metics, and dietary supplements. 79 These prohibited parts include
specific risk materials that are known to harbor concentrations of the
infectious agent for BSE, such as the brain, skull, eyes, and spinal cord
of cattle thirty months of age or older, and a portion of the small
intestine and tonsils from all cattle, regardless of their age.80 Prohib-
ited parts under the interim final rule also include material from non-
ambulatory disabled cattle, cattle that are not inspected and passed
for human consumption, and mechanically separated beef.81 This fi-
nal interim rule is consistent with the recent interim final rule issued
by USDA declaring these materials to be unfit for food and prohibit-
ing their use as human food.8 2
73. See CHUCK CULVER, GLOSSARY OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, PROGRAMS AND
POLICV - FOURTH EDITION, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/glossary
(defining Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), as a "[a] chronic, degenerative,
fatal disease affecting the central nervous system of cattle").
74. See Note, Challenging Concentration of Control in the American Meat Industry, 117
HARv. L. REv. 2643 (2004).
75. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Agric. Food Safety and Inspection Serv., USDA
and HHS Strengthen Safeguards Against Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (July 9,
2004), available at http://www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0280.04.html; Federal Measures
to Mitigate BSE Risks: Considerations for Further Action; Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg.
42,288 (July 14, 2004).
76. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MAD Cow DISEASE: IMPROVEMENTS IN
THE ANIMAL FEED BAN AND OTHER REGULATORY AREAS WOULD STRENGTHEN U.S. PRE-
VENTION EFFORTS (2002).
77. See id.
78. See supra note 58.
79. See Use of Material Derived from Cattle in Human Food and Cosmetics, 69
Fed. Reg. 42,255-74 (July 14, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 189, 21 C.F.R. pt.
700) (including a more complete discussion of the reasons for the rule and explana-
tion of the various banned cattle parts).
80. See USDA and HHS Strengthen Safeguards, supra note 75.
81. See id.
82. See Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and
Requirements for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle, 69 Fed. Reg.
1,862-01 (Jan. 12, 2004); see also Bovine Spongiform Encepalopathy Teaching Work-
shops, 69 Fed. Reg. 4,106 (Jan. 28, 2004). The initial proposed rule was later revised
and broadened. See Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human
Food and Requirements for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle; Meat
Produced by Advanced Meat/Bone Separation Machinery and Meat Recovery (AMR)
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The second announcement was an advanced notice of proposed
rulemaking (ANPR)8 3 action regarding proposals to increase efforts
to prevent mammalian proteins in animal foods.8 4 Although FDA is-
sued a ban on these proteins in 1997,85 there has been some evidence
that the ban has not been entirely effective, and that not all animal
facilities are compliant.8 6 There is also concern that the ban does not
address the common practice of feeding cattle by-products to chick-
ens, who produce litter that is then added to the feed of cattle.8 7 This
announcement also called for comments on potential regulatory
shifts, including the idea of implementing a national animal identifi-
cation system, changing the rules for interacting with countries who
import and export meat with the United States, and preventing non-
ambulatory disabled cattle from being used in animal feed.
88
The third announcement was a proposed rule to require that
manufacturers and processors of human food and cosmetics contain-
ing cattle-derived material establish and maintain records showing
that prohibited materials are not used in their products. 89 This an-
nouncement is intended to help ensure compliance with the prohibi-
tions in the interim final rule.90
Systems; Prohibition of the Use of Certain Stunning Devices Used to Immobilize Cat-
tle During Slaughter; Bovine Spongiform Encepalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Pro-
gram, 69 Fed. Reg. 18,245 (Apr. 7, 2004) (to be codified in scattered sections of 9
C.F.R.). USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service recently announced it would re-
view these rules due to their "significant economic impact." See Regulatory Flexibility
Act; Amended Plan for Reviewing Regulations Under Section 610 Requirements, 70
Fed. Reg. 4,047 (Jan. 28, 2005).
83. RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PROCESS 321 (3d. ed. 1999)
("The agency's notice of proposed rule making starts the process of framing the issues
in a rule making by giving interested members of the public a target for critical
comments.").
84. See USDA and HHS Strengthen Safeguards, supra note 75.
85. See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed, 21 C.F.R. § 589.2000
(2004).
86. See, e.g., Michael B. Abramson, Mad Cow Disease: An Approach to Its Containment,
7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 316, 334-37 (2004) (noting the various ways in which
organizations in the United States are still not compliant with the ban).
87. See Challenging Concentration of Control, supra note 74.
88. See USDA and HHS Strengthen Safeguards, supra note 75.
89. See id.; Recordkeeping Requirements for Human Food and Cosmetics Manu-
factured From, Processed With, Or Otherwise Containing, Materials from Cattle, 69
Fed. Reg. 42,275 (July 14, 2004) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 189, 700 (2004)).
90. Use of Materials Derived From Cattle in Human Food and Cosmetics; and Re-
cordkeeping Requirements for Human Food and Cosmetics Manufactured From,
Processed With, or Otherwise Containing, Material From Cattle; Final Rule and Pro-
posed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 42,255, 42,263 ("We believe that records documenting the
absence of prohibited cattle materials in human food and cosmetics are critical ... to
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C. FDA Establishes Rules for Keeping Records Under the Bioterrorism Act
On December 9, 2004, FDA published in the Federal Register a
final rule implementing the recordkeeping provisions of the Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act, commonly re-
ferred to as the Bioterrorism Act.9 1 The rule was passed to help ad-
dress concerns about the vulnerability of the United States' food
supply.92 The recordkeeping rule is the fourth rule in a series of regu-
lations issued by FDA under the Bioterrorism Act.
93
The final rule is effective February 7, 2005. 9 4 The final rule, how-
ever, extends the time period for firms to comply. Most firms have
one year after the final regulations are published to comply (i.e., De-
cember 9, 2005), which is double the six months originally pro-
posed.95 Small businesses, those businesses with 500 or fewer full-time
ensure compliance with the prohibitions on the use of prohibited cattle materials in
this interim final rule.").
91. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Press Release,
Food and Drug Admin., FDA Issues Final Rule on the Establishment and Mainte-
nance of Records to Enhance the Security of the U.S. Food Supply Under the Bioter-
rorism Act; FDA Also Issues Draft Guidance Regarding Records Access (Dec. 6, 2004),
available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01143.htm.
92. See, e.g., John Blanchard, The Bioterrorism Act: The Cost of Compliance: With the
Final Rules Yet to Come, Food and Beverage Processors are Gearing Up For the Expected Require-
ments While Implementing the Systems They Hope Will Make Them Compliant, FooD ENGI-
NEERING, Sept. 1, 2004, at BT1.
93. See FDA Issues Final Rule, supra note 91; see also Registration of Food Facilities
Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20)
(requiring domestic and foreign facilities that manufacture, process, produce, pack,
or hold food for human or animal consumption in the United States to register with
the FDA); Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and Bi-
oterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,974 (Oct. 10,
2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (requiring that entities provide prior notice
of all foods for human or animal consumption before they enter the United States);
Administrative Detention of Food for Human or Animal Consumption Under the
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 69
Fed. Reg. 25,242 (June 4, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 16) (providing
procedures for the seizure of foods meant for animal or human consumption).
94. See Establishment and Maintenance of Records Under the Public Health Secur-
ity and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002; Establishment and
Maintenance of Records for Foods; Notice of Public Meeting; Availability of Draft
Guidance for Records Access Authority; Final Rules and Notice, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,561-
62 (Dec. 9, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 11).
95. Compare Establishment and Maintenance of Records, 69 Fed. Reg. at 71,562,
with 68 Fed. Reg. 25,188, 25,190 (May 9, 2003) (offering the original proposed rule
for public comment).
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employees, have eighteen months from the publication date to com-
ply (i.e., June 9, 2006), which is up from the twelve months originally
proposed. 96 Very small businesses, those businesses with ten or fewer
full-time employees, have two years to comply (i.e., December 9,
2006), which is up from the originally proposed eighteen months.
97
The agency's recordkeeping rule applies to all those who manu-
facture, process, pack, transport, distribute, receive, hold, or import
food.98 Farms, restaurants, and foreign persons (other than persons
who transport food in the United States), and certain other entities
are excluded from the rule, which also allows for special exceptions
for the makers of food contact substances.99 The proposed regula-
tions had contemplated covering foreign persons. 100 Exempting for-
eign persons in the final rule's requirements to maintain and provide
access to records, except for foreign transporters hauling commodi-
ties or food into the United States, eliminates a potential burden for
foreign producers. 10' It still may be prudent, however, for exempt
foreign persons to maintain a recordkeeping system in order to re-
spond appropriately to inquiries at the time of entry from either Cus-
toms and Border Protection or FDA.102
96. Compare Establishment and Maintenance of Records, 69 Fed. Reg. at 71,562,
with 68 Fed. Reg. 25,188, 25,190 (May 9, 2003).
97. Compare Establishment and Maintenance of Records, 69 Fed. Reg. at 71,562,
with 68 Fed. Reg. 25,188, 25,190 (May 9, 2003).
98. See FDA Issues Final Rule, supra note 91 (noting that records kept by persons
who transport foods do not need to be kept for longer than one year).
99. See Establishment and Maintenance of Records, 69 Fed. Reg. at 71,563; see also
Final Recordkeeping Rule Does Not Require Lot # On Retail Level, FDA WK., Nov. 10, 2004
(explaining that some groups were concerned that industry lobbying efforts had
weakened the effectiveness of the record keeping requirements); Recordkeeping Rule a
Step Towards Relying on Foreign Sister Agencies, FDA WK., Nov. 10, 2004 (explaining some
of the reasons FDA chose to exempt foreign companies who export to the United
States from the record keeping requirements).
100. See generally 69 Fed. Reg. 25,188 (including foreign facilities throughout the
requirements of the proposed rule).
101. The comments to the proposed rule argued that attempting to impose such
requirements on foreign facilities could have triggered challenges within the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and subjected U.S. companies to the same treatment by
foreign governments. See Establishment and Maintenance of Records, 69 Fed. Reg. at
71,569.
102. See, e.g., Persons Required to Maintain Records, 19 C.F.R. § 163.2 (Bureau of
Customs and Border Prot., Dep't of Homeland Sec. 2004); Prior Notice of Imported
Food Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,974 (FDA Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt.
1) (requiring that entities provide prior notice of all foods for human or animal con-
sumption before they enter the United States); Administrative Detention of Food for
Human or Animal Consumption Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
200 [VOL. 1:18 7
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Firms subject to the final rule must keep records of all food they
receive and release. 10 3 The records must contain information as to the
identity of the food, the immediate supplier of the food, and the im-
mediate consumer for the food. 0 4 This information in general in-
cludes the names of the relevant entities, address, telephone number,
fax number, e-mail address, description of the food, date the food was
received, the lot or code number for the food, quantity of food, and
how the food was packaged. 10 5 The requirements differ slightly for
transporters versus non-transporters. 106
All records must be kept at the establishment where these activi-
ties take place or at a reasonably accessible location. 10 7 Records re-
lated to animal and pet foods must be kept for at least one year.
Records related to human foods must be kept for six months to two
years, depending on the shelf life of the foods in question.10 8 These
records are to be made available to FDA within twenty-four hours of a
proper agency request.'0 9 FDA may request these records only when
it has a reasonable belief that the food is adulterated and poses a
"threat of serious adverse health consequences or death."" 0 Failure to
produce the requested records within the mandatory twenty-four hour
production period can result in civil and/or criminal penalties."'
D. Qualified Health Claims
In the last quarter of 2004, FDA announced approval of two new
qualified health claims. A health claim is considered a labeling claim
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 25,242 (FDAJune 4, 2004) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 16) (providing procedures for the seizure of foods
meant for animal or human consumption).
103. See Establishment and Maintenance of Records Under the Public Health Secur-
ity and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,561,
75,562 (Dec. 9, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 11).
104. See Establishment and Maintenance of Records, 69 Fed. Reg. at 71,562-63.
105. See Establishment and Maintenance of Records, 69 Fed. Reg. at 71,563-64.
106. See Establishment and Maintenance of Records, 69 Fed. Reg. at 71,564.
107. See 69 Fed. Reg. 25,188, 25,190 (May 9, 2003).
108. See id.
109. See Establishment and Maintenance of Records Under the Public Health Secur-
ity and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,561,
75,564 (Dec. 9, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 11). Previously, the agency
proposed to require that companies provide access to records within four hours if
requested on a weekday and eight hours on a weekend. See 68 Fed. Reg. 25,188,
25,190 (May 9, 2003).
110. See Establishment and Maintenance of Records, 69 Fed. Reg. at 71,562-63.
111. See Establishment and Maintenance of Records, 69 Fed. Reg. at 71,562 (Dec. 9,
2004) (stating that failure to comply with the provisions of the regulation will be a
violation of the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act).
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that characterizes the relationship of a substance to a disease or
health-related condition. 12 The first of these new qualified health
claims was announced in September 2004, allowing food companies
to make a qualified health claim concerning the benefits of omega-3
fatty acids.1 1 3 The second announcement came in November 2004,
allowing a qualified health claim related to the benefits of consuming
olive oil.114 These two new qualified health claims signify a new era in
FDA's treatment of health claims and are lauded as providing instruc-
tive information to consumers.'1 5 Critics worry, however, that these
new qualified health claims make consumer education for health-con-
scious consumers too complicated 1 6 and that isolating the benefits of




Prior to the 1980s, few health claims were made for food prod-
ucts.'1 8 FDA treated health claims for food as bringing that food
within FDA's definition of a drug ("intended for use in the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease"). 119 When firms
112. See Health Claims: General Requirements, 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(a) (1) (2005).
113. See Press Release, Food and Drug Admin., FDA Announces Qualified Health
Claims for Omega-3 Fatty Acids (Sept. 8, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/
topics/news/2004/NEWO1 1 15.html.
114. See Press Release, Food and Drug Admin., FDA Allows Qualified Health Claim
to Decrease Risk of Coronary Heart Disease (Nov. 1, 2004), available at http://www.
fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEWOI 129.html.
115. See Press Release, Food and Drug Admin., FDA Announces Initiative to Provide
Better Health for Consumers (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/
topics/NEWS/2002/NEW00859.html.
116. See, e.g., Sally Squires, Omega-3 Foods Can Put Benefits on Label, FDA Says, WASH.
POST, Sept. 9, 2004, at A4 (quoting the director of the Center for Science in the
Public Interest as saying qualified health claims are not in the best interests of con-
sumers because "[t]he tenet of consumer education is to keep it simple. The FDA is
making it quite complicated for health-conscious consumers who are trying to im-
prove their diets.").
117. See id.; see also MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS 315 (2003) (criticizing the use of
health claims and noting that since all foods and beverages contain some ingredients
that are essential for life, almost any food has the potential for being marketed for its
health benefits).
118. See, e.g., Clement Dimitri Pappas, Maintaining a Level Playing Field: The Need for a
Uniform Standard to Evaluate Health Claims for Foods and Dietay Supplements, 57 FooD c
DRUG L.J. 25, 27 (2002) (implying the FDA faced intense pressure in the 1980s as
more scientific studies began to show a connection between diet and chronic
disease).
119. See Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act, Definitions; Generally; 21 U.S.C.
§ 321 (2004).
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began making health claims for foods without requesting FDA ap-
proval, 120 FDA published in 1987 a proposed rule addressing health
claims.1 21 In 1990, FDA published a proposed regulation to establish
rules for health claims for foods that was published again by FDA in
1990.122
Shortly after the 1990 proposed rule, Congress passed the Nutri-
tion Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA), authorizing FDA to
allow certain health claims to appear in food labeling.123 Pursuant to
the Act, FDA was to evaluate health claims using a standard of signifi-
cant scientific agreement, which required that a sufficient body of
sound, relevant scientific evidence show consistency across different
studies and among different researchers. 124
In 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held in Pearson v. Shalala that FDA's denial of four health
claims on dietary supplements violated the First Amendment. 125 The
court held that FDA was required, under commercial speech doctrine,
to consider whether inclusion of appropriate disclaimers would ne-
gate the potentially misleading nature of health claims. 126 The court
also found that FDA's failure to define the phrase "significant scien-
tific agreement" in its regulation governing the authorization of
health claims violated the Administrative Procedure Act.127 Despite
urging from the food industry to apply the Pearson decision to conven-
tional foods, FDA implemented the Pearson decision only with respect
to dietary supplements.' 28 This dichotomy effectively created differ-
ent standards for foods and dietary supplements, subjecting FDA to
some pointed criticism. 29
120. See, e.g., Pappas, supra note 118 (discussing the successful efforts of Kellogg
Company to get permission from the Federal Trade Commission and the National
Cancer Institute to list the health benefits of consuming bran on its cereal packaging,
a move that was against FDA regulations at the time and helped lead to the agency's
increased willingness to consider the allowance of qualified health claims).
121. See Food Labeling: Public Health Messages on Food Labels and Labeling, 52
Fed. Reg. 28,843 (proposed Aug. 4, 1987).
122. Food Labeling; Health Messages and Statements; Reproposed Rule, 55 Fed.
Reg. 5,176 (proposed Feb. 13, 1990, codified at 21 C.F.R. § 101 (2005)).
123. Nutrition Labeling and Health Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-535, 104
Stat. 3562 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
124. See 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2004).
125. See 164 F.3d 650 (U.S. App. D.C. 1998).
126. See id. at 655-60.
127. See id. at 660-61.
128. See Public Meeting Concerning Implementation of Pearson Court Decision
and Whether Claims of Effects on Existing Diseases May Be Made as Health Claims,
65 Fed. Reg. 14,219 (Mar. 16, 2000).
129. See generally Pappas, supra note 118.
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In December 2002, FDA changed its policy. The agency an-
nounced that it was updating its approach to implementing the Pear-
son decision to include conventional foods, in addition to dietary
supplements.130 FDA also announced that it would evaluate health
claims for dietary supplements and conventional foods using a weight-
of-the-scientific-evidence standard, which is less stringent that the sig-
nificant-scientific-standard.131 FDA also established a task force to
help determine how the agency should evaluate scientific evidence for
qualified health claims and to develop an overall framework for the
regulations.1 32
Six days after the announcement of FDA's change in policy, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in Whitaker v. Thompson
held that in interpreting Pearson, the "credible evidence" standard, an
even lower standard than the weight-of-the-scientific-evidence stan-
dard, was the appropriate standard for FDA to apply in evaluating
qualified health claims.1 33 As in Pearson, the Whitaker case on its facts
specifically involved dietary supplements, not conventional food.134
In July 2003, in a notice published in the Federal Register, FDA
announced the availability of the task force report and the availability
of two guidance documents that stated in light of Whitaker, the weight-
of-the-evidence standard set forth in the December guidance "must be
tempered by the test of credible evidence. 1 35 The July guidance also
asserts FDA's authority to permit a qualified health claim for conven-
tional food where supported by credible evidence.13 6 As of Septem-
ber 2003, FDA has implemented on an interim basis an evidence-
based-ranking system and a set of procedures for qualified health
claims, suggested by the task force report identified in the earlier July
guidance.1 3 7 The evidence-ranking system assigns a final rank to the
130. See Guidance for Industry: Qualified Health Claims in the Labeling of Conven-
tional Foods and Dietary Supplements; Availability, 67 Fed. Reg. 78,002 (Dec. 20,
2002).
131. See, e.g., Release of Task Force Report; Guidance for Industry and FDA: Interim
Evidence-Based Ranking System for Scientific Data; Interim Procedures for Health
Claims on the Labeling of Conventional Human Foods and Human Dietary Supple-
ments; Availability, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,387 (July 9, 2003).
132. See id.
133. See 248 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.C. 2002).
134. See id.
135. See Release of Task Force Report, 68 Fed. Reg. at 41,388-89.
136. See id.
137. See Health Claims: General Requirements, 21 C.F.R. § 101.14 (2004); Petitions
for Health Claims, 21 C.F.R. § 101.70 (2004).
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evidence in support of the health claim and accommodates the use of
disclaimers and clarifying language1 38
This new rule is not uniformly endorsed. The Federal Trade
Commission, as well as numerous health and consumer groups have
raised concerns about the clarity of these new rules.139 The FDA's
rule changes are also being challenged in a law suit filed by two con-
sumer groups: the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI)140
and Public Citizen.1 41 In September 2003, CSPI and Public Citizen
filed a complaint, alleging that the NLEA requires health claims on
food to be backed up by the significant-scientific-agreement stan-
dard.142 The suit alleges also that FDA is ignoring laws requiring the
agency to respond to public comments and to justify its decisions re-
garding new health claims.143
In April 2004, walnuts became the first conventional food for
which FDA formally approved a qualified health claim.' 44 FDA deter-
mined that the walnut claim could be stated as follows:
Supportive but not conclusive research shows that eating 1.5 oz. (a
little more than a handful) of walnuts per day as part of a low satu-
rated fat and low cholesterol diet, and not resulting in increased
138. See Release of Task Force Report, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,387, 41,389.
139. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Staff Provides FDA With Com-
ment on Permitting Health Claims for More Foods (July 30, 2004), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/07/fdacomment.htm; How Qualified Are Health Claims for
Food?, HARv. HEALTH LETTER, Dec. 1, 2004.
140. The Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) is a non-profit consumer
education and advocacy organization that conducts research and represents con-
sumer interests in food safety and nutrition before Congress and federal government
agencies. See, e.g., Center for Science in the Public Interest, About CSPI, at http://
www.cspinet.org/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2005); Complaint for Declara-
tory and Injunctive Relief, CSPI et. al. v. FDA, No. CV-01962 (D. D.C. filed Sept. 23,
2003), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/compl-3.8xx.pdf.
141. Public Citizen is a non-profit consumer advocacy organization that promotes
consumer health and safety through research and public education on matters in-
cluding food, drugs, and health care delivery systems. See Public Citizen, About Public
Citizen, at http://www.publiccitizen.org/about/; Complaint for Declaratory and In-
junctive Relief, CSPI et. al. v. FDA, No. CV-01962 (D. D.C. filed Sept. 23, 2003), availa-
ble at http://www.citizen.org/documents/compl-3.8xx.pdf.
142. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, CSPI et. al. v. FDA, No.CV-
01962 (D. D.C. filed Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
compl-3.8xx.pdf.
143. See id.
144. See Letter from Laura Tarantino, Acting Director, Office of Nutritional Prod-
ucts, Labeling and Dietary Supplements, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutri-
tion, FDA, to Sarah E. Taylor, Covington & Burling (Mar. 9, 2004), available at http://
www.cfsan.fda.gov/%7Edms/qhcnuts3.html.
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caloric intake, may reduce the risk of coronary heart disease. See
nutrition information for fat (and calorie) content. 145
This first qualified health claim was heralded by food marketers, espe-
cially those in the walnut industry, who claimed that "[w] alnuts are a
powerful weapon in the battle against heart disease."' 4 6 Critics were
troubled not necessarily by the walnut qualified health claim itself, but
by the fear that health claims "for which there are limited data and
inconclusive evidence, will start appearing."'
47
2. Two New Qualified Health Claims: Omega-3 Fatty Acids and
Olive Oil
(a) Omega-3 Fatty Acids
In September 2004, FDA formally approved a second qualified
health claim. 148 FDA announced that it would allow producers of
foods containing omega-3 fatty acids to make qualified health claims
on food labels.' 49 The new rule allows the makers and marketers of
foods that contain eicosapentaenoic acid (EPA) and docosahexaeo-
noic acid (DHA) omega-3 fatty acids to add labels making qualified
health claims stating these acids may reduce the risk of coronary heart
disease.1 5 0 FDA's approved phrasing states that "supportive but not
conclusive research shows that consumption of EPA and DHA omega-
3 fatty acids may reduce the risk of heart disease. One serving of [x]
food provides [x] grams of EPA and DHA omega-3 fatty acids."' 51 In
2000 FDA allowed a similar health claim to be added to the labels of
dietary supplements containing EPA and DHA omega-3 fatty acids.
1 52
145. See id.; see also Squires, supra note 116.
146. See, e.g., Lawrence Linder, Health Claims Rest on Inconclusive Data, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 7, 2004 (quoting an official from walnut-marketer Diamond of Califor-
nia), available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/health-science/articles/2004/
09/07/healthclaims rest on inconclusive-data/.
147. See id.
148. See Press Release, Food and Drug Admin., FDA Announces Qualified Health




151. See id. The label also tells consumers to look at additional nutrition informa-
tion to see the total fat, saturated fat, and cholesterol content of the product. See id.
152. See FDA Announces Qualified Health Claims, supra note 148. FDA also recom-
mends that no more than two grams of these acids should come from dietary supple-
ments. See id. At the time, FDA also warned against consuming more than three
grams of these acids every day. See id.
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Omega-3 fatty acids are most frequently found in oily fish such as
salmon, tuna, lake trout, and herring. These acids can also be found
in other foods as well, 153 but the regulation forbids food producers
from adding omega-3 fatty acids to otherwise unhealthy foods simply
to make the health claim. Most foods must also be low in cholesterol




In November 2004, FDA announced the allowance of an addi-
tional qualified health claim 155 related to the benefits of consuming
olive oil. 156 The new claim coincided with the agency's recommenda-
tion that consumers wishing to reduce their risk of coronary heart
disease replace foods high in saturated fat with the monounsaturated
fat from olive oil and olive oil-containing foods. 15 7 FDA approved
phrasing for the new labeling reads:
Limited and not conclusive scientific evidence suggests that eating
about 2 tablespoons (23 grams) of olive oil daily may reduce the risk
of coronary heart disease due to the mono-unsaturated fat in olive
oil. To achieve this possible benefit, olive oil is to replace a similar
amount of saturated fat and not increase the total number of calo-
ries you eat in a day. One serving of this product [Name of food]
contains [x] grams of olive oil.
158
While foods bearing this claim will not be held to the low fat and
low saturated fat requirement applied to omega-3 fatty acid claims,
159
foods that are higher in saturated fat must direct consumers to "see
nutritional information for saturated fat content."160 Foods must
153. See id.
154. See Squires, supra note 116. (noting that fish and dietary supplements are ex-
empted from the low cholesterol and low saturated fat requirements).
155. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
156. See Press Release, Food and Drug Admin., FDA Allows Qualified Health Claim




159. See supra. note 154 and accompanying text.
160. See Letter from the Food and Drug Administration's Center for Food Safety
and Applied Nutrition's Office of Nutritional Products, Labeling and Dietary Supple-
ments, to Bob Bauer, North American Olive Oil Association, formally titled Letter
Responding to Health Claim Petition dated August 28, 2003: Monounsaturated Fatty
Acids from Olive Oil and Coronary Heart Disease (Nov. 1, 2004), available at http://
www.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/qhcolive.html.
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also be relatively low in cholesterol to meet the claim's require-
ments.
16 1
E. FDA & USDA Present Joint Effort to Combat Salmonella in Eggs
USDA and FDA combined forces in September 2004 to distribute
a proposed rule for combating Salmonella Enteritidis (salmonella) in
eggs. 162 Salmonella is a food borne disease that can cause severe dis-
comfort, and in some cases death. 163 High-risk populations-the very
young, the very old, or anyone with pre-existing illness or reduced
immunity-are especially vulnerable. 164 The Centers for Disease Con-
trol has identified salmonella as a public health problem since 1986,
when an outbreak in at least seven states sickened more than 3,000
people. 165 Since then, the number of reported salmonella incidents
have either declined and increased, depending on the geographical
region and period of time.166 It is estimated that 118,000 illnesses per
year are caused by consumption of salmonella-contaminated eggs.167
Unlike past outbreaks of salmonella, evidence shows that current
cases of salmonella are being transmitted through intact and healthy
looking eggs. This is because the disease infects the ovaries of hens
which means salmonella is entering the structures of eggs before they
are formed.
68
Federal regulation of eggs is complex. Multiple agencies and
multiple laws govern the safety and quality of eggs and egg prod-
ucts.' 69 Agencies involved in regulating eggs, from the hen to the
consumer, include FDA and numerous agencies within USDA, includ-
161. See id.; see also Specific Requirements for Nutrient Content Claims, 21 C.F.R.
§ 101.62(d) (2004) (giving the specific requirements for general labeling claims re-
lated to cholesterol).
162. See Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, 69
Fed. Reg. 56,824 (proposed Sept. 22, 2004).
163. See Ctr. for Disease Control Div. of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, Salmonella
Enteritidis: Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/disease
info/salmentg.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
164. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), FOOD SAFETY. U.S. NEEDS A CONSIS-
TENT FARM-To-TABLE APPROACH To EGG SAFETY, at 28 (1999).
165. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOOD SAFETY AND QUALITY. SALMONELLA
CONTROL EFFORTS SHOW NEED FOR MORE COORDINATION, at 10 (1992).
166. See Sandra B. Eskin, Putting All of Your Eggs in One Basket: Egg Safety and the Case
for a Single Food Safety Agency, 59 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 441 (2004).
167. Press Release, Food and Drug Admin., FDA Proposes Further Action to Im-
prove Farm-to-Table Shell Egg Safety (Sept. 20, 2004), available at http://www.fda.
gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01 117.html.
168. See Eskin, supra note 166, at 445-46.
169. See id. at 444.
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ing, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS), Agricul-
tural Marketing Service (AMS), and Food Safety Inspection Service
(FSIS).170 These agencies may operate under the Egg Inspection
Act 171 and various federal programs and state laws. 172 Such fragmen-
tation has exposed the nation's egg safety efforts to criticism for lack-
ing focus and for containing gaps, inconsistencies, and
inefficiencies.
173
The joint effort by USDA and FDA is an attempt to coordinate in
seeking to identify farm-to-table actions that will decrease the food
safety risks associated with eggs. 174 The proposed egg safety rules
would call for increased safety education, refrigeration requirements,
and specific cleaning and disinfecting processes for farms that have
tested positive for salmonella. 175 One of the key provisions in the pro-
posed rule would be an increase in the testing of eggs for infection at
the farm level, and another key provision requires the creation of a
bio-terrorism security program for eggs to be implemented in the fu-
ture.176 The two agencies also released final versions of rules related
to recordkeeping in December; these new rules will go into effect in
February 2005.177
IV. RECENT ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
A. FTC Settles Dispute with KFC Corporation Over False Advertising
Claims
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has primary responsibility for
regulating the advertising and other marketing practices associated
with FDA regulated products, including food.178 In September 2004,
FTC finalized a settlement with KFC Corporation, owner of the inter-
170. See FOOD SAFETY-. U.S. NEEDS A CONSISTENT FARM-To-TABLE APPROACH, sup-a
note 164.
171. See Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 1031 et. seq. (2004).
172. See FooD SAFETY: U.S. NEEDS A CONSISTENT FARM-To-TABLE APPROACH, supra
note 164.
173. See id.
174. See Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, 69
Fed. Reg. 56,824, 56,832 (Sept. 22, 2004).
175. See Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, 69
Fed. Reg. 56,824, 56,834 (Sept. 22, 2004).
176. See Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, 69
Fed. Reg. 56,824 at 56,834-38 (Sept. 22, 2004).
177. See generally Establishment and Maintenance of Records Under the Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 69 Fed.
Reg. 71,561 (Dec. 9, 2004).
178. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 52, 55 (2004).
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national restaurant chain Kentucky Fried Chicken, in a dispute over
health-related claims the company had made in advertisements for its
food. 179 FTC claimed the advertisements in question promoted the
supposed health and weight loss benefits of fried chicken in a mislead-
ing manner.18 0 The agency offered evidence that KFC had stated two
KFC chicken breasts contained less fat than a Burger King Whopper,
and had also implied eating KFC's fried chicken was compatible with
various branded diet plans and other attempts to lose weight.',, In
reality, two of the restaurant's breaded chicken breasts have slightly
less fat than the Whopper but contain higher levels of trans fat, so-
dium, cholesterol, and calories.'
8 2
As part of the final settlement order KFC agreed to stop running
the advertisements and not to make similar health claims in the fu-
ture. 8 3 The settlement also barred the company from claiming its
chicken has any health benefits or comparing the nutritional content
of its chicken to that of other foods.' 8 4 The agency stated the agree-
ment was part of its cooperation with a recent government-wide effort
to fight the rise of obesity in America.
8 5
V. RECENT CASE DECISIONS
A. Government Regulation of Egg Safety and Taking of Private Property
In June 2004, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit va-
cated and remanded a case in which the lower court held that the
government's attempt to restrict the sale of contaminated eggs consti-
tuted a "taking" of private property and awarded millions of dollars in
179. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, KFC's Claims That Fried Chicken is a
Way to "Eat Better" Don't Fly (June 13, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2004/06/kfccorp.htm. The settlement agreement was announced in June, and after
a period of public comment it was finalized without changes on September 17, 2004.
180. See id.; see also Complaint of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter
of KFC Corporation (F.T.C. 2004) (No. G-4118).
181. See KFC's Claims Don't Fly, supra note 179; see also Editorial, KFC Blunders in
'Health' Ads, ADVRTISING AGE, Nov. 3, 2003, at 22 (calling the ads in question "as
laughable, and as damaging, as any we can imagine or recall, and [ ] should be pulled
off the air immediately. In the long history of absurd, misleading and ludicrous ad
claims, the campaign's positioning of KFC's breaded, fried chicken as a part of a
healthy diet merits special derision").
182. See Complaint of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of KFC
Corporation (F.T.C. 2004) (No. C-4118).
183. See Decision and Order of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter
of KFC Corporation (F.T.C. 2004) (No. C-4118).
184. See id.
185. See KFC's Claims Don't Fly, supra note 179.
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damages.18 6 This case poses several interesting elements of modern
agriculture and food production: a family-owned business that has
evolved into a highly integrated egg production enterprise, a food
safety concern that has widespread health implications, and govern-
ment regulation and action that significantly disrupts the enterprise.
1. Facts and Background of the Case
Rose Acre is a family-owned business, albeit one of the largest egg
producers in the nation, based in Seymour, Indiana.18 7 It is primarily
engaged in the production of table eggs, which are raw poultry eggs
sold in their shellsi s88 Rose Acre is a highly integrated table-egg pro-
duction business consisting of eight layer-hen farms with millions of
hens. 189
Increasing concern of Salmonella Enteritidis (salmonella) led to
interim regulations in 1990 that restricted the interstate sale and
transportation of eggs and poultry from flocks determined under the
regulations to be salmonella-contaminated. 190 After the interim regu-
lations took effect, salmonella outbreaks were traced to each of the
three Rose Acre farms. 191 The government required that Rose Acre
depopulate, clean, and disinfect the infected houses and then have
those houses pass USDA inspection.1 92 For a period of twenty-five
months, Rose Acre was unable to sell eggs as table eggs from one or
more of the three farms.193 The trial court determined that the gov-
ernment action constituted a regulatory taking of the hens and
awarded millions of dollars in damages, including attorney fees and
expenses.194
2. Analysis
The issue on appeal before the Federal Circuit Court was whether
under the United States Supreme Court's test in Pennsylvania Coal
Compny v. Mahon'95 the egg and poultry regulation went far enough
186. See Rose Acre Farms v. United States, 373 F.3d 1177 (2004).
187. See id. at 1179.
188. See id. at 1179-80.
189. See id. at 1180.
190. See, e.g., Salmonella Enteritidis in Eggs, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,502-11 (Food Safety
and Inspection Serv.) (May 19, 1998) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 59).
191. See Rose Acre Farms, 373 F.3d at 1182.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 1183.
195. See 260 U.S. 393, 413-15 (1922).
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to be recognized as a taking. 196 Pennsylvania Coal noted that in a regu-
latory taking claim arising from a public program, the test is to "deter-
mine whether justice and fairness require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. 1 97 A
three-factor balancing test was then developed to determine whether
there is a regulatory takings claim: first, the "economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant;" second, "the extent to which the regula-
tion has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations;"
and, third, "the character of the governmental action."
98
The Federal Circuit Court held that the trial court erred in its
application of the first and third factors of the regulatory-takings test
that was explained in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New
York. 199 The court found that the evidence cited by the trial court did
not appropriately gauge the severity of the economic impact of the
regulations on Rose Acre as a whole operation, as opposed to each
independent hen house.200 Thus, the fact that 57.5 million dozen of
Rose Acre's eggs from each of the hen houses were, as a result of the
restrictions, diverted for sale at less than Rose Acre's average total cost
of production, was not enough.201 The court noted that while some
of the eggs on some of the Rose Acre farms suffered a reduction in
value, the impact on its operations was relatively brief-approximately
two years-after which Rose Acre reverted to its pre-regulation table-
egg sales levels.20 2 The court instructed the trial court to determine
on remand, by combining the three farms together, whether the eco-
nomic impact is best measured by a value decline or profitability de-
crease caused by the restrictions.20 3
The court also found that the trial court erred in its analysis of
the character of the government's action.204 The trial court had mis-
givings about the regulations, based on its finding that a less-burden-
some egg testing scheme was feasible. 20 5 The court found, however,
that the regulatory means of the government were consistent with the
196. See Rose Acre Farms, 373 F.3d at 1183-84.
197. See id. at 1184.
198. See id.; citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
199. See Rose Acre Farms, 373 F.3d at 1184-91.
200. See id. at 1188-89, 1195-98.
201. See id. at 1184, 1198.
202. See id. at 1185.
203. See id. at 1196.
204. See Rose Acre Farms, 373 F.3d at 1192-95.
205. See id. at 1193.
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knowledge the government possessed at the time they were adopted
or applied against Rose Acre. 20 6
B. Location of Open-Air Field Tests of Biopharmaceutical Crops
In August 2004, a federal district court issued a ruling ordering
USDA to disclose locations of open-air field tests in Hawaii of "bi-
opharmaceutical" crops genetically modified to produce industrial
chemicals and drugs. 207 Ruling that locations do not qualify as confi-
dential business information, the court found that defendants USDA
and Biotechnology Industry Organization 2°8 had failed to provide suf-
ficient evidence that revealing the location of the open-field trials
would cause damage specifically in Hawaii via theft of the seeds or
plants by competing companies or vandalism by opponents of the bio-
technology industry.20 9 The court gave USDA ninety days from the
date of the order to demonstrate that releasing the locations to the
public would cause irreparable harm.
210
The order raises the interesting issue of how geographic-specific
the evidence must be showing irreparable harm. The court was not
persuaded by evidence of past commercial arrogation and destruction
of crop fields and biotechnology companies in other parts of the
world.211 In the event that disclosing the location of field-test sites
leads to actual harm, it will be interesting to watch whether other
courts follow the decision made by the Hawaii court in this case.
VI. INTERESTING DEVELOPMENTS AND PENDING LEGISLATION
A. Proposed Legislation: The National Uniformity for Food Act
The proposed National Uniformity for Food Act 212 presents sev-
eral potential amendments to the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act
(FDCA).213 These amendments would strengthen the FDCA's ability
to nullify state or local government food safety and labeling require-
ments whenever those requirements ask companies to adhere to stan-
206. See id. at 1194.
207. See Center for Food Safety v. Veneman, No. 03-00621 (D. Haw. Aug. 3, 2004).
208. Biotechnology Industry Organization filed as an intervener in the case. See id.
at 6.
209. See id. at 10.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 9.
212. See H.R. 2699, 108th Cong. (2004).
213. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2004); see also PETER BARTON HuTr & RacHARD A. MER-
RILL, FOOD & DRUG LAW 10 (2d ed. 1991) (stating the FDCA establishes the basic legal
framework for controlling the activities of food producers).
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dards that go beyond what is required at the federal level.2 14 The new
act would also prohibit additional warning requirements on food
products, although the proposal does provide for emergency
exceptions.
2 1 5
The proposed act allows for a lengthy petition process, during
which individual states can petition the Secretary of DHHS for a
waiver or lobby for FDA to adopt their food safety requirements in-
stead.2 16 While industry advocates have praised the proposed Act as
another progressive step towards establishing national food safety
standards, 2 17 some consumer groups argue the Act will significantly
reduce the power of state and local health departments and food
safety agencies.
2 18
The Act was initially introduced in 2003 by Representative Rich-
ard M. Burr, a Republican from North Carolina. The bill listed 164
cosponsors by the end of the 108th Congress, but the congressional
session ended before it was brought to a vote. 219
B. Agencies Launch Programs Aimed at Combating False or Deceptive
Claims in Weight-Loss Advertisements
FTC announced a new initiative in November that is aimed at
fighting deceptive advertising efforts regarding weight-loss products.
In addition to targeting companies who create the advertisements, the
new initiative plans to discourage media outlets from carrying adver-
tisements that make deceptive weight-loss claims and encourage them
214. See H.R. 2699(2) (a); 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2004) (stating the current law, which
allows for some federal preemption of state and local requirements).
215. See H.R. 2699(2)(b).
216. See H.R. 2699.
217. See, e.g., White Paper, Grocery Manufacturer's of America, National Uniformity
for Food Act: Background and Analysis, available at http://www.gmabrands.com/pub-
licpolicy/docs/whitepaper.cfm?DocID=606; see also Hurr & MERRILL, supra note 213,
at 986-94 (discussing the history of the movement for creating uniform food laws, and
offering samples of various arguments related to the issue).
218. See, e.g., Letter from Jean Halloran, Director, Consumer Policy Institute, to a
Congressional Representative, formally tided National Uniformity for Food Act: Uniformly
a Disaster for Consumers (Sept. 28, 2004), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/
pub/core-foodsafety/001400.html#more (worrying that "states will spend time and
money wrangling with the [FDA], or worse, in court litigating, over whether or not
their current laws are identical to federal laws, rather than protecting their citizens").
219. See H.R. 2699 (listing 164 Republicans and 38 Democrats, representing at least
39 states, among the bill's cosponsors).
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to educate the public about deceptive claims.220 FTC has named the
program "Operation Big Fat Lie," launching its campaign by filing ac-
tions against six companies in courts around the country.221
The announcement came during a time when FTC increasingly
seems to be interested in false or deceptive weight-loss claims. 222 In
addition to the action taken against Kentucky Fried Chicken last sum-
mer,223 the agency also charged three Florida companies with decep-
tive advertising in its marketing of Pedia Loss, a weight-loss
supplement aimed at children. 224 During the six-month period cov-
ered by this update, FTC also filed complaints against numerous other
companies who made false, misleading, or unsubstantiated claims re-
lated to the weight-loss benefits of their products.225 In addition to
administrative complaints, the agency also won at least one case
against weight-loss companies in federal court.226
FTC's campaign announcement complemented a FDA an-
nouncement in November of 2004 of three major regulatory initia-
tives designed to further implement the Dietary Supplement Health
220. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Launches "Big Fat Lie" Initiative
Targeting Bogus Weight-Loss Claims (Nov. 9, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2004/1 1/bigfatliesweep.htm.
221. See id. (stating that complaints had been filed in California, Connecticut, Flor-
ida, Illinois, New York, and Maine against companies marketing a variety of products
claiming to help consumers lose weight).
222. See FTC Goes On Offensive Against Overblown Weight Loss Claims, DRUG INDUS.
DAILY, Nov. 12, 2004 (noting FTC has been steadily increasing its oversight of the
dietary supplement industry, and the agency had banned ephedra in early 2004).
223. See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text.
224. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Challenges Ads for Kids' Weight
Loss Pill (June 16, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/06/dynamic
health.htm.
225. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Ads for Various Diet Supplements
and Topical Gels Don't Cut the Fat, Says the FTC (June 16, 2004) (charging a Utah
company and its affiliates with marketing numerous false claims, including some for
products containing illegal ingredients and some aimed at children), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/06/dietsupp.htm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n,
FTC Continues Campaign to Halt Deceptive Advertisements & Other Scams Aimed at
Hispanics (June 17, 2004) (initiating a law-enforcement action against a company that
claimed its pills would cause "permanent weight loss"), available at http://www.ftc.
gov/opa/2004/06/hispsweep.htm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Two Maine
Dietary Supplement Marketers Pay Nearly $1 Million to Settle FTC Deceptive Adver-
tising Complaints (Aug. 27, 2004) (announcing the punishment of companies that
had marketed "carb blocker" and "fat blocker" tablets by using unsubstantiated claims
and unrealistic promises of weight loss), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/
08/pvt.htm.
226. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Slim Down Solution: Problem
Solved (Oct. 19, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/11/slimdown.htm.
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and Education Act of 1994 (DSHEA).227 These initiatives include a
regulatory strategy, an open public meeting, and a draft guidance doc-
ument for the industry.2 28 The initiatives are viewed as sending a mes-
sage to marketers that claims about the benefits of dietary
supplements must be truthful and substantiated by scientific evi-
dence. 229 In October 2004, FDA sent eight warning letters to dietary
supplement distributors that were making unsubstantiated claims for
dietary supplement products promoted for weight loss over the In-
ternet. 23 0 Also, on the same day it announced the initiatives, FDA sent
a letter to major retailers of dietary supplements to inform them that
products labeled with unsubstantiated claims are misbranded and that
FDA may take enforcement action against misbranded products in
their possession.
231
C. Government Committee Prepares New Dietary Guidelines to Be Released
in 2005
Every five years DHHS and USDA release new recommended di-
etary guidelines. 232 While the guidelines do not have any coercive ef-
fects on what foods are sold and consumed in the United States, they
are subject to intense scrutiny since they influence the types of foods
Americans choose to purchase and consume. 233 The thirteen mem-
227. See Press Release, Food and Drug Admin., FDA Announces Major Initiatives for
Dietary Supplements (Nov. 4, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/
news/2004/NEWO1 130.html.
228. See id.
229. See id. (quoting FTC Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras, who said the effort
sends a clear and strong reminder to marketers that claims about the bene-
fits of dietary supplements, wherever they appear, must be truthful and sub-
stantiated by high quality scientific evidence. Today's FDA action leaves no
doubt that our two agencies are united in our efforts to combat false or
unfounded claims. We look forward to continuing our close collaboration




232. See Announcement of the Availability of the Final Report of the Dietary Guide-
lines Committee, A Public Comment Period and a Public Meeting, 69 Fed. Reg.
52,697 (Aug. 27, 2004). The release of nutrition guidelines is mandated by the Na-
tional Nutrition Monitoring and Related Research Act. See 7 U.S.C. § 5301 (2004).
233. See David Feder, Building a New Food Pyramid... or Plate, or Whatever: The 2005
USDA Dietary Guidelines Are On Their Way With More Than the Recommended Allowance of
Controversy, FOOD PROCESSING, Oct. 1, 2004, at S14 (discussing the political process of
creating the dietary guidelines); Judith Weinraub, Redrawing the U.S. Roadmap to
Health: Revised Dietary Guidelines Expected to Have Major Impact, SUN-SENTINAL (Ft. Lau-
derdale, Fla.), Dec. 9, 2004, at 5 (originally published as Coming Soon: The Government's
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ber Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee met several times over the
last two years to study data and to hear comments from industry and
consumer groups who are concerned about the content of future
guidelines. 234 While the final 2005 guidelines were not released until
January 2005, the Committee's final report was published in late 2004
and contained nine phrases it labeled "key messages" for the future.
These messages encourage people to consume a variety of foods
within and among the basic food groups while staying within energy
needs; control calorie intake to manage body weight, be physically ac-
tive every day; increase daily intake of fruits and vegetables, whole
grains and non-fat or low-fat milk or milk products; choose fats wisely
for good health; choose carbohydrates wisely for good health; choose
and prepare foods with little salt; if you drink alcoholic beverages do
so in moderation; and keep food safe to eat.23 5 In addition to the key
messages, the guidelines were accompanied by a lengthy report cover-
ing detailed proposals for diet, nutrition and exercise
recommendations. 23 6
Revised Guidelines for Healthful Eating, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2004 at Fl); see also Emily
Heil, Critics See Food Pyramid With Lobbyists at the Top, CONG. DAILY, Sept. 21, 2004 (stat-
ing that "[f] ood lobbies representing large commodities - such as beef and sugar -
swarm around the process, as a prime spot on the pyramid can be a potent marketing
tool").
234. See, e.g., Judy Walker, Going with the Grain; They Came to New Orleans to Hatch a
Plot: To Get at Least Three Ounces of Whole Grains into Every American's Daily Diet, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 2. 2002 (discussing the efforts of the Whole Grains
Council and the Oldways Provision Trust to get increased grain consumption into the
2005 dietary guidelines); Raja Mishra, Soft Drink Industry Fighting a Possible Health Warn-
ing, CHARLESTON GAZET E, Dec. 1, 2004, at 12B (discussing the efforts of soft drink
industry lobbyists to have the connection between sugar-sweetened beverages and
weight gain removed from the proposed guidelines); Kay Ledbetter, Have Your Steak
and Eat It Too, AMARILLO GLOBE-NEws (Texas), Nov. 14, 2004 (previewing efforts of
beef enthusiasts to promote beef as a dietary guideline-approved food); Group Urges
Government to Give Realistic Nutrition Advice, OBESITY, FITNESS & WELLNESS WK., Oct. 23,
2004, at 985 (discussing efforts to get the committee to recommend dietary supple-
ments in the guidelines, and add a tenth key message stating "consider a daily multiv-
itamin"); see also Kim Krisberg, Emphasis on Sugar Intake Weakened in New Dietary
Guidelines, NATION'S HEALTH, Oct. 1, 2004, at 1 (lamenting the lack of recommenda-
tion for people to "reduce" sugar intake in the current version of the guidelines).
235. See Dep't of Health and Human Serv. And USDA, Executive Summary, 2005
Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee Report, available at http://www.health.gov/
dietaryguidelines/dga2005/report.
236. See id. For example, the report recommends that Americans increase their in-
take of oily fish which some scientific evidence indicates can help combat coronary
heart disease. See id.; see also supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
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D. FDA Proposal for Draft Guidance for Industry to New Plant Varieties
In November 2004, FDA announced the availability of a draft gui-
dance document entitled "Guidance for Industry: Recommendations
for the Early Food Safety Evaluation of New Non-Pesticidal Proteins
Produced by New Plant Varieties Intended for Food Use."23 7 The issu-
ance of draft guidance was proposed in August 2002 in a Federal Reg-
ister Notice published by the Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP) as part of proposed federal actions to update field test re-
quirements to establish early voluntary food safety evaluations for new
proteins produced by bioengineered plants. 238 The draft guidance
discusses the early food safety evaluation of new proteins in new plant
varieties, particularly in new bioengineered varieties that are under
development for possible use as food for humans or animals.
2 39
Under the proposal, developers would provide FDA with information
about the food safety of the new protein early in the development of
the crop.240 When a developer decides to commercialize a crop, the
developer would be expected to participate in FDA's voluntary pre-
market consultation process. 24 1 To date, all new plant varieties devel-
oped through biotechnology that are intended for food and feed mar-
keted in the United States have completed the consultation process
before they enter the market.
24 2
237. Draft Guidance for Industry: Recommendations for the Early Food Safety Eval-
uation of New Non-Pesticidal Proteins Produced by New Plant Varieties Intended for
Food Use; Availability, Action Notice, 69 Fed. Reg. 68,381-01 (Nov. 24, 2004); FooD
AND DRUG ADMIN. & CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EARLY FOOD SAFETY EVALUATION OF NEW NON-
PESTICIDAL PROTEINS PRODUCED BY NEW PLANT VARIETIES INTENDED FOR FOOD USE
(2004), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/bioprgui.html; see also Talk Pa-
per, Food and Drug Admin., FDA Proposes Draft Guidance for Industry for New Plant
Varieties Intended for Food Use, FDA Talk Paper (Nov. 19, 2004), available at http://
www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2004/ANS01327.html.
238. See Proposed Actions to Update Field Test Requirements for Biotechnology
Derived Plants and Establish Early Food Safety Assessments for New Proteins Pro-
duced by Such Plants, 67 Fed. Reg. 50,578-01 (Aug. 2, 2004).
239. See GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 237.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id.
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